US embassy cable - 05ATHENS355

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AMBASSADOR'S BALKANS LUNCH HIGHLIGHTS GREECE'S DESIRE FOR LEADERSHIP ROLE

Identifier: 05ATHENS355
Wikileaks: View 05ATHENS355 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Athens
Created: 2005-02-02 16:14:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV GR AMB
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR, AMB 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S BALKANS LUNCH HIGHLIGHTS GREECE'S 
DESIRE FOR LEADERSHIP ROLE 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  At a February 1 lunch hosted by Ambassador 
to discuss Balkans issues, Greek MFA Balkans Director 
Mallias, recently returned from a visit to Washington, 
advocated for the EU to involve itself more in Kosovo -- 
ideally, administering the territory until final status 
negotiations are complete.  He agreed that Serbia needed to 
do more on ICTY cooperation, and said that delivering war 
crimes indictees should be linked to explicit rewards, such 
as PfP membership.  Asked about Greece's vaunted Balkan 
Reconstruction Fund, Mallias answered that the GoG was moving 
ahead, having already allocated 90 of the total 500 million 
euros, but that Greece needed to be more careful in 
accounting for expenditures.  Other participants urged U.S. 
engagement in the Balkans and worried that USG preoccupation 
with Iraq would reduce U.S. commitment to the region.  The 
lunch, also attended by opposition leader Papandreou's 
foreign policy advisor, highlighted the extent to which 
Balkans policy is not a partisan issue here: both big parties 
support a leadership role for Greece in the region and 
broadly similar approaches.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  Greek invitees to Ambassador's February 1 Balkan 
issues lunch included:  Ambassador Alexandros Mallias, Head 
of the MFA's Balkans Directorate; Panayiotis Kammenos, Vice 
Chairman of the Parliament Foreign Relations Committee; 
Professor Costas Yfantis, Associate Professor of 
International Relations, University of Athens, and Director 
of the MFA's Center of Analysis and Policy Planning; Dimitris 
Droutsas, foreign policy advisor to opposition PASOK leader 
George Papandreou; and Vassilis Costis, Deputy Head of the 
MFA's Balkans Directorate. 
 
Kosovo Status, Haradinaj, U.S. engagement 
 
3.  (C)  Reflecting remarks he made during his recent visit 
to Washington, Ambassador Mallias said it made the most sense 
for the EU to administer Kosovo until final status is 
achieved.  Asked if the EU was willing to engage in this way, 
Mallias admitted that it would be a difficult task, noting 
that European Commission officials had argued to him that the 
EC had no experience with "administering colonies." 
Nevertheless, Mallias maintained that the EU had to be more 
involved in Kosovo to make clear the benefits of an EU 
perspective and to better monitor progress. 
 
4.  (C)  Mallias had praise for PM Haradinaj, with whom he 
talked in the past week, saying that Haradinaj wanted to move 
ahead on matters affecting Kosovar Serbs, such as the 
rebuilding of Orthodox churches damaged in the March 2004 
violence.  Asked about Haradinaj's possible indictment for 
war crimes, Mallias answered that it was just a matter of 
time, as ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte had signaled her 
intention to go ahead. 
 
5.  (C)  Parliament Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Kammenos 
argued that nothing in Kosovo would change without first 
establishing security for all inhabitants and ridding the 
area of organized criminal gangs, including those that 
traffic in humans.  In this regard, he made a strong pitch 
for the U.S. to remain engaged in Kosovo (and in the Balkan 
region generally):  only the U.S. can provide the security 
that is needed; the EU still cannot.  Picking up on this 
theme, Professor Yfantis commented that some Greeks believed 
the U.S. was no longer interested in the Balkans because of 
its preoccupation with Iraq.  Ambassador answered that the 
Balkans remained an area of strategic interest for 
Washington. 
 
Serbia 
 
6.  (C)  Ambassador noted that the news out of Serbia was 
fairly bleak, particularly regarding cooperation with ICTY 
and on Kosovo.  Mallias agreed with this assessment, saying 
that the country "had lost five years" on its path toward 
trans-Atlantic integration, but that there had been some 
recent good news, such as the intended surrender of indicted 
war criminal General Lazarevic to ICTY.  Mallias argued in 
favor of telling the Serbs explicitly that cooperation on 
delivering the other Serb indictees to ICTY would bring clear 
benefits, such as moving ahead with Serb membership in NATO's 
Partnership for Peace. 
 
Albanian Elections 
 
7.  (C)  Mallias agreed with Ambassador's comment that the 
2005 general elections in Albania represent an important 
litmus test of that country's progress, and mentioned that 
Greece remains concerned about electoral developments, 
particularly as they relate to Greek minority areas in the 
south of the country.  (Note:  On February 2 Mallias' deputy, 
Vassilis Costis, called us to say the GoG would weigh in with 
the Albanians to urge that there be no changes to electoral 
districts in the months before the elections.  Costis said 
that Greek minority contacts in Albania have voiced their 
fears to the GoG about being gerrymandered, and asked if the 
USG would raise this issue with the Albanians as well.  End 
Note.) 
 
Balkan Reconstruction Fund 
 
8. (C)  Asked the status of Greece's 500 million euro Balkan 
Reconstruction Fund (BRF), Mallias said that some 20 percent 
had already been allocated, all in the form of co-financing 
of private investments.  He added that few if any of the 
direct government-to-government grants have been allocated. 
While reiterating his government's commitment to the Fund, 
Mallias cited his government's present budget crisis as 
putting a crimp on disbursements.  He also mentioned that his 
government had to be extremely careful in accounting for BRF 
money, noting that the GoG had not been able to determine how 
USD 200 million was spent in Albania in 1997-1999. 
Understanding the difficulty of funding appropriate projects 
and establishing large-scale aid missions, the Ambassador 
offered to arrange meetings with appropriate USG personnel 
who could offer assistance to Greece in this regard.  Mallias 
agreed that this could be useful.  For his part, Dimitris 
Droutsas, foreign policy advisor to opposition PASOK leader 
Papandreou, pointed out that the Fund was initiated under 
PASOK and welcomed the GoG's continued commitment to it. 
 
Greece's SEECP Chairmanship 
 
9.  (C)  Mallias related that during its upcoming SEECP 
Chairmanship, Greece would focus on making the SEECP more 
effective by holding closed-door, ministers-only meetings, 
rather than the large, showy, highly-publicized SEECP 
meetings of the past.  Greece wanted there to be serious 
discussion of the main Balkans issues, such as Kosovo's 
status, and believed this could best be achieved in this 
manner.  Also, Greece would initiate a "harmonization of 
textbooks" project to put an end to Balkan schoolchildren 
learning that "our country's territory is far too small, 
while our neighbor's is far too big." 
 
10. (C)  COMMENT:  Mallias' comments suggest that Greece, 
both the government and opposition, realizes this is an 
important year for Balkan developments -- Kosovo status 
review, Serbia at the crossroads, Albanian elections -- and 
wants to see the EU play a far greater role in the region. 
At the same time, we didn't sense much optimism on the Greek 
side that they would succeed in convincing EU partners to 
take on still more of the responsibilities.  END COMMENT. 

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