US embassy cable - 05PARIS665

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, FR 
SUBJECT: FURTHER FRENCH REACTION TO IRAQ ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 656 
     B. PARIS 601 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and comment:  During a brief February 2 
discussion with us on Iraq's recent elections, the 
Presidency's new Middle East advisor stressed two points: 1) 
the need to ensure Sunni inclusion in the political process, 
which remains precarious, and 2) the need to help the new 
Iraqi authorities -- a departure from typical French talking 
points on Iraq.  On the latter point, the Middle East advisor 
stressed that the GoF understood that that President Bush 
wanted France to do more on Iraq, and reiterated GoF 
readiness to help Iraq both through police training and other 
means, such as training civil administration.   End summary 
and comment. 
 
2. (C) During a February 2 introductory call on Presidential 
Technical Advisor for Middle East/Americas Dominique Boche 
which focused largely on Syria/Lebanon (ref a), we also 
sought further GoF reaction to Iraq's successful January 30 
elections.  Boche, referring to the January 31 telephone 
conversation between President Bush and Chirac, observed that 
the GoF was delighted by the election results, which 
represented a failure for terrorists.  At the same time, 
Boche expressed concern over potential dangers ahead.  In the 
GoF view, the low turnout of Sunni Arabs represented a 
potential danger and destabilizing factor not only for Iraq, 
but for the rest of the region.  The GoF viewed low Sunni 
turnout as the combined result of boycotts and intimidation, 
and the possible consequence was that Iraq's election might 
deepen cleavages between Iraq's communities.  In order to 
avoid this outcome, the GoF hoped that this new phase of 
Iraq's transition would involve a relaunch of national 
dialogue so "no one who rejects violence" was excluded from 
the process.  Boche conceded that it was up to the new Iraqi 
government to decide what form such overtures might take, but 
one possibility might be some form of national reconciliation 
conference.  It was essential, in the GoF view, that drafting 
of the constitution take place in a similar inclusive spirit, 
with Sunnis part of the process.  Poloff responded by 
stressing our strong support for an inclusive political 
process, and noted that all of Iraq's major political groups 
had endorsed this concept.  Boche accepted the point, but 
added that we needed to ensure that Iraq did not become an 
Islamic republic; he agreed that statements by Iraq's leading 
Shi'a parties against such an eventuality and in support of 
secular government were reassuring. 
 
3. (C) In addition to ensuring greater inclusion in the 
political process for Sunnis, Boche said that helping the new 
Iraqi authorities was a second necessity, in the GoF view. 
On this point, Boche affirmed that the GoF understood that 
President Bush wanted France to do more on Iraq, and expected 
the U.S. to press this issue during high-level encounters 
later this month.  Chirac had sought to emphasize to 
President Bush French readiness, not only to help Iraq via 
police training, but through other means, such as training 
civil administration.  On the training proposal, Boche 
stressed that the GoF offer had been long-standing and was 
not a new development; what was needed now was responsiveness 
from the Iraqi side, which hopefully would be more 
forthcoming in the aftermath of IIG President Yawer's 
successful December visit to Paris. 
 
4. (C) Comment: While concern over Sunni inclusion is a 
long-standing French concern, emphasizing the need to help 
the Iraqi government is a new French talking point on Iraq. 
While we don't want to overstate the significance of one 
official's comments, we see Boche's remarks as encouraging 
and hopefully indicative of a more forward-looking French 
approach on Iraq, in advance of key meetings with U.S. 
officials.  At the same time, we note that past, open-ended 
French statements of willingness to help Iraq have gone 
largely unimplemented.  End comment. 
 
5. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
Leach