US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO312

C O N F I D E N T I A L  COLOMBO 000312 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CE 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: EASTERN LTTE POLITICAL LEADER KILLED 
 
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission.  1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary. On February 7, E. Kausalyan, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Political Leader for the eastern 
districts of Batticaloa and Ampara, was killed in an ambush 
in a Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)-controlled area while 
driving to Batticaloa from LTTE-controlled territory in the 
north.  Four or five others, including a pro-LTTE former 
Tamil MP, were killed in the same attack, while four other 
passengers were injured.  Pro-LTTE sources and media outlets 
blamed paramilitary operatives working with the Sri Lankan 
armed forces for the attack; however, the LTTE did not file a 
ceasefire violation complaint with the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM).  Most interlocutors do not think the attack 
will precipitate a break in the nearly three year-old truce 
between the GSL and the LTTE, but do expect retribution, 
probably in the form of revenge killings.  The incident may 
complicate post-tsunami cooperation between the GSL and LTTE. 
 End Summary. 
 
 
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Ambush on "Lonely" Road Kills LTTE Political Leader 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (C)  On February 7, E. Kausalyan, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Political Leader for the eastern districts 
of Batticaloa and Ampara, was killed in an ambush while 
driving from LTTE-controlled territory in the north to 
Batticaloa.  According to Neville Wijesinghe, Deputy 
Inspector General of Police (DIG) for the Eastern Range, and 
Sri Lanka Army (SLA) spokesman Brigadier General Daya 
Ratnayake, the van was carrying 10 passengers, including 
Kausalyan; several other LTTE cadres (both political and 
military); former Ampara Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
MP Arianayagam Chandranehru; two police officers on 
protective detail for Chandranehru; Chandranehru's civilian 
bodyguard; and the driver of the van.  At least four of 
Kausalyan's traveling companions, including the former MP, 
were killed in the attack.  DIG Wijesinghe told poloff that 
the van was attacked by gunfire at approximately 8:00 pm on 
February 7 near a Sinhalese village about three miles from 
the border of the Batticaloa District.  Some press reports 
claimed that another car blocked the van in the road and 
forced it to stop, at which point the van was ambushed and 
fired upon. 
 
3.  (C) Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) MP from Batticaloa, told poloff that 
Kausalyan, who reported to LTTE Political Leader S.P. 
Tamilchelvan, was returning from a tsumani relief planning 
meeting with Tamilchelvan at LTTE headquarters in the 
northern district of Kilinochchi.  (Note:  Apparently the 
former MP had not been at the Kilinochchi meeting.  Instead, 
Kausalyan and his fellow Tigers joined Chandranehru, whom 
Pararajasingham described as "doing political work for the 
LTTE" after his unsuccessful re-election bid in April 2004, 
at some point en route to Batticaloa.)  According to Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Spokeswoman Helen 
Olafs-Dottir, the remaining four injured passengers were 
transferred to hospitals in Colombo.  There is no indication 
that any of the attackers were killed, despite some press 
reports of crossfire.  Olafs-Dottir noted that LTTE cadres 
are not allowed to have weapons in Government-controlled 
areas and surmised that the source of any crossfire might 
have been the weapons of the two police officers accompanying 
former TULF MP Chandranehru. 
 
4.  (C) Although no one has claimed responsibility for the 
attack, it is widely assumed that members of a dissident LTTE 
faction, loyal to former LTTE eastern military leader Karuna, 
may be behind the killings.  Several sources asserted that 
the slain LTTE cadres, knowing the potential risk in the 
area, should have requested security for the journey. 
Brigadier General Ratnayake told poloff that the SLA had 
warned the LTTE of possible threats from the Karuna faction 
and therefore had offered Tiger cadres security when they 
traveled in the east.  DIG Wijesinghe noted that camps of 
Karuna's cadres remain in the vicinity, adding that some 
local Sinhala villagers take money to shelter Karuna 
sympathizers.  The SLMM's Olafs-Dottir told poloff that 
Kausalyan and other LTTE political cadres, unlike their 
military counterparts, typically did not request security. 
Pro-LTTE TNA MP Pararajasingham suggested that the LTTE had 
erred in not requesting security from the SLMM or the SLA, 
and surmised that the LTTE must "have relaxed" after the 
tsunami. 
 
 
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LTTE Blames SLA 
--------------- 
 
5. (C)  Pro-LTTE website TamilNet posted news of the attack 
immediately and reported that the LTTE "blamed paramilitary 
operatives working with the Sri Lankan armed forces for the 
attack."  An international reporter told poloff that she had 
spoken to LTTE spokesman Dayamaster, who alleged that a 
military-supported group aligned with the Karuna faction was 
responsible for the attack on the LTTE.  Nonetheless, the 
Tiger spokesman said the LTTE would respect the ceasefire, 
which the reporter described as "standard LTTE language." 
Dayamaster had also suggested that LTTE leader Velupillai 
Prabhakaran might make a statement about the killings on 
February 8. 
 
 
6. (C) TNA MP Pararajasingham told poloff that he had "every 
suspicion that military intelligence had a hand in the 
killings."  Pararajasingham noted that the attack took place 
in a "lonely" Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) -controlled area, 
about one-half kilometer away from an SLA camp.  (Note:  LTTE 
and TNA representatives frequently cite the proximity of SLA 
camps to sites where LTTE have been killed as evidence of SLA 
involvement.  According to DIG Wijesinghe, there are two or 
three SLA divisions stationed nearby. End note.)  SLMM 
Spokeswoman Olafs-Dottir told poloff that, despite TamilNet's 
accusation that Sri Lankan armed forces were involved in this 
most recent incident, the Tigers had not filed an official 
ceasefire violation against the SLA, and the SLMM does not 
expect they will. 
 
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Implications for the Ceasefire 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (U)  Although the December 26 tsumani may have dampened 
the internecine warfare between the two LTTE factions for a 
time, in recent weeks the killings have resumed. On January 
31, according to press reports,  suspected LTTE cadre Rienzie 
Benedict was killed in Negombo, north of Colombo.  On 
February 4, pro-LTTE TamilNet reported that S. Thevathas, an 
LTTE official in charge of forest conservation in his area, 
was killed near Batticaloa.  There may also have been more 
killings in LTTE-controlled areas, but these are rarely 
reported in the press. 
 
8. (C) Most interlocutors do not think the attack will 
precipitate a break in the nearly three year-old truce 
between the GSL and the LTTE.  Ketesh Loganathan, a Director 
at Centre for Policy Alternatives, a prominent local 
think-tank, told poloff that the LTTE is likely to retaliate 
quickly, but will be unwilling to concede publicly that 
Karuna's cadres were responsible for the attack on the LTTE's 
most prominent eastern leader.  Loganathan explained that the 
killing was a "hard reminder" that the "Wanni" Tigers, who 
are based in the north, are not in control of the east, and 
"this killing makes it clear." 
 
 
9. (C)  The LTTE may comment yet.  In the next few days, the 
obligatory high-profile LTTE funerals will offer the Tigers 
the opportunity to propagate their version of the attack to 
their supporters and the media. When asked if he would attend 
Kausalyan's funeral, TNA MP Pararajasingham told poloff he 
was undecided about his attendance, and noted, "I have 
security concerns of my own."  In the meantime, the Tigers 
have called a hartal, or general strike, on February 9 from 
Trincomalee all the way down the eastern coast to Pottuvil 
(south of Ampara) to protest the killings. 
 
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Comment 
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10. (C)  This event marks the first high-level killing of an 
LTTE member since June.  While we agree with interlocutors 
that this incident will not break the ceasefire, the killings 
are nonetheless a direct challenge to LTTE claims to control 
the East--a challenge the LTTE leadership cannot afford to 
ignore.  Before the tsunami, many observers believed the LTTE 
slowly was re-establishing control in the fractious east. 
Since then, however, the dissident Karuna faction may have 
capitalized on post-disaster confusion to reorganize and 
regroup itself in this troubled district. The LTTE has long 
alleged GSL complicity in Karuna's defection--a charge the 
Government has been hard put to refute convincingly.  While 
there is no direct evidence of a GSL hand in this latest 
incident, its proximity to SLA installations can only inflame 
LTTE suspicions at a time when the Government is publicly 
seeking the Tigers' cooperation in reconstruction efforts. 
 
 
LUNSTEAD