US embassy cable - 05MADRID515

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000515 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, SP 
SUBJECT: INCREASED SPANISH ENGAGEMENT WITH CUBA 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 0555 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary. Regional leader and Socialist Party (PSOE) 
President Manuel Chaves touched off a minor political scandal 
when he announced in Havana that King Juan Carlos and 
President Zapatero would make official visits to Cuba in 
2006.  Representatives of both the King and President 
Zapatero disclaimed the announcement and said they had no 
plans to visit Cuba.  The MFA Cuba desk officer insisted that 
Chaves was either misinformed or acting on his own 
initiative, but did confirm GOS plans to increase high level 
contacts with the Cuban Government.  GOS Development Minister 
Magdalena Alvaro will travel soon to Havana for "routine 
meetings" and Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque will 
visit Madrid in March (at Cuba's request).  Looking ahead, 
Fidel Castro is invited to the Ibero American Summit in Spain 
in October, though he has not indicated whether or not he 
will participate.  The GOS believes Castro is in a 
wait-and-see mode in the wake of the EU's decision to 
temporarily lift its restrictive measures on Cuba, though 
Spain expects Cuba will release a large number of political 
prisoners in the next several months. 
 
2. (C) The MFA does not expect dramatic improvements in Cuban 
behavior as a result of EU overtures, but Spain is determined 
to improve ties with the GOC in order achieve small gains, 
such as the reopening of the Spanish Cultural Center in 
Havana.  In our discussions, we have emphasized the USG's 
continuing skepticism regarding the Spanish approach and 
noted that Cuba will remain an issue of contention in the 
bilateral relationship.  The GOS hopes that we will accept 
Spanish policy as complementary to USG Cuba policy, a point 
MFA DG for Latin America Javier Sandomingo is likely to make 
during his upcoming meeting with WHA A/S Noriega.  We do not 
believe the GOS will shift from its course on Cuba over the 
near term, a course driven by a mixture of commercial 
interests, lingering romantic notions of revolutionary Cuba 
within the Socialist Party, and naivete regarding Spain's 
ability to influence Castro. End Summary. 
 
//SPANISH REGIONAL LEADER STUMBLES IN HAVANA// 
 
3. (C) Poloff met with MFA Cuba desk officer Pablo Gomez de 
Olea on February 7 to get a readout of the February 5-6 visit 
to Havana of Andalucia Regional President Manuel Chaves and 
to encourage the GOS to follow through with its announced 
plans to increase contact with the Cuban opposition.  Chaves, 
who is also President of the ruling Socialist Party (Zapatero 
is Secretary General of the PSOE), was the first significant 
EU political figure to visit Havana since the EU's suspension 
of its restrictive measures on Cuba.  Chaves met with Fidel 
Castro as well as with opposition leaders and touched off a 
minor scandal for informing Castro that King Juan Carlos and 
President Zapatero would make official visits to Havana in 
2006.  Both the Royal household and the President's office 
denied any such plans, but most political observers doubt 
Chaves would have raised the possible visits without 
authorization/instruction from the GOS. 
 
4. (C) De Olea insisted that the MFA "had no information" of 
plans by either the King or Zapatero to go to Cuba and 
suggested that there may have been a misunderstanding on 
Chaves' part.  He said he had not received a readout from 
Havana of Chaves' visit, but that the MFA was pleased that he 
had met for 45 minutes with dissident figures Manuel Cuesta 
Morua, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Oswaldo Paya, Elizardo Sanchez, 
and Vladimiro Roca.  According to press reports, Chaves 
relayed the Spanish Government's new policy on Cuba.  Chaves 
told the press that he found the opposition to be "divided... 
lacking unity and cohesion." 
 
//INCREASED HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES// 
 
5. (C) De Olea confirmed Chaves' announcement that Cuban 
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque would travel to Madrid in 
March for meetings with GOS officials.  He said the meeting 
was arranged at Cuba's request and that the Spanish did not 
expect anything to come from the meeting.  De Olea also said 
that Spanish Development Minister Magdalena Alvarez will 
travel soon to Havana for a "routine working visit" with 
Cuban officials which would not involve any new Spanish aid 
initiatives.  (NOTE: Though de Olea did not mention it, 
Chaves also urged Castro to attend the Ibero American Summit 
in Salamanca, Spain in October.  END NOTE.) 
 
6. (C) De Olea said Spain believes that Castro is in a 
wait-and-see mode with respect to the EU and said the GOS 
does not expect dramatic changes in either EU-Cuban relations 
or in Cuba's political environment.  He does expect the GOC 
to release significant number of political prisoners in the 
next few months in an effort to maintain forward momentum in 
relations with Europe.  For its part, the Spanish Government 
plans to use the next several months to cautiously begin 
discussions with the GOC on the key bilateral issues.  During 
the Perez Roque visit, Spain will press for improved Cuban 
servicing of its debt to Spanish entities and for increased 
counter-terrorism cooperation.  De Olea did not elaborate on 
the latter item, but it is most likely a reference to Spain's 
desire for greater Cuban cooperation regarding Spanish 
investigations of ETA members who reside in or travel through 
Cuba. 
 
//ENGAGEMENT AT ANY COST// 
 
7. (C) Poloff requested details regarding Spain's plans for 
ramping up contact with the opposition, as the GOS said it 
would do to counter-balance the easing of EU measures against 
the Cuban Government.  Poloff also reviewed USG suggestions 
on possible options for increased engagement with Cuban civil 
society, which we had previously shared with Spain and other 
EU members.  De Olea was familiar with the USG suggestions 
and said that many coincided with Spain's ideas on how to 
provide tangible assistance to Cuban activists. 
 
8. (C) With this in mind, De Olea said the MFA is focused on 
getting Cuban acceptance for the reopening of the Spanish 
Cultural Center in Havana, which was closed down by the GOC 
in September 2003.  De Olea said he now favored acceding to a 
standing Cuban demand for GOC oversight of the Cultural 
Center's events and the right to veto any programs it finds 
objectionable.  He said it was more important to give the 
Cuban public access to international news and other outside 
information than to maintain the full independence of the 
Cultural Center.  (NOTE: It is not clear whether others in 
the MFA would also be willing to give the Castro Government 
such a degree of oversight of a theoretically Spanish 
institution.  END NOTE). 
 
9. (C) Poloff asked whether MFA DG for Latin America Javier 
Sandomingo would travel to Cuba for discussions with the 
opposition, as he had been planning to do for several months. 
 De Olea said that Sandomingo would likely not travel to Cuba 
soon, admitting that the Cuban Government refused to allow 
him entry since his agenda would include meetings with 
dissidents.  De Olea argued that such a visit was no longer 
necessary since Manuel Chaves had met with the opposition 
during his recent visit.  There are no GOS plans for 
reciprocal impediments on official Cuban travel to Spain. 
 
//SKEPTICISM OF SPANISH APPROACH// 
 
10. (C) Poloff noted that the USG remained disappointed with 
the EU's decision to suspend its restrictive measures since 
Castro had done nothing to merit such an overture.  In our 
view, Spain's leadership of the move to ease the EU measures, 
combined with the increased high level exchanges between Cuba 
and Spain, virtually ensured that Cuba would remain a 
significant irritant in U.S.-Spain relations.  The USG hoped 
that MFA DG Sandomingo would be able to discuss concrete 
Spanish successes in support of Cuban democracy activists 
during his February 14 meeting with WHA A/S Noriega. 
 
11. (C) Poloff explained that there was particular skepticism 
within the USG regarding the willingness of the Spanish 
Ambassador in Havana to Havana to undertake measures to 
support dissidents, given his obvious preference for working 
with the Cuban Government.  De Olea said the Spanish 
Government was well aware that EU diplomats in Havana tended 
to fall prey to the "Stockholm Syndrome" and said that most 
of the hard work in support of Cuban dissidents would not be 
undertaken by local EU diplomats.  However, local EU 
diplomats, including Spanish diplomats, would be expected to 
"faithfully execute EU policy" with respect to aiding the 
opposition. 
 
12. (C) De Olea said he hoped the USG would understand the 
Spanish approach and give the GOS time to let their 
engagement effort bear fruit.  According to de Olea, one 
benefit of EU plans for engaging the opposition is that they 
would force the opposition to speak to the EU with a single 
voice, improving coordination among the fractious 
organizations.  Poloff lauded this goal, but noted that many 
respected dissidents declined to participate in such 
artificial unions because of the Castro regime's extensive 
use of infiltrators and double agents, with several purported 
leaders being among the prime suspects.  De Olea acknowledged 
this danger as significant impediment to any effort to aid 
the opposition. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
13. (C) GOS disavowals notwithstanding, it seems likely to us 
that Chaves had explicit authorization from the Zapatero 
Government to float the possibility of a Zapatero or Royal 
visit to Havana next year since increased engagement with the 
Castro Government is clearly a Zapatero/PSOE priority.  The 
GOS will likely continue on this course despite friction with 
the USG over the issue.  Spanish engagement with Cuba appears 
driven by a combination of factors, including pressure by 
Spanish investors in Cuba to improve the Spanish Government's 
ability to lobby on their behalf.  More importantly, Zapatero 
remains focused on drawing a clear distinction between his 
policies and those of former President Aznar.  Improving 
relations with Castro satisfies both this objective and the 
desire of his leftist constituency to repair ties with a 
leader many in Spain continue to view as a revolutionary 
hero.  Finally, FM Moratinos and other GOS officials seem 
genuinely convinced that Spanish engagement with the GOC will 
allow them to wield increased influence with Castro and his 
successors.  The fact that Spain has made concession after 
concession to Castro with little to show for it has so far 
not dispelled this illusion. 
MANZANARES