US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI940

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000940 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2015 
TAGS: KISL, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, SCUL, IN, IZ, India-Iraq 
SUBJECT: INDIAN REACTIONS TO THE IRAQ ELECTION REFLECT 
IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDES 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 756 
     B. NEW DELHI 594 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The reaction of India's political parties 
and major newspapers to the January 30 election in Iraq 
predictably reflected their political orientations.  The UPA 
government saw the election as a step forward, but unveiled 
no new initiatives or specific plans for greater engagement. 
The opposition BJP expressed wholehearted support for the 
election, hinted that the GOI should quickly increase its 
involvement and urged tough military measures against the 
insurgents.  The Communist parties dismissed the election as 
flawed, downplayed its significance, and opposed any greater 
GOI involvement in Iraq until American forces depart.  The 
UPA is divided, with many on its left wing sympathetic to the 
Communist view, which will induce continued caution. 
Capitalizing on the positive results of the elections, the 
Ambassador arranged a join press conference with Iraqi Charge 
Muyad Hussain on February 4 to provide a forum for the 
under-exposed Charge to make observations about the conduct 
of the polls, offer insights about how India can assist Iraq 
in the future, and answer questions from the press.  Embassy 
also plans to explore with Embassy Baghdad ways in which we 
might encourage India to expand its engagement in Iraq.  End 
Summary. 
 
Two Insider Comments 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Reacting to the GOI's January 31 statement that 
described the voter turnout as "encouraging," and a 
"noteworthy development," the "Times of India" diplomatic 
correspondent Indrani Bagchi claimed that the MEA has 
realized that the election has put "a stamp of legitimacy on 
the exercise, that will be recognized by the UN, the EU and 
Iraq's neighbors," and quoted a senior MEA official as 
saying, "the Americans have pulled it off, first in 
Afghanistan and now in Iraq," and "India will have to 
recalibrate its stance towards Iraq."  Pointing out that 
India's Ambassador in Iraq has not been replaced following 
his retirement several months ago, several editorials urged 
the MEA to show its commitment to Iraq by filling the post. 
In the interim, the GOI's newly-appointed Special Envoy to 
West Asia, Chinmaya Gharekhan will travel throughout the 
region and submit a detailed report on the election's impact 
(septel). 
 
3.  (U) Leading strategic thinker K. Subrahmanyam argued that 
"it would be a mistake to treat the events in Iraq as 
peripheral to our national interests," in that India could 
reap benefits from a short-term alliance with the US that 
will far outweigh any costs thereafter.  Pointing out that 
India has the second largest Muslim population in the world, 
Subrahmanyam maintained that "India cannot afford to commit a 
mistake when democratization of Islamic regimes is the 
issue."  He concluded, however, that "we should protect 
ourselves from any major disruptive developments to our 
national security and interests caused by religious 
fundamentalist forces." 
 
The UPA View 
------------ 
 
4.  (C) In a February 3 meeting with Poloff, Congress MP 
Rashid Alvi, who is close to the Gandhi family and coterie 
and has an insider's view of party thinking, maintained that 
the Congress and the UPA would stick to the official GOI 
statement welcoming the election as a sign of progress.  He 
confided, however, that many in Congress remain opposed to US 
Iraq policy and share the views of the Communists that India 
should not become too deeply involved too quickly. 
 
Communist Views 
--------------- 
 
5.  (U) India's Communists predictably dismissed the 
election.  Leninist CPI leader A.B. Bardhan cast doubt on the 
initial estimates of voter participation, and called on 
Iraqis to continue resistance to the "US occupation." 
Pro-Beijing CPI(M) Politburo member Prakash Karat struck a 
slightly different tone, suggesting that the Left Front 
"would not oppose a decision to establish relations with the 
new government and some level of humanitarian aid,." but 
urged the GOI not to intervene further until "peace is 
restored, and US troops are pulled out." 
 
6.  (U) Left-oriented newspapers echoed these views.  The 
"Hindu" derided US efforts to depict the election as a 
"turning point," saying "Washington cannot wish away the 
disturbing trends in the pattern of the voting," in which "a 
majority of Sunni voters apparently obeyed the insurgents' 
call for a poll boycott."  The paper warned that the election 
could "sharpen the sectarian divide and push the country to 
the brink of civil war."  The "Asian Age" stated that "no 
election held under a foreign military occupation has any 
legitimacy under international law." 
 
7.  (U) Hamid Ansari, former Indian Ambassador and prominent 
commentator on Islam, agreed that the GOI should "cooperate 
with Iraq in its reconstruction in every possible way," but 
that this does not mean that India should accept the 
"ideological predilections" of the US, which he described as: 
"the doctrines of pre-emption, regime change, coercive 
democratization, cartographic engineering and 'Islamic 
threat." 
 
8.  (U) The mass-circulation Bengali daily "Anandabazar 
Patrika," respected in the "Red Fort" of Calcutta, claimed 
that the election has "actually neutered the Leftists to a 
great extent," as they must now admit that an "imperialist 
force" has completed a successful "experiment in democracy." 
The paper argued that the Communists cannot continue to 
denounce the election without being seen to "deny the 
democratic process." 
 
The BJP View 
------------ 
 
9.  (C) The pro-BJP "Pioneer" was effusive in its praise for 
the election, claiming that "it clearly indicates that the 
over-whelming majority of Iraq's population wants not 
terrorism and violence but peace, democracy and the 
restoration of normal conditions."  The newspaper urged that 
the best way for the US to ensure the success of Iraqi 
democracy is to crush "terrorism with a mailed fist," and not 
to remove its troops "until the job is done." 
 
10.  (C) In a February 4 meeting with Poloff, Retired LTG. 
N.S. Malik, BJP Convenor of Defense Affairs, and Vijay Vir of 
the BJP National Council congratulated the US for a "job well 
done" in Iraq, and expressed support for the US troops for 
"undertaking a difficult job under trying circumstances." 
Malik maintained that while BJP sympathies are with the US in 
Iraq, it cannot support increased Indian involvement until 
the UN takes over from the US.  He predicted that a fully 
democratic and sovereign democratic government will be in 
place in Iraq "within the year," and suggested that the UN 
should be invited in shortly thereafter. 
 
11.  (C) General Malik pointed out that Iraq has long been 
"India's greatest friend in the Middle East," that the Indian 
armed forces trained the Iraqis for many years, and that 
Indian companies built much of Iraq's infrastructure. 
According to Malik, Indian firms are eager to get back into 
Iraq.  Vir pointed out that the vast majority of Indian 
Muslims are Sunni, and the UPA wants their backing, and will 
not antagonize them by backing US actions in Iraq which they 
view as "anti-Islamic." 
 
Will the Left Come Around? 
-------------------------- 
 
12.  (U) Some insiders have predicted that the Left will 
soften its resistance and quietly acquiesce to greater GOI 
involvement in Iraq.  Quoting "top government sources," the 
"Times of India" Bagchi claimed that the UPA would soon 
initiate a dialogue on Iraq and that the Left parties will 
"be more pragmatic and take reality into consideration,"  and 
claimed that "the first steps on the realistic road have 
already been taken." 
 
13.  (C) Congress MP Alvi dismissed Communist opposition to 
increased Indian involvement in Iraq, stating that "they 
oppose any US policy and are not important."  Alvi claimed 
that both PM Singh and Sonia Gandhi had stated to him that 
the Communists could not change Indian foreign policy. 
According to Alvi, the Congress leadership has determined 
that the Left's principal concern is acquiring and 
maintaining power in its three "red forts (West Bengal, 
Tripura, Kerala)," and that critical statements were meant 
primarily to appease its supporters there.  Alvi maintained 
that rhetoric aside, the Left would not withdraw support from 
the UPA government on any foreign policy issue as long as the 
only alternative is the BJP's return to power. 
 
Enthusiastic Shia Support 
------------------------- 
 
14.  (U) Indian Shias continue to express strong public 
support for the elections (Ref B).  Leading Shia 
organizations held a public meeting in Lucknow on February 2 
to "rejoice on the occasion of the first peaceful elections 
in Iraq in five decades," and to "thank all those countries 
who have contributed significantly to ensure the safety and 
security of Shia religious shrines in Iraq from terrorists." 
At the meeting, Shia leader Hasan Mehdi compared Sunni 
terrorists in Iraq to those in J&K, noting that they are 
opposed to democracy and want to prevent people from voting. 
 
15.  (C) Shia Leader Zaheer Zaidi told Poloff February 3 that 
Indian Shias welcomed the election and anticipate that 
conditions will soon stabilize in Iraq enough for large 
numbers of them to begin visiting the Iraqi holy places in 
peace.  Zaidi praised Ayatollah Sistani for his role in the 
elections, confirmed that Indian Shias acknowledge him as 
their leader and would take direction from him regarding 
democratization.  He noted that Indian Shia leaders regularly 
travel to Iraq to meet with Sistani and his aides. 
 
Some Shia Skepticism 
-------------------- 
 
16.  (U) Leading Shia journalist Saeed Naqvi took a more 
skeptical view, arguing that "the voter turnout should be 
seen for what it is: a means to get the Americans out.  Under 
Grand Ayatollah Sistani's leadership, the Shias decided on 
"tactics of patience," but "the dangerous trek to the polling 
booths was their way of demonstrating that they would go to 
any lengths to ensure than occupation of their ends.  If the 
Americans read the meaning of the turnout in any other way, 
they will face Iraq's 60 percent population turning upon them 
the way the 20 percent has over the last two years," he 
commented. 
 
And Sunni Disdain 
----------------- 
 
17.  (C) India's dominant Sunni press has been almost 
uniformly negative, condemning the election as "a sham 
exercise aimed at serving colonial interests and nothing 
else," and describing the elections as "neither free, nor 
fair, nor democratic," as "they took place under the state of 
emergency and the threat to use force," with candidates 
"hand-picked by an occupying power with a monopoly on TV 
reporting."  One Urdu daily described the elections as a a 
"stage-managed show with no credibility," claiming that the 
Iraqis have "rejected the Americans, their stooges and their 
policies in Iraq." in that both "those who voted and those 
who boycotted" want to "get rid of their common enemy." 
 
Embassy Outreach 
---------------- 
 
18.  (SBU)  The Ambassador and Iraqi Charge Muyad Hussain 
held a joint press conference on February 4.  In his opening 
statement, Hussain highlighted the prospects that successful 
elections presented to the Indo-Iraq relationship.  "There 
are lots of opportunities for the Indian business community 
to re-establish its old position....Indians have long 
experience in working in the region and Iraq can benefit from 
their expertise in various fields: construction, engineering, 
oil exploration, and information technology," he stated. 
Responding to a question from a reporter, Hussain went on to 
say that Iraq needs more assistance from the international 
community and was also looking to India to provide more help, 
but stopped short of saying what specific assistance Iraq 
sought from the GOI.  The event generated generally favorable 
coverage, with most local press focusing on whether the GOI 
will see the polls as the impetus to step up its engagement 
in Iraq. 
 
19.  (C) Behind the scenes, post will continue to encourage 
the GOI toward greater involvement in Iraq, recognizing, 
however, that in order to do this, the GOI will have to 
proceed cautiously with incremental steps that do not require 
Parliamentary approval, so as not to raise the ire of those 
that oppose such moves within its own coalition. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
20.  (C) The election results caught the UPA and the Indian 
political class by surprise, but opposition to US Iraq policy 
remains deep-rooted, and one successful election was not 
enough to swing Indian popular opinion decisively in favor of 
greater GOI engagement in Iraq.  Although the January 30 
election had a positive impact on popular political 
sentiments, and may yet influence GOI policy, the UPA 
leadership appears determined to move very cautiously so as 
not to get too far out front of the population.  Embassy 
plans to consult Embassy Baghdad on specific ways that we 
might encourage India to expand its engagement within the 
political parameters outlined above. 
 
BAGHDAD Minimize Considered. 
 
MULFORD