US embassy cable - 05PARIS670

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000670 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS NRC; DOE FOR A/DPTY U/S FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AOKI; 
DOS FOR NP/NE COMELLA; NSC FOR HARWARD; NRC FOR 
FAULKNER/KANE/SHEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: ENRG, FR, KNNP, MNUC, PREL 
SUBJECT: U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND 
NUCLEAR COUNTER-TERRORISM, JANUARY 24 - 27, 2005 
 
REF: A. 04 PARIS 7833 
     B. 04 PARIS 5464 
 
Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 B, D 
 
1.  (U) Summary: Following up on high-level discussions held 
in July 2004 (see ref B), U.S. and French delegations held 
three days of meetings in Paris on physical security measures 
for nuclear facilities and materials, agreeing on a path 
forward to coordinate and accelerate future bilateral 
cooperation in this area. The meetings were supplemented by a 
visit to the MELOX fuel fabrication plant and a nuclear 
reactor for briefings on the security measures currently in 
place at those facilities. The French team was led by Didier 
Lallemand, Senior Official for Defense in the Ministry of 
Industry (Haut Fonctionnaire de Defense - HDF), who has 
regulatory authority for security at all French nuclear 
sites. It included active participants from all of the French 
agencies with nuclear security and safety responsibilities, 
as well as representatives of the state-owned nuclear fuel 
cycle and electrical power generation industries. The U.S. 
delegation was made up of DOE, NRC, NSC, State, and Embassy 
Paris officials. 
 
2.  (U) In opening remarks and side conversations, Lallemand 
emphasized the importance the French government attached to 
the creation of an active bilateral channel for cooperation 
on nuclear security. He said that France and the U.S. shared 
a common view of the terrorist threat, and in his view, had 
parallel approaches to security. He added that there was now 
high-level support for closer cooperation with the U.S., 
noting that he had been invited to participate in 
preparations for the upcoming visit of Secretary Rice, and 
that the results of our meeting would be briefed to the Prime 
Minister and the office of the President. It was apparent 
that a number of difficult bureaucratic and policy issues 
have been resolved on the French side, and there is now a 
strong desire to seek a closer and more cooperative 
relationship with the U.S. in the area of nuclear security, 
including the exchange of classified and other sensitive 
information. 
 
3.  (U) Both delegations provided briefings on the 
organization of nuclear security and physical protection 
within their governments, and on the implementation of 
security at fuel cycle facilities, defense nuclear 
laboratories and production plants, and nuclear power plants. 
 End Summary 
 
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Threat Assessment 
----------------- 
 
4.  (C)  During their presentations, the French made clear 
that their threat assessment now focuses on the risk of 
attack by a well-armed terrorist commando, as well as other 
forms of suicide attack, such as an aircraft strike on a 
reactor. They said that the regulatory agencies have adopted 
a design basis threat based on a team composed of a specified 
number of armed attackers  (One of their speakers disclosed - 
perhaps without authorization - that their planning is based 
on a team of six to seven attackers.) They are also moving to 
a denial-of-task philosophy for their protective posture, to 
be achieved by a combination of on-site security forces, 
physical barriers, and response forces. The reluctance of the 
electric utility (Electricite de France - EdF) to arm the 
protective forces at reactors is now a major issue for the 
governmental authorities, who are about to force action 
through new regulation. Armed security officers are already 
present at fuel cycle facilities operated by COGEMA and at 
Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat a l,Energie Atomique 
- CEA) defense nuclear sites, and are supported by both local 
and national gendarmerie response forces. CEA has developed 
an analytical methodology to evaluate the performance of 
physical security measures, using computer software to 
calculate the delays introduced by barriers, protective 
forces, and other elements of the security scheme across all 
available attack routes. An important difference between U.S. 
and French approaches is the greater visibility of our armed 
protective forces - the French acknowledged that there is a 
deterrent benefit to stationing well-equipped security 
officers at the outer perimeter of facilities, but said that 
this posed public acceptance problems for them. 
 
5.  (C) In a side discussion, Lallemand expressed interest in 
continuing to exchange threat assessments through 
intelligence channels, and in making sure that key 
intelligence judgments were also shared with those agencies 
that have operational security responsibilities. 
 
--------- 
Exercises 
--------- 
 
6.  (U) The U.S. repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
force-on-force exercises to evaluate the performance of 
security forces and other elements of the security system. 
The French described their current system of exercises, which 
includes events at the national, local, and facility level. 
Lallemand indicated that the French were interested in having 
an exchange of observers at security force exercises at 
nuclear facilities in our two countries. We agreed that this 
would be a very constructive step, and committed to look at 
schedules to identify an appropriate near-term time for such 
a visit to the U.S., to include exercises at both 
NRC-regulated and DOE sites. 
 
-------------- 
Transportation 
-------------- 
 
7.  (U) Both delegations made presentations on the security 
measures employed for shipments of Category I nuclear 
materials, and we were taken to see the control center 
operated by IRSN for real-time monitoring of shipments. The 
French described the capabilities of their vehicles and the 
qualification process for their drivers, and said they have 
recently reinforced the police escort that accompanies 
nuclear material shipments. 
 
------------------------ 
Research and Development 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (U)   The two delegations described current R&D programs 
to support physical protection, and identified a number of 
areas where additional technical exchanges could be 
beneficial.  (See para 17, below.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Visits to MELOX and the Tricastin Nuclear Power Plant 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
9.  (C) The U.S. team visited the MELOX mixed oxide fuel 
fabrication plant at Marcoule and an operating nuclear 
reactor. At both facilities we were shown security control 
rooms and received briefings on the deployment and training 
of the guard force. MELOX, which is a commercial operation of 
the COGEMA nuclear fuel cycle company, has its own organic 
armed security detail, which can be reinforced by a much 
larger force from the surrounding CEA-managed Marcoule site. 
The Tricastin reactor site does not have armed guards, but 
relies on hardening of its control rooms and a response from 
the local Gendarmerie for security. There is a Gendarmerie 
presence on-site, however, whenever fresh MOX fuel is being 
received or introduced into the reactor. The reactor is quite 
close to a public road, and there are concerns about the 
potential vulnerability of the facility to a vehicle bomb. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Regulatory base for Regulation of Radioactive Sources 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
10.  (U) The U.S. team met with safety regulators at the DGSN 
(Directorate Generale pour la Surete Nucleaire), who in 
addition to providing safety oversight for nuclear 
facilities, maintain controls over the use of radioactive 
sources. They told us they are seeking additional legal 
authority to vet source users; in some instances they have 
refused licenses to applicants where they believed there to 
be a security issue, but are not certain this would withstand 
legal challenge. 
 
-------------------- 
Bilateral Agreements 
-------------------- 
 
11.  (U) As preparation for this meeting, the French 
researched existing bilateral agreements to identify 
authorities for nuclear security-related cooperation, 
including a legal basis to share classified information. They 
believe there is a sufficiently inclusive set of agreements 
between various French agencies and both DOE and NRC to 
permit near-term implementation of the cooperation we have 
been discussing, but would like the U.S. to consider whether 
a higher-level government-to-government agreement would be 
useful as a means of simplifying and extending the existing 
arrangements to ensure that all relelvant agencies can 
participate in the joint activities. As an immediate step, 
they would like to amend the current agreement between the 
HFD and NRC to allow it to also cover exchanges with DGSN, 
(Direction Generale de la Surete Nucleaire),  the nuclear 
safety regulator, and the CEA and to expand the scope of 
possible subjects to be discussed. The U.S. delegation agreed 
to consider these proposals and to review the agreements 
currently in force. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Next Steps for Bilateral Cooperation 
------------------------------------ 
 
12.  (U) The two delegations agreed on the need to move 
quickly to develop and expand technical cooperation, 
including through visits to U.S. facilities, while 
maintaining periodic contact at the senior level. We are 
looking to hold the next senior-level meeting in the U.S. 
sometime in the September-October time frame. Lallemand 
suggested that this should be a smaller group of about four 
or five on each side, charged with steering our cooperation 
rather than a large interagency setting to provide briefings. 
This would also be a venue to discuss more sensitive issues, 
including an exchange of threat assessments, the parameters 
of cooperation to address aircraft strikes on reactors, and 
issues involving third countries. 
 
------- 
Belgium 
------- 
 
13.  (S)  On the margins of the meeting, Aoki raised with 
Lallemand U.S. concerns about physical security 
implementation in Belgium, citing a recent Belgian press 
article disclosing a May, 2004 letter on the subject by 
Secretary Powell to Foreign Minister Michel. Lallemand said 
 
SIPDIS 
that the French have little or no bilateral contact on 
physical protection issues with their Belgian counterparts, 
and that the dialogue that takes place occurs either through 
a recently-established informal group of European nuclear 
safety regulators or at the IAEA. He emphasized that France 
does not want to encourage other European countries or EU 
institutions to intervene in French domestic decision-making 
on nuclear security or safety matters, and has therefore 
avoided pressing its neighbors on these matters. Nonetheless, 
France understood that the U.S. had serious concerns about 
security implementation in Belgium, and would consider what 
it could do. Lallemand asked if we could provide any details 
about the cause for our concerns; Aoki responded that a U.S. 
team had recently visited Belgian facilities, but that we 
were constrained by confidentiality commitments from 
divulging our observations. Lallemand said he understood, but 
would still be interested in any information we could provide 
on a classified basis. 
 
14.  (U) A record of meeting drafted by the French delegation 
and agreed by the U.S. team and an annex listing priority 
areas for future collaboration are provided at para 17, 
below. The French will also collect the presentations made by 
both sides at the meetings and distribute them as a 
classified document. 
 
---------------- 
Delegation Lists 
---------------- 
 
15.  (U) French participants were: 
 
Didier Lallemand, HFD, Ministry of Industry 
Grard Charneau, HFD 
Eric Plaisant, HFD 
Frdric Joseph, HFD 
Corentin Le Doare, DGNSR, Ministry of Industry 
Jacques Aguilar, DGNSR 
Hugues de Longevialle, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Henry-Jacques Neau, AREVA 
Caroline Jorant, Areva 
Pierre Sirot, Cogema 
Jrome Sartre, Cogema 
Pascal Jaunet, Cogema 
Michel Briere, IRSN 
Jean Jalouneix, IRSN 
Bruno Autusson, IRSN 
Jean-Louis Petitclerc, IRSN 
Herv Bernard, CEA 
Didier Kechemair, CEA 
Pascal Durieux, EDF 
Bernard Boube, SGDN 
Bernard Janvier, SGDN 
Alain Munier, SGDN 
Philippe Joyer, SGDN 
 
16.  (U) U.S. participants were: 
 
Steven Aoki, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for 
Counterterrorism, DOE 
William Kane, Deputy Executive Director, NRC 
Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator for Emergency 
Operations, DOE/NNSA 
Robert Harward, NSC 
Joseph Shea, NRC 
Donald Solich, DOE 
Patricia Comella, State NP/NE 
Howard Faulkner, NRC 
Robert Dry, Science Counselor, Embassy Paris 
 
-------------- 
Summary Record 
-------------- 
 
17.  (U) The following was agreed to by the two delegations 
to reflect the discussions held. 
 
Begin Text of Summary Record: 
 
In order to maintain continuity and strengthen the exchanges 
concerning the security of nuclear material, sites, and 
transportation, DOE and NRC on the one hand, and HFD from the 
Ministry in charge of industry and the French organizations 
concerned on the other intend to meet twice a year (once in 
each country), in order to review the implementation of 
cooperation between the two Parties, to maintain an open 
informal discussion, and to exchange information. 
 
These exchanges will be based on strict reciprocity. 
 
The next meeting could take place in the US, during the fall 
in 2005. It is being understood that these meetings will be 
brief and with delegations adjusted to the topics. 
 
Available current security Agreements mentioned during 
discussions will be reassessed by each Party.  In particular, 
the opportunity to extend the scope of the 1984 Agreement 
between US NRC and the Ministry in charge of industry by 
associating CEA and DGSNR, as was decided in 2004 for IRSN 
will be studied.  The question of a new cooperation Agreement 
between DOE and the Ministry in charge of industry (HFD) will 
be studied, based on the 1977 intergovernmental Agreement, 
and with which American entities and French organizations 
concerned (IRSN, CEA, DGSNR) would be associated. 
 
Information exchanges will comply with the level of 
protection required by the State providing them, in 
conformity with applicable Agreements, and this within strict 
compliance with the protection of sensitive information, 
business confidentiality, industrial secrecy, and 
intellectual property. 
 
The two Parties have identified potential topics listed in 
Annex to the present summary record which, subject to further 
examination, could be the object of exchanges and cooperation 
efforts. 
 
ANNEX 
 
Design Basis Threat 
 
-- Methodology used for creation and the validation of the 
design basis threat for nuclear facilities and materials 
 
-- Implementation of DBT at nuclear sites - Impact on 
security posture 
 
-- Modelling and assessment of security force performance 
 
-- Methodology for treatment of internal threat 
 
-- Sharing of responsibilities between government and nuclear 
operators in prevention of acts of terrorism 
 
Exercises 
 
-- Discussion on philosophy, planning and objectives of 
exercises 
 
-- Design and implementation of exercise program 
-- Exchange of observers for exercises at sites handling cat. 
I 
 
Research and development 
 
-- Exchange of information on physical protection research 
and development priorities and program plans 
 
-- Demonstration of tools for physical protection 
applications, including advanced concepts for threat 
identification and access denial 
 
Security of Facilities from External Attack 
 
-- Exchange of methodologies for assessment of containment 
and structure performance against e.g. aircraft strikes, high 
energy attacks, other threats of interest 
 
-- Design and evaluation of transport containers to take 
account of terrorists threats 
 
-- Assessment of the consequences of illegal intended acts 
against transportation 
 
Emergency Response Procedures 
 
-- Continuation or acceleration of existing exchanges on 
responses to a terrorist event involving nuclear or 
radioactive material 
 
-- Exchange of observers for exercises 
 
Control of Radiological Sources and other Radioactive 
Materials 
 
-- Legal and regulatory implementation of controls and 
security measures on radioactive materials 
 
Basis for cooperation 
 
-- Both sides will assess the currently available bilateral 
agreements to determine whether a sufficient basis exists for 
the desired level of cooperation, including the exchange of 
sensitive and classified information. For the longer term, we 
will consider drafting a new government-to-government 
agreement. 
Leach