US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI858

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, EAID, PREF, ASEC, IN, NP, CH, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING INDIA'S ANGER OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NEPAL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: New Delhi's surprisingly angry reaction to 
developments in Nepal underlines the serious mid to long-term 
implications the GOI believes King Gyanendra's actions will 
have on Nepal, India, and the GOI's larger foreign policy 
objectives.  From New Delhi's perspective, the King has 
strengthened the Maoists and critically injured legitimate 
political forces in Nepal, including multiparty democracy and 
the monarchy itself.  The resulting instability could spill 
across the border, a scenario that is particularly worrying 
given indications of growing cooperation between Nepalese 
Maoists and anti-India insurgents.  The King's dismissal of 
Indian concerns and his refusal even to communicate with New 
Delhi also comes as an embarrassment, especially in light of 
India's aspirations to a growing extra-regional role. 
Finally, the situation in Nepal raises uncomfortable 
questions about India's foreign policy strategies, especially 
better relations with the PRC, which has taken a far 
different approach to the crisis.  For the GOI, one of the 
few bright spots in this episode has been the close, 
collaborative approach that Washington has taken.  Given 
acute Indian frustration over the King's action and threats 
to "take some unpopular decisions," it is plausible that 
India could suspend military assistance or other support.  We 
should communicate to the GOI our strategy for dealing with 
the Palace, and the limits on what we are prepared to do. 
Mission would appreciate overnight guidance for a meeting the 
Ambassador has with NSA Narayanan on February 4.  See action 
request paragraph 6.  End Summary. 
 
Undermining Democracy and the Monarchy 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) India believes that King Gyanendra's actions have 
threatened Nepal's long-term political stability by 
undermining both the monarchy and multiparty democracy, while 
inadvertently strengthening the Maoists.  According to South 
Asian Studies Professor and influential GOI advisor SD Muni, 
the Palace has eroded the democratic advances made in Nepal 
since 1960, effectively destroying gains in openness and 
human rights and setting Nepal's political development back 
by many years.  From India's perspective, the King has also 
substantially damaged the monarchy, a concern that has grown 
since Maoist leaders offered to unite with the parties to 
defeat the Palace. 
 
3.  (C) The waning of democracy and potential increase in 
Maoist influence could have immediate domestic repercussions 
for India, particularly in the border areas of West Bengal, 
Bihar, and Sikkim.  Foreign Secretary Saran noted in a 
February 2 press conference that the Maoist insurgency has 
already resulted in a "very large exodus of ordinary Nepalis" 
to India, and the local press is reporting that senior 
Maoists have crossed the border since the King's February 1 
seizure of power.  This is particularly troubling given GOI 
concerns about the growing nexus between the Maoists and 
anti-India militants, and is likely to loom especially large 
for NSA Narayanan, who in the past has expressed to us deep 
concern about the Maoist phenomenon.  The reported exodus 
into India of Nepalis -- including some Maoists -- is a 
particular concern because the border state of Bihar is among 
the worst affected by "Naxalite" violence. 
 
A Snub to India 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) Gyanendra's actions were interpreted by many here as 
a "snub to India" given the GOI's repeated insistence that 
the King work with the political parties to defeat the Maoist 
insurgency.  During his February 2 press conference, FS Saran 
reiterated his annoyance with Gyanedra, complaining that 
India had advised the King on numerous occasions "against 
taking the kind of step that he has taken."  As an additional 
insult, the Palace has rebuffed repeated Indian attempts to 
communicate through diplomatic and military channels, a move 
viewed by New Delhi as an overt act of defiance.  Commenting 
on Gyanendra's refusal to speak with Indian officials, Saran 
noted that "there is no way in which we are able to engage 
the Government of Nepal in even making a proper assessment of 
what is happening."  Given that Nepal falls squarely within 
New Delhi's sphere of influence, the King's refusal to bend 
to Indian insistence, or even to communicate with New Delhi, 
is an embarrassment. 
 
Foreign Policy Concerns 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The on-going crisis in Nepal also raises prickly 
questions for India's foreign policy agenda, particularly 
with respect to China.  Beijing's tacit acceptance of the 
King's actions, and local suspicions that the Palace has 
tried to ingratiate itself with the PRC by closing the 
offices of the Dalai Lama, have the potential to create a 
source of friction in the India-China relationship, 
especially given the widespread perception that Beijing hopes 
to "contain" and encircle India. 
 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Continued cooperation with the GOI on Nepal provides 
a tangible opportunity to put the US-India strategic 
partnership to work in furtherance of our shared objectives. 
Given Indian anger over Gyanendra's actions, we are inclined 
to take seriously Foreign Secretary Saran's warning to the 
Ambassador that New Delhi may have to "take some unpopular 
decisions."  We find it entirely plausible that if the Palace 
persists in the current course, New Delhi could decide to 
express its unhappiness by suspending military assistance or 
other forms of support.  Given that, it will be important to 
communicate to the GOI our strategy for dealing with the 
Palace, and the limits on what we are prepared to do in 
sanctioning the GON.  If we fail to do this upfront and India 
takes steps we are unable to support, we could find our 
currently favorable relations severely strained.  Mission 
requests specific points on this issue that we could convey 
to Foreign Secretary Saran and NSA Narayanan, for a meeting 
the Ambassador has with Narayanan on February 4. 
MULFORD