US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA1296

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 001296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USAID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, WHA FOR DAS SHAPIRO, NSC 
FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR SHANNON 
 
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C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - (ADD ADDRESSEE) 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINR, EAID, CO 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE MEETS WITH USAID ADMINISTRATOR 
NATSIOS AND OTHER USDEL MEMBERS TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS 
CONFERENCE ON COLOMBIA 
 
REF: BOGOTA 1070 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY: President Uribe expressed his gratitude for 
U.S. support of Colombia during his February 3 meeting with 
USAID Administrator Natsios, before the opening of the 
International Donors Conference on Colombia in Cartagena.  In 
a wide ranging discussion, Uribe reviewed outstanding human 
rights cases stressing that he would not tolerate impunity in 
GOC public forces, reviewed the GOC draft law for truth, 
justice and reparations predicting that the Congress would 
adopt a new law by June, and discussed his expectations for 
the meeting scheduled later in the day with President Chavez. 
 Natsios congratulated Uribe on his own war on terrorism and 
expressed ongoing USG support for his efforts.  He also 
encouraged Uribe to do more on human rights.  Ambassador 
Wood, while reiterating the Secretary's remarks that 
reconciliation in Colombia was up to Colombians to decide, 
urged the GOC to reach consensus on a legal framework for the 
peace process to deal with those guilty of serious human 
rights crimes as soon as possible.  During the discussion on 
Chavez, DAS Shapiro reiterated U.S. support for Colombia and 
underscored that all of Colombia's neighbors needed to 
cooperate in the fight against terrorism and not allow their 
territories to be used by narco-terrorists like the FARC. 
(Note: Uribe developed an inner-ear infection later in the 
morning following his opening address at the conference 
forcing him to cancel his trip to Caracas.) END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) On February 3, prior to the opening of the 
international donors conference on Colombia in Cartagena, 
USAID Administrator Natsios met with President Uribe for 
breakfast at Casa de Huespedes.  The President was 
accompanied by Vice President Santos, Presidential Adviser 
Juan Lozano, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Camilo Reyes, 
Director of the Colombian Agency for International 
Cooperation Luis Alfonso Hoyos, Colombian Ambassador to the 
U.S. Luis Alberto Moreno, Director of Communications at Casa 
de Narino Jaime Bermudez, and representatives from the 
Defense and Interior/Justice ministries.  Also present was 
Ramon Crespo Morles, head of the Fundacion Convergencia 
Civica Nacional and a personal friend of the president's who 
planned to accompany him to Caracas to meet Chavez. 
Administrator Natsios was accompanied by Ambassador Wood, WHA 
DAS Shapiro, USAID director for Colombia and polcouns 
(notetaker). 
 
3. (C) Uribe opened by thanking Administrator Natsios and the 
rest of the USG for the steadfast support of Colombia. He 
underscored that the fight against narco-terrorism was a 
difficult one and that the GOC had experienced a setback on 
February 1 and 2 with FARC attacks in Narino and Putumayo 
departments.  Nonetheless, he was determined to carry on. 
Natsios said Colombia's progress against narco-terrorism was 
impressive; the country was succeeding.  He wondered early in 
the Uribe Administration whether the ambitious plans laid out 
by the president could be accomplished.  Now he had stopped 
wondering and wished many more like Uribe were leading 
developing countries.  President Bush, Secretary Rice and the 
USG would continue to support Colombia. 
 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
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4. (C) Administrator Natsios expressed support for President 
Uribe's efforts to address impunity and other human rights 
concerns but underscored that more needed to be done.  He 
asked for a status report on the Mapiripan, Cajamarca, 
Guaitarilla and Arauca cases.  Ambassador Wood added that the 
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U.S. needed movement on these cases for the upcoming 
certification which would release $32.5 million in 
assistance.  Uribe said that the Minister of Defense was 
working on these cases.  He referred to the ongoing trial of 
retired general Jaime Uscategui for his alleged inaction on 
the Mapiripan case.  He noted that the case goes back to 
1997, five years before his administration began.  On 
Cajamarca, he said there were no doubts. It was an accident 
that resulted in unfortunate civilian casualties by the armed 
forces.  On Guaitarilla, he remained upset and disappointed 
with the police and hoped that the final investigation would 
clarify the matter. On Arauca, the soldiers who committed the 
crime were now in jail.  Uribe stressed that he has 
repeatedly made it clear to the armed forces that he will not 
tolerate impunity. 
 
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARA DEMOBILIZATION 
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5. (C) Uribe raised the status of the GOC draft law for 
truth, justice and reparations. He planned to make four 
points about it in his opening remarks at the conference: (1) 
timing -- recent demobilizations had established a momentum 
and a track record that made it the right time to adopt a 
credible legal framework; (2) equilibrium -- there had to be 
a balance between justice and peace and the GOC draft had 
such a balance; (3) universality -- the law was designed to 
apply to paramilitaries and guerrillas alike; and (4) 
improving on past processes -- unlike past GOC peace 
initiatives, the draft law would deal with the issue of 
impunity.  Uribe reiterated that, with 11,000 individuals 
demobilized, including more than 6,000 paramilitaries, a 
genuine peace process was underway making it the right moment 
to advance a credible legal framework.  The need for a 
balance between justice and peace was important and that, 
unlike in the past, the GOC would not accept impunity in the 
name of peace.  On the question of universality, he said the 
same framework had to apply to both the paramilitaries and 
the guerrillas.  This was important because certain members 
of Congress would be inclined to be easier on the FARC and 
ELN if or when they demobilized.  He stressed that his 
administration would make every effort to reach consensus 
with sponsors of the other drafts, and predicted that a law 
would be adopted by Congress before the session ends in June. 
 
 
6. (C) DAS Shapiro inquired whether the GOC and the coalition 
of Senators from different parties led by Rafael Pardo could 
reach agreement.  Uribe responded that Minister of Interior 
and Justice Sabas Pretelt had informed him that an agreement 
was reached two to three nights before but then the Pardo 
Group returned to the table to say that a few of its members 
from the Liberal and Polo Democratico parties could not 
agree.  Subsequent signals from the negotiators suggested 
that an agreement was not yet firm but Uribe insisted he 
would circulate the GOC text on February 8 regardless. 
Congress would then have three versions of the bill to deal 
with.  Vice President Santos noted that there would be much 
political posturing between now and then. 
 
7. (C) Ambassador Wood said that the U.S. was trying hard not 
to express its views publicly on what should be in the law. 
The Secretary had said, when she was National Security 
Adviser, that reconciliation in Colombia was up to Colombians 
to decide.  Nonetheless, expectations were high and the 
sooner the executive and legislative branches reached 
consensus on a draft law, the better.  Uribe reiterated his 
seriousness about reaching consensus as soon as possible and 
his intention to follow the process closely, step by step. 
Administrator Natsios thanked Uribe for his commitment to 
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seeing the law through and reiterated the U.S. point of view 
that micro-managing the process from abroad, as certain NGOs 
and European countries wanted to do, was counterproductive. 
It was up to Colombians to decide how best to deliver peace 
in their own country. 
 
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MEETING WITH CHAVEZ 
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8. (C) (Note: Uribe was scheduled to meet with Chavez in 
Caracas later in the day.  An inner-ear infection that 
emerged several hours later forced him to postpone his trip 
to Caracas and his Feb. 7-11 trip to Madrid, Paris and 
Brussels.)  Uribe expected his meeting with Chavez to be 
difficult.  He was determined not to pre-judge the outcome of 
the Caracas meeting but acknowledged that Chavez operated on 
a double standard: he behaved one way in private and another 
way in public.  Uribe also worried about all the oil money 
Chavez had at his disposal.  To prevent "complicated 
discussions of sovereignty," Uribe said he would insist that 
the two governments cooperate on fighting terrorism.  Without 
such cooperation, more Granda-like incidents would occur.  If 
Chavez brought the U.S. into the discussion, Uribe planned to 
respond that the U.S. was Colombia's ally and friend whose 
help had been genuine and concrete rather than just rhetoric, 
and that all his neighbors should follow the example.  Uribe 
expressed irritation at a recent public statement by Chavez 
that Colombia was producing guerrillas because it had a 
market economy. Uribe said he was going to ask a journalist 
to plant a question (for the first time, he claimed) about 
the remark in the news conference so he could respond to 
Chavez.  He was not going to tolerate criticism of Colombia's 
economic model.  Natsios reiterated that Uribe was on the 
right path and using exactly the right model.  It was Chavez 
who had it wrong. The absence of true free markets 
contributed to the growth of guerrilla movements. 
 
9. (C) DAS Shapiro added that Uribe could continue to count 
on U.S. support and that all Colombia's neighbors needed to 
cooperate in the fight against terrorism.  No nation should 
allow its territory to be used by guerrilla groups.  The GOC 
should seek all available measures, such as drawing on the 
OAS resolution that followed the 2003 Nogal bombing, to 
secure such commitments from its neighbors. 
 
10. (C) Uribe reiterated his gratitude for U.S. support on 
the Colombian-Venezuela matter and insisted that he would not 
downplay it in his dealings with regional interlocutors.  In 
that regard, he raised Fidel Castro, noting his help with 
Chavez.  Uribe insisted that Castro "showed a real interest 
in solving the problem."  That said, he also continued to be 
clear with Castro regarding the case of narco-trafficker 
Hernando Gomez Bustamante (aka "Rasguno") whom the Cubans had 
detained and Castro agreed to extradite to Colombia on the 
condition that he not be extradited to the U.S.  Uribe said 
he refused to accept Castro's deal, telling the Cuban that he 
would not back away from his commitment to the U.S. on 
extraditions. Hence, said Uribe, the Cubans decided to 
commence legal proceedings against Rasguno in Cuba.  Uribe 
also noted Castro's help in the past with the ELN, which had 
produced some movement. 
WOOD