US embassy cable - 05HARARE180

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER POSTPONES WASHINGTON VISIT, 
PREVIEWS ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai told the 
Ambassador on February 2 that he needed to stay in Zimbabwe 
to focus on the upcoming parliamentary elections instead of 
traveling to the United States and Canada next week as 
earlier planned.  Tsvangirai was optimistic about the party's 
chances as it prepared to re-enter the campaign arena with 
resurgent energy.  He said that the party was exploiting new 
campaign space and a surprisingly tolerant posture by the 
police.  The party would redouble its outreach to civil 
society, with which it continued to have differences.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Washington Trip Off 
--------------- 
 
2.  (C) During a meeting at the Residence, Tsvangirai said 
the press of election-related business and the fact that key 
Administration officials would be out of town, especially the 
Secretary, had led him to defer his planned trip to New York 
 
SIPDIS 
and Washington.  He added that  the visit might be more 
appropriate after the election in any eventsince the 
government would almost certainly have tried to make 
political capital out of a visit at this time by accusing him 
of running off to Washington "to get orders from Bush" the 
minute elections were called. 
 
Plan A: Win the Election 
------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Emerging from the first day of a two-day meeting of 
the MDC's national executive to discuss the election, an 
upbeat Tsvangirai described intra-party atmospherics as 
uplifting.  The party had finished candidate selection for 
the parliamentary races with little of the rancor associated 
with ZANU-PF's primary process.  Tsvangirai would not 
forecast the party's likely seat count in the election, which 
has been set for March 31, but said the MDC would "win." He 
quickly sketched MDC prospects across the country.  He 
predicted that the MDC would hold its seats in Harare and 
Bulawayo, excluding the three seats recently gerry-mandered 
out; would increase its representation Manicaland and 
Masvingo; would win most urban seats and possibly a couple of 
rural ones in Midlands, and Mashonaland East, West and 
Central.  Elaborating on campaign priorities, Tsvangirai said 
sitting urban MPs were essentially on their own.  The party 
leadership, including Tsvangirai, would focus its energies 
principally on marginal constituencies.  Unlike their ZANU-PF 
counterparts, MDC MPs had little to deliver their 
constituencies in terms of basic wants, and would have to 
rely in many cases on "basic minimum social interventions" 
and show a strong physical presence in their districts. 
 
4.  (C) Tsvangirai was optimistic that the party would be 
able to exploit growing political space.  He was encouraged 
by the numbers and enthusiasm he was seeing at rallies 
throughout the country.  The impending reinstatement of the 
Daily News and access to Zimbabwe television in March would 
prove decisive in overcoming voter apathy and getting out the 
vote.  (Note: Rumors are flying that the GOZ will permit 
resumed operations by The Daily News, the daily independent 
shut down by the GOZ in 2003, upon the issuance of an 
expected Supreme Court decision in the paper's favor on 
February 7.  End Note.)  The police's increasingly 
constructive posture was potentially pivotal; he noted that 
police leadership had approached the party leadership to 
coordinate security, including in some rural areas.  Local 
party structures were effectively using Police Commissioner 
Chihuri's publicized statements insisting on tolerance and 
non-violence in resisting customary local ruling party 
efforts to forcibly conscript people for party rallies.  He 
reported that local ZANU-PF structures in some areas were 
challenged by their leadership's public directives on 
non-violence and were pleading the leadership to be unleashed 
if the party wanted to win.  Tsvangirai concluded that the 
overconfident ZANU-PF leadership had lost its base and was in 
a dilemma that it might not fully appreciate as to the 
pivotal role played by fear in its control over the country. 
He added that the MDC would structure its campaign so as to 
keep ZANU-PF complacent.  There would be no mass rallies this 
time around that could alert the ruling party to the MDC,s 
popularity and that might provoke violence or fraud. 
 
5.  (C) Tsvangirai said that the MDC would run on a platform 
built on the need for change.  Rule of law, human rights, 
land use, education, housing, jobs, economic reconstruction 
would all be issues but the main theme would be the need to 
end the &criminality8 of ZANU-PF rule.  He added that in 
the event the MDC won a majority in parliament it would in 
essence make the country ungovernable in order to drive 
President Mugabe from power.  Its first order of business 
would be to repeal repressive legislation such as POSA, 
AIPPA, and the NGO bill.  He said that under the Zimbabwe 
constitution, the president could only veto a bill twice, if 
parliament subsequently passed the bill again, it would 
become law after 60 days.  Finally, he noted that an MDC 
majority in parliament would also work to amend the 
constitution to remove the president,s power to name the 
government without parliamentary approval. 
 
Plan B: a Little Vague 
----------------- 
 
6.  (C) According to Tsvangirai, the party had been working 
on a "Plan B" if the election results proved untenable.  The 
main ideas were to paint the elections as having been 
inherently unfair, that the MDC had only participated out of 
deference to the wishes of its supporters, and that neither 
the party, the region,  or the international community should 
recognize another illegitimate election.  The party would 
also maintain pressure on the regime by keeping its 
supporters motivated and it would use whatever foothold it 
retained in Parliament to obstruct the ruling party's 
legislative and constitutional plans. 
 
Skepticism on Civil Society, South Africa 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (C) On the Ambassador's inquiry, the MDC leader reported 
that he would be meeting within the next few days with ZCTU 
and civil society figures to discuss strategies.  He 
acknowledged continued differences with some, notably 
Lovemore Madhuku's National Constitutional Assembly, and was 
dismissive of others, but said they "were coming around." 
 
8.  (C) Turning to South Africa, Tsvangirai asserted that the 
ANC leadership had gradually shifted away from ZANU-PF.  He 
worried, nonetheless, that the spy scandal had weakened 
Mbeki's hand and the Mugabe would more freely snub him and 
SAG efforts. 
 
Coltart's Take 
------------ 
 
9.  (C) During a meeting at the Embassy earlier in the day, 
MDC Shadow Minister of Justice David Coltart told the 
Ambassador that party spirits were indeed high as it prepared 
to re-enter the race officially.  He said that he had not 
seen such numbers at his own rallies in a long time and party 
structures were stronger and better organized than ever 
before.  The regime was fragile, and would be susceptible to 
breakdown given the right spark.  Its recent purge of "Young 
Turks" left the ruling party with even fewer capable leaders, 
exacerbating its problems in managing the Parliament and 
policy agendas. 
 
10.  (C) Nonetheless, he predicted that the party would win 
only 25 seats in the election because of various forms of 
ruling party rigging.  He said intimidation and official 
harassment continued to be impediments for MDC candidates, as 
reflected by the detentions of MDC MPs Chamisa and Thuke in 
recent weeks.  (Note: Each was released within 24 hours, as 
is customary in such cases.  End note.)  Coltart emphasized 
the importance of international pressure on Zimbabwe, and in 
that vein complimented the President's and Secretary Rice's 
recent public remarks about the need to confront tyranny.  He 
stressed the pivotal role of USG assistance in the survival 
of democratic forces and civil society in Zimbabwe but 
expressed concern that the strong messages coming from 
Washington would be offset by shrinking resources for 
democratic forces in Zimbabwe. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
11.  (C) The MDC  is re-energized by the continued opening of 
campaign space, by the surprisingly tolerant posture of the 
police, and by the prospects for more media coverage.  Many 
MDC leaders are genuinely optimistic about their prospects in 
this election, even as they are preparing the groundwork for 
protests should they lose.  The MDC's February 3 official 
announcement that it would participate in elections (e-mailed 
to AF/S) echoed Coltart's dismal assessment of Zimbabwe's 
election environment and was at odds with Tsvangirai's more 
upbeat appraisal.  It was, however, consistent with MDC plans 
to protest the tilted playing field in the event of electoral 
defeat.  That said, the biggest obstacle to their electoral 
prospects may not be renewed violence or fraud on the part of 
the ruling party.  Rather, it may be their inability to 
articulate a clear message of how an MDC parliament will make 
people,s lives better and thereby energize an otherwise 
passive, already intimidated electorate.  Tsvangirai offered 
few details of the MDC,s platform or its positive message. 
Instead, 50 days before the election, one has the sense that 
he believes the election will be a referendum on ZANU-PF 
misrule and that the MDC has only to call attention to that 
misrule to win. 
DELL