US embassy cable - 05ATHENS392

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, GR, IRAQ 
SUBJECT: GREECE EYING MODEST CONTRIBUTION TO IRAQI 
TRAINING, NOTHING MORE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: USNATO 69 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  Greece is weighing the removal of the 
caveat that prevents Greek officers assigned to the NATO 
staff from serving in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq 
(NTM-I), and is also considering an unidentified contribution 
to the training of Iraqi security forces, according to a 
mid-level MFA official.  Although Greece supports ISAF's 
mission in Afghanistan, political and economic constraints 
make it impossible for Greece to increase its role in ISAF 
beyond what it has now committed.  End Summary. 
 
NTM-I: We'll Help in Our Own, Small Way 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Poloff met with MFA NATO Division Deputy Director 
Theodore Daskarolis February 7 to review the status of Greek 
participation in NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
run-up to Secretary's February 9 visit to NATO HQ and the 
informal NATO Defense Ministerial in Nice.  As a matter of 
principle, the United States believed Greece should allow 
Greek officers serving in NATO billets to take part in NTM-I, 
as necessary.  As a practical matter, poloff added, the 
United States agreed with SYG de Hoop Scheffer that all 
allies should make some type of national contribution to the 
training mission.  Noting the Greek government's positive 
statement about the January 31 Iraqi elections and widespread 
media coverage of the Secretary's positive discussions with 
European leaders, including German Chancellor Schroeder, 
poloff emphasized the importance of Greece removing itself 
from the list of a small handful of allies that were doing 
nothing to help out in Iraq.  Asked whether the United States 
was looking for symbolism or substance, poloff said both were 
needed and, to date, Greece had provided neither. 
 
3.  (C)  Daskarolis replied that Iraq was not a high priority 
for the Greek government, which had oppposed military action 
there from the outset.  Nonetheless, he said, Greece would do 
what it could to assist.  On what Daskarolis called the 
"symbolic" question of Greek NATO officers serving in NTM-I 
billets, Daskarolis said he was aware of discussions about 
lifting this caveat, but knew of no change in the 
government's position yet.  (Note: MFA's Secretary General 
told Ambassador January 28 that we should expect a decision 
"in days."  End Note)  On the issue of a more "concrete" 
Greek contribution to the training of Iraqi security 
personnel, Daskarolis said Greece would "do something," but 
could not offer specifics on the form this assistance would 
take or when his government would be ready to announce it. 
Whatever Greece did, he said, it would not happen inside 
Iraq.  Greece had, from the outset, opposed training within 
Iraq.  Poloff replied that, while the United States believed 
training within Iraq was the most effective way to accomplish 
NATO's goal of improving the capabilities of Iraq's security 
forces, other allies had taken a different approach.  While 
we questioned the relative efficiency of out-of-country 
training, even this was better than the nothing that Greece 
was currently doing. 
 
Afghanistan: We're Doing All We Can 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Noting the Greek pledge of a Role II medical 
facility for ISAF, poloff said additional European -- 
including Greek -- contributions would be needed as ISAF 
sought to expand its mandate to the south of Afghanistan. 
Daskarolis said it was unlikely that Greece would be able to 
do more there "in the short, medium, or long term."  Already, 
he pointed out, the decision to send a medical team had been 
criticized in parliament, and the 6 million euro cost was 
difficult to cover in a time of budgetary difficulties. 
Poloff commented that Greece was not the only ally with 
budget problems, emphasizing the importance of the alliance 
succeeding in Afghanistan. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  (C)  Daskarolis is far from the final word on what 
Greece's participation in Iraq and Afghanistan will look 
like.  Nonetheless, his perspective that Iraq and, to a 
lesser extent, Afghanistan are not central to Greek 
interests, is representative.  We are confident that Greece 
will come around on caveats, if only to avoid being left 
alone on the issue, and will eventually agree to increase its 
contributions to alliance efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
We will continue to send the message that, if they want to be 
seen as responsible allies, partners, and members of the 
UNSC, the Greeks will have to bring something to the table on 
issues like these. 
RIES