US embassy cable - 05BRATISLAVA107

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SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SLOVAKIA

Identifier: 05BRATISLAVA107
Wikileaks: View 05BRATISLAVA107 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2005-02-07 18:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL LO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071849Z Feb 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR FRIED, WILSON, AND HAINES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, LO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SLOVAKIA 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott N.Thayer for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary/Introduction: The Slovaks -- government and 
public alike -- are euphoric to welcome President Bush 
February 23-24 as the first sitting U.S. President ever to 
visit Slovakia.  The GOS sees the visit as validation of its 
ambitious reform program and pro-U.S. policies.  The Slovak 
people, whose national character tends to view Slovakia and 
Slovaks as underdogs, are flattered (and slightly 
incredulous) that their capital was chosen as the site for an 
important meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin. 
 
2. (C) Slovak self-deprecation aside, there is a good story 
to tell here, one which resonates well with the themes of 
promoting liberty and transformational diplomacy.  Since 
1998, Slovakia has gone from being what Madeleine Albright 
termed "the black hole of Europe" to the "Tatra Tiger."  NATO 
and EU membership were the focal points of the Slovak 
government and people and the locomotive of reform, and they 
engaged in a remarkable sprint (with U.S. and other donor 
support) that reached both those goals in the spring of 2004. 
 That reform experience is now being exported, to Ukraine, to 
Belarus, to the Balkans, and to Iraq, again in tandem with 
the U.S. and other donors.  However, having reached those 
goals, the Slovak political leadership has not come to 
closure over what it wants to accomplish as a NATO and EU 
member; as a result Slovakia is hesitant to speak up in most 
NATO and EU meetings. 
 
3. (C)  Slovak-American ties date back to the end of the 19th 
century, when thousands emigrated to the coal mines and steel 
mills of the industrial Northeast.  As a result, many Slovaks 
have American relatives, albeit distant, and the U.S. is 
still viewed as the beacon of hope that never dimmed during 
the Communist era.  Slovak views are reflexively 
transatlantic and receptive to our policy message.  The 
President should encourage the Slovaks to become 
more-outspoken in both NATO and EU fora, in support of their 
own and U.S. interests.  It would also be a good time to 
discuss future requirements for operations in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and other NATO priorities, and urge Slovakia to step up 
its commitments.  On the bilateral front, U.S. investment 
continues to pour into the country, and our influence is felt 
more and more in economic and business spheres.  The 
President's visit thus affirms the past, and points to the 
future.  End summary/introduction. 
 
Internal Politics 
----------------- 
 
3.  (C) Prime Minister Dzurinda heads a coalition government 
that is far more stable than its precarious parliamentary 
status would suggest.  (Technically, it has lost its majority 
and relies upon independent deputies to implement its 
program.  Realistically, no one doubts Dzurinda will be able 
to complete his four year mandate in 2006 and continue his 
reform agenda.)  Nevertheless, other parties are acutely 
aware that the GOS -- and its policies -- are dominated by a 
party (Dzurinda's SDKU) which has only 23 seats in the 150 
member Parliament.  In public and private meetings, it will 
be important to recognize the contributions that all 
governing parties and members of parliament have made in 
implementing Slovakia's reform program. 
 
Foreign Policy 
-------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Dzurinda is instinctively pro-American, and he has 
sealed his legacy as the Prime Minister who reintegrated 
Slovakia into European and transatlantic structures.  NATO 
accession in March 2004 and EU accession in May 2004 were the 
result of the aggressive foreign policy and internal reform 
program during Dzurinda's first (1999-2002) and second 
(2002-2006) terms.  In March 2004, Dzurinda hosted the 
"Bratislava II" conference to encourage other European and 
Eurasian countries on their paths to modernization. 
 
5. (C) The GOS has been pursuing an extensive defense reform 
program with the aim of creating a smaller, more deployable 
military that meets NATO standards.  The Dzurinda government 
has been steadfast in its military commitments in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Balkans, and maintains peacekeepers in 
UN PKO's around the world.  Slovakia's deployments to OIF, 
OEF, and KFOR underscore its commitment to the war on terror. 
 Slovakia is contributing roughly 650 troops to military 
operations around the world--a number that is high in 
relation to the population of the country--and is now 
shifting away from (often reimbursable) UN peacekeeping 
 
operations towards NATO-, EU-, and U.S.-led operations.  This 
is an expensive decision, and both the GOS and Parliament are 
wary of negative public reaction that any discussion of an 
increase in force commitments could generate.  Hence, 
although we have been trying to persuade the Slovaks to do 
more (such as a PRT in Afghanistan or a sizable contribution 
to NTM-1), we have not been successful at the political 
level.  Coming the day after the February 22 NAC and MNF 
force generation conference in Bucharest, the President's 
visit is an opportunity to underscore the need for Slovakia 
to provide more forces. 
 
6. (C) Slovakia often agrees with U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, but is rarely an outspoken actor in international 
institutions.  With an upcoming term on the UN Security 
Council (2006-2007), and full-fledged membership in both NATO 
and the EU, our challenge is encouraging the Slovaks to play 
a more active role in formulating policies in these 
organizations.  The GOS sees its niche in policy toward the 
Balkans and its Eastern neighbors (Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Moldova).  It has been and can be very helpful both through 
formal government channels and through NGO activities helping 
to build civil society. 
 
Economy and Investment 
---------------------- 
 
7. (C) Slovakia has been called an investors' paradise and it 
is now poised to become a regional economic power, especially 
in the automotive industry.  Reforms have made Slovakia an 
economic success story and captured the attention of 
policymakers and businesspeople around the world.  Cumulative 
foreign direct investment has quintupled in the past five 
years and American companies are the third largest investors. 
 U.S. Steel's Kosice operation is the largest economic force 
in Slovakia and the well-regarded company won the Department 
of State's 2003 Award for Corporate Excellence.  The U.S. has 
a disproportionately large and positive presence in 
economically depressed eastern Slovakia.  As the standard of 
living increases (Bratislava is above the EU average, though 
the rest of the country lags well behind), there will be a 
bigger market for U.S. trade as well.  Our very strong 
economic ties will help balance EU influence and provide a 
sturdy framework for our overall relationship for many years 
to come. 
 
8. (C) Corruption continues to be a problem throughout 
Slovakia, and the broad immunity from conflict of interest 
and financial disclosure laws which MPs and judges enjoy 
continues to be criticized by watchdog groups.  Nevertheless, 
economic growth and increased western investment have brought 
with them higher business standards.  Parliament passed a law 
creating a special prosecutor's office and court system for 
corruption cases, and there have been several 
highly-publicized arrests of past and current government 
officials on corruption charges.  Both anecdotally and in 
measures such as the Transparency International index, the 
overall level of corruption appears to have diminished over 
the last several years. 
 
Public Opinion 
-------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Slovak citizens generally view the U.S. favorably; 
they remember American support for freedom in Central Europe, 
and many Slovaks have family ties to the U.S.  Nonetheless, 
public opinion does not keep pace with the government on 
issues like Iraq, where only 21 percent of the population 
favored the deployment of Slovak troops.  However, public 
opposition has not been strongly voiced, and there were no 
large-scale anti-Iraq war demonstrations.  Support for NATO 
membership has recovered to 58% after a low two years ago of 
35%.  Three-fourths of Slovak citizens are critical of the 
President's treatment of international politics.  Compared to 
other Europeans, fewer Slovaks think their country should 
take an active part in world affairs. 
 
Visas 
----- 
 
10. (C) The visa issue is one of the greatest irritants in 
terms of public opnion.  Slovak citizens strongly believe 
they should be given visa-free travel to the United States 
because Slovakia has proven to be such a staunch ally and is 
now a member of both NATO and the EU.  In October 2004 the 
embassy and the GOS set up a bilateral working group on 
consular issues; it will next meet on February 11.  We have 
already adopted many best practices recommendations from CA 
in order to streamline the visa application process.  While 
 
GOS officials recognize they must temper expectations and 
acknowledge that Slovak behavior (overstays and fraud) 
contribute to the situation, they continue to press for 
Slovakia's eventual admission to the Visa Waiver Program. 
 
Roma and Other Minorities 
------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Slovakia's transition to a diverse, multicultural 
society is not complete.  The GOS has made efforts to improve 
the lives of its Roma population living in poverty, but 
progress has been slow and a comprehensive solution will 
likely require the EU to take a major role.  Anti-Semitism 
and xenophobia still persist in certain elements of Slovak 
society, although repudiated by mainstream politicians.  The 
President's inaugural address emphasized that a nation cannot 
export freedom if it tolerates racism at home, and it is a 
point that is as relevant in Slovakia as in the U.S. 
 
Extradition 
------------ 
 
12. (C) In late December 2004 we presented to the GOS the 
draft text of a new bilateral extradition treaty.  Slovakia 
amended its laws to permit extradition of its nationals to EU 
member states pursuant to the European Arrest Warrant, and we 
are asking the GOS to expand that commitment and agree to 
extradite nationals to the U.S.  Several other EU member 
states have agreed to this.  Crime is international; 
prosecution should not be hindered by outmoded obstacles such 
as nationality.  To date the GOS has not responded whether 
they would agree to extradite nationals to the U.S.  A direct 
appeal from the President on this point could have tremendous 
influence on the decision. 
 
Export Controls/Arms Sales 
-------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Slovakia's past (during previous regimes) as a 
supplier of arms and other goods to less-desirable regimes 
means old habits have not completely gone away.  GOS export 
controls are now much stronger, and we are regularly 
consulted in advance of questionable sales.  Still, interest 
persists in trade with Libya, Belarus, Iran, and other 
countries of concern.  It would be useful to thank the GOS 
for consulting with us and to reiterate our concerns about 
putting commerce ahead of security or human rights. 
THAYER 
 
 
NNNN 

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