US embassy cable - 05ANKARA777

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, TU, CY, MT 
SUBJECT: NATO-EU COOPERATION: STILL HOSTAGE TO CYPRUS 
 
REF: A. STATE 19853 
 
     B. ANKARA 373 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Turkey will not change its position on 
NATO-EU cooperation absent ROC concessions on the Cyprus 
issue, including measures to help the Turkish Cypriots.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador delivered ref a demarche Feb. 9 to MFA 
Deputy Under Secretary for Multilateral Political Affairs 
Nabi Sensoy.  Ambassador urged the GOT to think creatively 
about possible solutions in order to ensure that certain 
European countries are not able to use this issue to drive 
NATO and the EU further apart.  President Bush's 
participation in the Feb. 22 NATO Summit would be an 
especially good setting to deliver the news that this issue 
is at least partly behind us. 
 
3. (C) Sensoy responded that with the Feb. 22 summit 
approaching the GOT had expedited its interagency discussion 
on this issue.  While Turkey places great importance on the 
transatlantic link and on its relationship with the EU, 
Sensoy said, "I can't give you good news."  While as of Dec. 
17 Turkey may have gained official status as entering formal 
accession negotiations with the EU, the experience of the EU 
summit itself and the lack of any significant action to 
ameliorate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) since 
May of last year make it impossible for Turkey to contemplate 
making an opening on this issue.  Given the current 
situation, Sensoy added, it would be premature even to 
discuss the possible areas for NATO-EU discussion outlined in 
ref a non-paper. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador responded that we don't want to see a 
situation where the Cyprus problem creates "collateral 
damage," such as NATO-EU cooperation.  With several issues 
related to Cyprus piling up at once--NATO-EU cooperation, 
Cyprus' application for bodies such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the Ankara Agreement extension protocol--Turkey 
runs the risk that many in the international community will 
again view Turkey as it did before 2004: as THE obstacle on 
all issues related to Cyprus.  If we were to see a positive 
step on Cyprus--for example if the ROC were to remove its 
block to EU aid and trade for the Turkish Cypriots--would 
Ankara be ready to move on this issue? 
 
5. (C) Sensoy said he was "not in a position" to say that 
this would make a difference.  The key, he pointed out, was 
that Turkish politicians would need to see real progress for 
themselves, progress they could also display to the Turkish 
people.  Absent such movement, why should Turkey feel 
obligated to move first? 
 
6. (C) Ambassador also discussed the issue Feb. 8 with 
Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul as Gonul prepared to depart for 
the Nice Defense Ministerial.  Gonul responded that the GOT 
must first see movement from the EU on Cyprus before it can 
make any concession on NATO-EU cooperation.  Feelings about 
Cyprus in Turkey are running so high now, he said, that to 
make any concession absent any action from the EU could 
derail Turkey's EU candidacy. 
 
7. (C) In addition to the Ambassador's efforts, PoMilCouns 
called on Deputy DG for Security Policy Fatih Ceylan Feb. 8 
to discuss ref a demarche.  Ceylan confirmed (as reported ref 
b) that the Turkish MFA has presented some ideas for 
compromise to the GOT, but the decision on NATO-EU 
cooperation is now both politicized and political.  Turkey's 
political leadership is grappling with two competing policy 
priorities: increasing NATO-EU cooperation and dealing with 
the EU's lack of progress on aid and trade for northern 
Cyprus.  Ceylan (please protect) candidly stated that the 
battle within the GOT is between the Cyprus hard-liners and 
the Atlanticists.  PolMilCouns noted that we continue to seek 
creative thinking on this issue.  Ceylan responded that even 
if Turkey were to decide to allow Cyprus and Malta to 
participate in NATO-EU security cooperation discussions, the 
topics could not cover any Berlin Plus issue, i.e., any topic 
which would include NATO operational planning. 
 
8. (C) Comment: The MFA has firmly linked NATO-EU cooperation 
to ROC concessions on Cyprus and measures to help the TCs. 
Ceylan's comments suggest the GOT understands the stakes and 
is therefore wrestling with this issue; Sensoy's indicate 
that the hard-liners are still on top.  Unfortunately, we 
cannot share ref a's view that Turkey's post-Dec. 17 status 
has changed the Turks' perspective on this issue.  Indeed, it 
may even have hardened.  As we noted ref b and Sensoy told 
the Ambassador, the Turks still have a bitter taste in their 
mouths regarding how the EU handled Cyprus at the Dec. 16-17 
EU summit and the lack of measures to help the TCs.  Sensoy 
made clear that Turkey feels betrayed by the international 
community--and especially the EU--for this lack of progress. 
We predict no movement on this issue from Ankara at least 
until and unless the EU can convince the ROC to stop blocking 
measures to assist the north. 
EDELMAN