US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE174

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EZ, CU, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECH PLANS TO REMAIN THE GADFLY IN THE EU'S CUBA 
POLICY 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer, Kimberly C. Krhounek for reasons 1.4( 
b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  While the Czechs eventually agreed with the 
EU's proposal to lift the restrictive measures against Cuba 
at last week's GAERC meeting, they are continuing to fight 
for EU approval of a detailed plan for structured dialogue 
with dissidents and hope to establish criteria to use as a 
benchmark when the policy comes up for review in six months. 
Petr Mikyska, who handles EU-Cuban issues at the MFA, 
provided a complete readout of the steps leading to the EU 
decision, discussed points which the Czechs want to be 
factored into the "review" of the new policy in six months, 
and requested further information sharing between our 
Interest Section and the Czech Embassy in Cuba (as their 
small embassy occasionally reports significant developments 
to the MFA too late to be effective).  As a reward for their 
efforts, the Czechs fully expect the Cuban government to 
attempt to "re-freeze" relations with their embassy, but 
believe that on this point at least, the EU will stand firm. 
End summary. 
 
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THE COCKTAIL WARS 
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2.  (C) According to Mikyska, the Czech MFA determined as 
early as last September that there was no EU support for 
maintaining the June measures, so it devoted its efforts to 
achieving textual changes, such as strengthening the section 
on interaction with the dissidents and eliminating any 
reference to whom the EU countries could invite to their 
national days. Mikyska conceded that while the issue of 
invitations for national day receptions was "collateral" to 
the real debate, he stressed that there is a historical 
precedent in the Czech Republic of western embassies inviting 
dissidents to their receptions during the Communist era. 
While there was no mention of EU invitations to dissidents in 
the final GAERC Council conclusion, Mikyska admitted that, 
despite FM Svoboda's claims to the contrary, the restriction 
on invitations to the diplomatic corps and EU nationals is 
indeed part of the EU negotiated policy.  Luckily for the 
Czechs, it is technically only in effect for the six months 
of this new policy, so may not affect the CR's national day, 
which falls in October. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS OF THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.  (C) The Czechs believe that the GAERC conclusion's 
requirement for more intense dialogue with dissidents needs a 
specific plan of action, beyond the specified requirement 
that high-level visitors must raise human rights and the 
position of dissidents with GOC officials.  While the Czechs 
believe that there is an "implicit" requirement for EU 
embassies in Havana to conduct regular outreach to satisfy 
the requirement for the EU's "regular and enhanced" meetings 
with dissidents, they want a list of specific actions to 
guide all EU embassies.   To ensure that all member states 
also engage with peaceful opposition members, the Czechs have 
proposed a detailed scheme that is now under discussion 
within the EU working groups (it was to be discussed today, 
but that meeting has now been postponed until next week). 
The Czech scheme focuses on two levels of meetings: those 
with Heads of Mission, and those at working level with 
embassy representatives who are part of the EU's Working 
Group on Human Rights.  The Czechs propose that Heads of 
Mission meet a minimum of four times a year with rotating 
groups of dissidents who represent different opposition 
groups.  Working level meetings would take place monthly, to 
ensure a minimum of 16 meetings a year.  Mikyska said that 
most elements of the Czech proposal have the tacit support of 
the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Finland, but the 
frequency of the required meetings remains in dispute.  The 
Dutch and Spanish prefer to have discussion with dissidents 
only at the Troika. 
 
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LET THE CUBANS BE THE BAD GUYS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Mikyska said that the Cuban government was already 
doing itself a disservice by claiming that the conditions 
attached to lifting the restrictive measures were 
"unacceptable."  With a laugh he said that if the Czechs 
couldn't stop the Spanish at the EU working level, they would 
sit back and give the Cuban government itself a chance to do 
so.  The Czechs believe there is a strong likelihood that the 
Cuban government will again try to "re-freeze" relations with 
them, and other troublesome embassies like Poland and the 
delegation of the European Commission.  The EC is already in 
a dispute with the GOC over Cuban attempts to wrest control 
over the management of EU funds, a non-starter for the EC 
which is concerned about the rampant corruption in Cuba. 
Mikyska said any attempt to refreeze relations with a select 
few would be met by the same demonstration of unity that 
occurred in December when Cuba attempted only a partial 
restoration of relations with EU countries.  On that issue at 
least, he affirmed that the EU remains "pretty strong" and 
has reaffirmed this position both internally and with the 
Cuban government. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
THE REVIEW PROCESS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) While Mikyska said no formal criteria had been worked 
out for the review of the EU's Cuba policy which is to take 
place in six months, the Czechs are developing their own 
criteria that they will be monitoring and plan to use in the 
review negotiations.  These criteria include: 
 
a) The release of dissidents; 
b) The treatment of embassies and status of diplomatic 
relations across the EU; 
c) Steps towards political and economic transformation; 
d) The Cuban government's attitude towards the UNHCR and 
Special Rapporteur; and 
e) The total lack of any movement on issues of importance to 
the EU. 
 
The Czechs firmly expect to see "a lack of progress" in the 
next six months, although Mikyska conceded that the GOC would 
likely release a few token dissidents in June, to curry favor 
prior to the formal review.  That said, even without tangible 
progress, the Czechs believe that it will be "very hard" to 
re-impose restrictive measures, especially as Spain is likely 
to argue that there will not have been sufficient time for 
the measures to take effect.  Throughout the EU 
deliberations, Mikyska claimed that the Spanish were in close 
contact with the Cubans, leaking information to the press 
about a consensus decision before it had been reached and 
remaining "difficult" today. 
 
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CZECHS REMAIN OUTSPOKEN 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) The MFA has strong support within the Czech Republic 
for its firm stance.  Former President Vaclav Havel, himself 
a former dissident and internationally recognized human 
rights figure, published a strongly worded opinion in papers 
throughout Europe condemning the EU's "betrayal" of Cuba's 
dissidents.  Citing the importance that simple acts such as 
access to foreign officials have to dissidents, he called for 
the EU to end its reliance on the worst political tradition 
of "appeasement of evil" in allowing the Cuban government to 
dictate to the diplomatic community who they may invite to 
official receptions.  Mikyska also noted that within the 
Czech MFA, the new EU policy is known as the new "appeasement 
policy."  Member of European Parliament Jana Hybaskova 
agreed, but blamed the individual member states (including 
the Czechs) for allowing such a policy to go forward.  "It is 
easy to blame the EU," she said, "But who is the EU?  The 
individual member states, that is who." 
 
------------------------------------- 
COMMENT AND APPEAL FOR HELP 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Mikyska concluded with an appeal for assistance from 
USINT Havana to help keep the Czech embassy there informed of 
events on the ground.  With only one Czech employee in 
addition to the HOM, their small embassy frequently struggles 
to stay up to speed on fast-beaking developments.  This was 
critical to MFA efforts in one instance last December when 
the Czech Charge d'Affairs informed the MFA of the arrest of 
an additional 21 dissidents last year, but it was too late 
for the Czechs to use it in the EU negotiations.  In 
addition, the Czechs have few contacts with Cubans in the 
provinces, and would appreciate being included in any 
meetings with people who operate outside of Havana. 
CABANISS