US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK1036

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR/B 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
OSD FOR OSD/ISA (STERN AND POWERS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH, Tsunami, Southern Thailand, Terrorism, BURMA, IRAQ, POL/MIL 
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON DEFENSE MINISTER 
SUMPUN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  During an introductory call on Defense 
Minister Sumpun Boonyanun February 3, Ambassador discussed a 
wide range of subjects and positively reaffirmed the overall 
excellent relations between our two militaries.  They 
exchanged views on the tsunami relief effort and overall 
U.S./Thai military cooperation; ongoing violence in southern 
Thailand and regional terrorism; Burma; Iraq; and the sale of 
U.S. F-16s to Thailand.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TSUNAMI RELIEF 
 
SIPDIS 
 
2.  (C)  On February 3, Ambassador made a formal introductory 
call on Minister of Defense Sumpun Boonyanun.  On the 
regional impact of the tsunami, Sumpun expressed his, and 
Thailand's gratitude for the immediate and significant U.S. 
relief effort in Thailand.  Sumpun noted that the MOD had 
been in contact with the U.S. the day of the disaster, and 
the U.S. had dispatched the first C-130 within 24 hours. 
Ambassador agreed that the impressive display of our 
militaries, and those of other countries, working together 
showed the benefits of years of joint training and 
operations.  He thanked Sumpun for the use of the Utapao 
Naval Air Base, noting it had saved lives throughout the 
region.  Sumpun noted that Admiral Thana, 3rd Naval Area 
Commander, and General Boonsrang, Supreme Command Chief of 
Staff had reported that the cooperation and coordination 
between the Thai and U.S. military at Utapao and in the 
Phuket area has been excellent. 
 
3.  (C)  Ambassador asked Sumpun if Thailand planned to 
dispatch additional aid or relief personal to Indonesia, 
noting that images of Thai soldiers helping Muslims would pay 
dividends with Thailand's Muslim neighbors, and with 
Thailand's own Muslim population.  Sumpun said they were 
considering sending aid in addition to the one C-130 supply 
relief mission they had dispatched earlier. 
 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
4.  (C)  Ambassador asked Sumpun for his assessment of the 
current situation in southern Thailand and the likely 
prospects for the future.  Sumpun said that it was important 
to bear in mind the historical context of the violence; 
noting that problems between ethnically Malay-Muslims and 
Buddhist-Thais go back "hundreds of years."  Sumpun noted 
that there remained deep cultural divisions between the two 
populations that needed to be addressed.  He said that he 
believed that education and job creation were keys to ending 
the violence and the Muslim's alienation.  Sumpun admitted 
that security remained a problem in the south and that the 
RTG had not found an effective formula for dealing with the 
common "hit and run" style attacks used by the militants. 
Sumpun also admitted that the RTG had experienced some 
difficulty identifying the perpetrators, but claimed that 
there were no more than 3,000 committed militants behind the 
violence. 
 
5.  (C)  Ambassador asked Sumpun about newspaper reports that 
a new infantry division was being created for the south. 
Sumpun said Prime Minister Thaksin had asked the Cabinet to 
approve creation of the 15th Infantry Division.  He said that 
the division would not have a combat role, but would work on 
engineering, medical, and civil affairs projects.  Sumpun 
confirmed that the division would report directly to Royal 
Thai Army headquarters. 
 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
 
6.  (C)  The Minister indicated that the specter of 
international terrorism remained a concern for the Thai 
government.  Sumpun said that the RTG was well aware that the 
long-term goal of Jemaah Islamiah (JI) was the inclusion of 
southern Thailand into a regional Islamic state.  While they 
are taking JI seriously, and remained vigilant, the RTG has 
not found direct evidence of its presence in southern 
Thailand.  Sumpun said the RTG remained concerned that other 
transitional terror groups would try to "take advantage" of 
the situation in the south. 
 
BURMA 
 
7.  (C)  Ambassador asked Sumpun about the situation in 
Burma, particularly the swirling rumors of ongoing leadership 
struggles.  Sumpun demurred, repeatedly saying that "there 
are a lot of unknowns" regarding the regime.  He noted that 
Supreme Commander Chaisit had spent two days in Burma in 
January, and had met with all members of the junta's 
leadership.  However, Sumpun cautioned that he didn't trust 
these "outward expressions from the Burmese," and again 
reiterated that the country remains a mystery, even to the 
Thais. 
 
IRAQ 
 
8.  (C)  Ambassador raised the subject of Iraq, and prospects 
for another Thai deployment.  Ambassador acknowledged the 
sensitivity of the issue given the current situation in the 
south, and also the sensitivity of Thailand's Muslim 
neighbor.  Sumpun indicated that some form of deployment 
remained under consideration, but the timing and scope had 
not been determined.  He studiously avoided further 
elaboration.  Sumpun did inquire about additional training 
opportunities through International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program. 
 
F-16s 
 
9.  (C)  Ambassador made a strong, direct pitch for a 
positive decision on the purchase of U.S. F-16s as Thailand 
retires its aging fleet of F-5 fighters.  While acknowledging 
the advantages for inter-operability and the positive RTAF 
experience with the F-16, as well as Thailand's long-term 
goal of buying into the Joint Strike Fighter program, Sumpun 
remained non-committal.  He indicated that he understood the 
obvious drawbacks of both the Swedish Gripen and the Russian 
SU-30, but said that the RTG was still involved in serious 
discussions with the Russians over trading chicken for the 
SU-30, as offsets remained a primary consideration for the 
deal. 
BOYCE