US embassy cable - 05MADRID395

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SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION

Identifier: 05MADRID395
Wikileaks: View 05MADRID395 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2005-02-02 16:24:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV AF SP NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AF, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 2743 B) MADRID SP 0307 
 
Classified By: Classified by Political Officer Ricardo Zuniga; reasons 
1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Coordinator for Afghanistan Maureen Quinn, 
accompanied by Department of Defense, JCS, and State 
Department officers met with Spanish MOD, MFA and Presidency 
officials on 1/26 to discuss Spain's commitment to lead a PRT 
in western Afghanistan.  Just before Ambassador Quinn's 
arrival, the GOS released a brief statement indicating that 
it was "studying" the possibility of both a Spanish 
deployment to western Afghanistan and taking over the FSB in 
Herat. The MOD meeting will be reported via septel.  GOS 
officials told the USG team that the press release was 
intended to convey Spain's determination to lead a PRT, 
though operational and political details remain to be worked 
out.  MFA Director General for Foreign Policy Rafael 
Dezcallar described the PRT decision as one of several recent 
GOS gestures aimed at repairing bilateral relations with the 
USG.  Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may 
travel to Afghanistan soon and that Spain may establish a 
permanent diplomatic mission in Kabul. 
 
2. (C) At the Presidential Palace, Deputy National Security 
Advisor Maria Alonso stressed the Zapatero Government's need 
to build public support for the deployment, given the general 
Spanish skepticism towards overseas military missions of any 
type.  She reviewed the steps necessary for the GOS to obtain 
Parliamentary approval of the PRT mission and said she was 
confident that the deployment would be approved with minimal 
debate.  She said Spain would also like to further discuss 
the USG offer to consider providing civilian experts to aid 
the PRT, per REF A points.  End Summary. 
 
//MFA:  SPAIN COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN// 
 
3. (C) MOD DG for Policy Admiral Torrente confirmed to 
Ambassador Quinn that Spain plans to lead a PRT in western 
Afghanistan, specifically at Qal'eh-ye Now, and to contribute 
troops to the FSB at Herat.  Full details of the MOD meeting 
will be provided septel. 
 
4. (C) At the MFA, DG Dezcallar pointed to the success of 
ISAF and OEF operations in Afghanistan as a "demonstration 
that multilateralism can be effective" and said NATO could be 
proud of its work in "helping the Afghans help themselves." 
Ambassador Quinn agreed that much had been accomplished, 
especially through new models such as PRTs.  She welcomed the 
news of Spain's decision to lead a PRT in western Afghanistan 
and to participate in the Herat FSB. 
 
5. (C) Dezcallar said the PRT decision was "intentionally 
leaked" by the GOS in order to convey Spain's commitment to 
the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan.  He said this 
was driven by strategic considerations, since Spain's 
investigation of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid 
suggested that the order to carry out the bombing had come 
from individuals based in Afghanistan. 
 
//NEXT STEPS ON SPANISH PRT// 
 
6. (C) While Dezcallar emphasized that the GOS has made the 
political decision to participate in a PRT, he also noted 
that several steps remain.  First, Spain will send a team of 
MOD and MFA experts to Afghanistan to scout the precise 
locations where Spanish forces will be deployed:  Herat and 
Qal'eh)ye Now (NOTE: The scouting team departed for 
Afghanistan on 1/28. END NOTE).  Second, the GOS will analyze 
the report of the team and deliver a recommendation to 
President Zapatero as to how Spain's deployment should 
proceed.  Lastly, President Zapatero will "consult" with 
Parliament to gain legislative support for the mission. 
 
//MENDING FENCES WITH USG// 
 
7. (C) Dezcallar made clear that an important factor in 
Spain's decision to proceed with a PRT was their sense that 
it would help bring an end to bilateral tensions between 
Madrid and Washington.  Dezcallar said he knew the USG 
appreciated actions more than words, so Spain had moved ahead 
on Afghanistan and other issues, including Spain's 
contribution of $20 million to the UNDP to support the Iraq 
elections, GOS diplomatic efforts to encourage good behavior 
on the part of Iraq's neighbors, and the decision of 
President Zapatero not to stop in Venezuela during his visit 
to Latin America.  Dezcallar said he hoped these positive 
steps would be recognized by the USG and would encourage 
reciprocal gestures from Washington.  He said "normalization" 
of ties with Spain would help both sides work together to 
advance the USG's "ambitious reform process" in the Mideast 
and suggested Spain's experience with the Barcelona Process 
could prove useful for the U.S.  Ambassador Quinn said the 
USG appreciated the positive steps taken by the GOS and  told 
Dezcallar that she would carry his message to Washington. 
 
//DEEPER SPANISH ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN// 
 
8. (C) Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may 
travel to Afghanistan in the next several months.  In 
addition, Spain hopes to establish a permanent diplomatic 
mission soon in Kabul and would eventually like to open an 
embassy.  Ambassador Quinn encouraged this increased GOS 
engagement, saying the Afghan people were counting on the 
international community to help them realize their growing 
hopes for stability and economic growth.  Dezcallar noted 
that the GOS has directed aid to Afghanistan through the 
Asian Development Bank, but would be willing to study other 
possible assistance projects, including on counter narcotics. 
 
 
//OEF)ISAF MERGER// 
9. (C) At Dezcallar's request, the USG team briefed him on 
the security situation in Afghanistan and the state of play 
among the various regional leaders and factions.  Dezcallar 
said he was encouraged by the USG's information regarding 
improved security conditions and suggested that coordination 
between ISAF and OEF operations will have to improve and 
perhaps even be merged as ISAF moves westward. (NOTE: We 
assume Dezcallar was suggesting the merger of the missions 
under an overall NATO command, since it is highly unlikely 
the GOS would place Spanish forces at the disposition of a 
U.S. command through participation in OEF.  END NOTE.) 
Ambassador Quinn agreed that integration is the right move, 
but said that we have no set timeline.  She noted the already 
high level of coordination between OEF and ISAF personnel. 
 
//PRESIDENCY: A FEW BUMPS ON THE ROAD TO PRT// 
 
10. (C) In her meeting with Deputy National Security Advisers 
Maria Alonso and Diego de Ojeda, Ambassador Quinn expressed 
the USG's appreciation of Spain's decision to lead a PRT and 
to contribute forces to the FSB in Herat.  Alonso, who covers 
the North America account, said the GOS was pleased that the 
MOD and MFA had presented a good plan for Spain's 
participation and that the GOS now had to explain the mission 
to a public skeptical of any Spanish military deployment 
abroad.  Alonso was confident that the GOS would have no 
problem in gaining Parliamentary approval for the deployment 
since the Popular Party, the largest opposition party, 
supported the NATO mission in Afghanistan.  However, Diego de 
Ojeda pointed out that the PRT proposal would have to be 
slipped in between major legislative action on controversial 
internal issues, perhaps briefly delaying formal approval of 
the PRT.  Also the two small leftist parties that generally 
work with the Socialists to give them a Parliamentary 
majority will vote against Spain's leadership of a PRT, 
creating a minor, but unwelcome rift within the center-left. 
 
//USG SUPPORT// 
 
11. (C) Alonso indicated that Spain wants to emphasize the 
civil reconstruction aspect of its PRT, but lacks civilian 
experts to support that element of the mission.  Spain hopes 
to establish strong links to NGOs already operating in 
western Afghanistan.  Alonso also alluded to the USG offer 
per REF A to consider making U.S. civilian experts available 
to buttress the Spanish deployment, saying Spain would 
appreciate such assistance.  Ambassador Quinn and Alonso 
discussed the makeup of the existing PRTs and the USG team 
urged Spain to study all of the models in developing its own 
plans. 
MANZANARES 

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