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| Identifier: | 05OTTAWA315 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05OTTAWA315 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ottawa |
| Created: | 2005-02-02 17:25:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN |
| Tags: | MARR PREL CA NORAD Jacques Gauvin |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 021725Z Feb 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000315 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2015 TAGS: MARR, PREL, CA, NORAD, Jacques Gauvin SUBJECT: CANADA: CABINET TO REVIEW MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE/CONCLUDE 2006 NORAD AGREEMENT IN EARLY FEBRUARY Classified By: POLITICAL M/C BRIAN FLORA. REASON 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C/NF) In meetings January 20 with NorthCom Deputy Commander and U.S. NORAD Vice Commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Inge, Canadian security policy officials professed interest in helping to advance North American security cooperation with Mexico, downplayed the likelihood of an "early" Canadian decision to participate in the missile defense program, acknowledged the need to move quickly on negotiations for NORAD renewal and the importance of addressing maritime domain awareness, and advocated incorporation of BPG functions into NORAD. PCO milrep, R/Adm Jacques Gauvin identified the issue of sharing U.S. classified intelligence as vital to enhanced bi-national cooperation. Lt. General Inge noted the need to update NORAD's underlying documents, especially with respect to the role of NorthCom and the concept of asymmetric threats, advocated development of a more flexible, longer-term, "living" NORAD Agreement, and affirmed the need to explore all domains for mutual cooperation opportunities. 2. (C/NF) U.S. representatives accompanying Lt. General Inge to his meetings included U.S. Northcom/NORAD Political Advisor Deborah Bolton, Embassy Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora (notetaker), and U.S. Army Attache Col. Bob Applegate. Canadian representatives assigned to Colorado Springs included RAdm. J.D. Fraser (Canadian Liaison to NorthCom) and PolAd Patrick Wittman (Norad). Meeting at Privy Council Office (PCO) ------------------------------------ 3. (C/NF) Canadian Privy Council Office (PCO) military representative, R/Adm Jacques Gauvin, said that the timeline for NORAD renewal was short and it was important to come to a quick consensus on "where we are headed." Gauvin noted that the government's mandate to negotiate and conclude the 2006 NORAD Agreement would be presented to Cabinet at its February 8 meeting. As currently drafted, the mandate to negotiate would be broad and would incorporate the full range of recommendations proposed by the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG). The issue of Canadian participation in the U.S. missile defense program, however, remained a highly sensitive political issue for the minority government and thus would continue to be managed by the Prime Minister's Office. 4. (C/NF) Lt. Gen. Inge said that Canadian political sensitivities about missile defense were understood in U.S. circles. He acknowledged that both sides sensed the urgency of the NORAD renewal process. At the same time, it was important to get the basics straight, he said: For example, NORAD's basic documents must be updated to include NorthCom and the concept of asymmetric threats. On the question of expanding security cooperation to the maritime domain, Inge urged a thoughtful approach given that domain awareness was considerably larger than the operations domain. It would be important first to identify what we want to accomplish, he said, and then decided how and where to manage it. There was room in the operational domain for U.S.-only operations and Canada-only operations. An operational construct was needed to decide who does what and the relevant circumstances before assigning responsibilities. Asked if he saw Canada eventually joining NorthCom, the General thought it not out of the realm of possibility, however such a development would need careful thinking-through; a great deal depended upon NORAD renewal agreement and the path the U.S. and Canada decided to follow. 5. (C/NF) Radm. Gauvin said that with the exception of bmd, which would stay in the purview of the PMO, Canada wanted to move forward on a broad mandate for NORAD renewal and hoped the U.S. would respond in this spirit as negotiations proceeded. The most difficult area, Gauvin said, was with regard to intelligence sharing. For example, Canadians needed to know immediately what the threat was when asked to board a ship. Often the intelligence was marked NOFORN or not releasable, and it would take days to obtain clearance to release or share. Gauvin said that Canada has a "different culture in classifying documents." Marking a document "CAN Eyes Only" was very difficult, so just about everything was made releasable to U.S. whereas the U.S. tended to default to NOFORN classification. (COMMENT: Gauvin did not make the argument, as other Canadian officials have, that Canada should have blanket access to most of the USG's classified information and intelligence. END COMMENT.) Lt. General Inge said that NorthCom was working on the challenge to more routinely classify NorthCom-generated intelligence reporting as releasable. 6. (C/NF) Gauvin observed that the PCO kept a close eye on public opinion and that with the exception of missile defense, currently there was "strong support" for Canadian cooperation with the U.S. on continental defense. Lt. General Inge responded that while the concept of integrated common defense was problematic, cooperation and engagement should still move forward. There was even movement with Mexico, he noted, indicating that defense delegations recently had exchanged visits and that mil-mil cooperation had reached unprecedented levels to respond to tsunami relief efforts. The U.S. wanted to move forward with Mexico on security issues wherever it could, the General said, but recognized we would not have the same relationship as with Canada and was prepared to go slow. He welcomed Canada's support in this endeavor. R/Adm Gauvin responded that while the primary focus of Canada's relations with Mexico were with regard to economic prosperity Canada nonetheless was interested in helping out where it could on the security front. Meeting at Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) --------------------------------------- 7. (C/NF) Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy, Jim Wright, provided a detailed explanation of the government's political dilemma with regard to missile defense. He noted that in addition to domestic political divisions over MD, Russian Ambassador to Canada Georgiy Mamedov, an arms control expert, was actively lobbying against Canadian participation. He was particularly concerned about the use of Canadian territory. At the same time, Wright continued, though Mamedov had provided a great deal of negative commentary to the press, much of what he had to say was non-factual and ideologically motivated. Against this backdrop, Wright said the government was trying to move forward on participation and appealed for U.S. patience. Lt. General Inge assured Wright that the U.S. understood Canada's situation, and indicated that NorthCom was pleased that Canadian officers at NORAD were integrated into the missile warning and threat assessment function. 8. (C/NF) Wright said that the Martin Government wanted to move forward with security cooperation and noted Canada's national security policy released in April 2004. At the same time, he cautioned that the current minority government situation meant greater parliamentary review of and involvement in what would be negotiated for NORAD, and the ratification process would be more complicated than before. Wright noted that NorthCom had presented a "communications" challenge for Canada (and Mexico) when it was first stood up and that there were some initial public reservations about it on sovereignty grounds. In this political environment, Wright said, clarifying the "complementarity" of NORAD and NorthCom would be important. He endorsed folding the BPG into NORAD as part of the renewal process and said it was important to address asymmetrical threats. The government was close to getting its negotiating mandate. Canada was ready to consider seriously maritime domain awareness and some forms of land cooperation, Wright said, and reiterated Gauvin's point that the negotiating mandate would be fairly broad. It was important to be flexible and forward thinking in this process, he concluded. 9. (C/NF) Lt. General Inge reiterated the points he made to PCO's Gauvin, saying the U.S. would like to explore ways to improve NORAD and expand its functions, but we needed to see what was possible in the short term and find ways to amend and add functions when we were ready. Responding to a question about NorthCom, the General said that the Command had a platter-ful of issues before it, including force protection, working with DHS to define roles and relationships, and coordinating JTF actions in a variety of areas. 10. This cable has been cleared by Lieutenant General Inge. Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa CELLUCCI
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