US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI826

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REACTING TO NEPAL, INDIA WILL NOT ATTEND THE SAARC SUMMIT

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI826
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI826 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-02-02 12:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IN BG PK NP India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IN, BG, PK, NP, India-Nepal, SAARC 
SUBJECT: REACTING TO NEPAL, INDIA WILL NOT ATTEND THE SAARC 
SUMMIT 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 792 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The MEA announced on February 2 that India 
will not attend the SAARC Summit scheduled for February 6-7 
in Dhaka.  Both publicly and privately, GOI officials cited 
both King Gyanendra's actions in Nepal on February 1, and the 
security situation in Dhaka following the violence of January 
27, as the reasons for the decision.  Foreign policy 
commentators noted that Nepal weighed more heavily, but the 
GOI was also looking to send a message to Dhaka about the 
political situation there.  Indicative of the extent of the 
deliberations in calling off India's participation, PM Singh 
consulted former PM Vajpayee prior to making his final 
decision -- a rare instance of foreign policy bipartisanship 
that came in the midst of a bitter state election season. 
Multilaterally only SAARC trade negotiations are likely to 
suffer from this further delay, but bilaterally India's 
decision puts off important air clearing for Manmohan Singh 
with his Pakistani and Bangladeshi counterparts.  End Summary. 
 
Convergence of Events 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Explaining that it was the result of a combination of 
recent developments in Nepal and concern over the security 
situation in Dhaka, Under Secretary (Bangladesh) Puneet 
Kundal told Poloff on February 2 that India will not attend 
the thirteenth SAARC Summit in Dhaka as scheduled.  MEA Joint 
Secretary (Nepal, Bhutan) Ranjit Rae remarked to PolCouns and 
 
SIPDIS 
Poloff that Nepal had a lot to do with it, and Joint 
Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar added that "Bangladesh has 
 
SIPDIS 
not made things any easier with their behavior."  Kundal 
added that concerns over the safety of Indian officials 
traveling to Dhaka following the August 27 attack which 
killed MP and former Awami League finance minister Shah 
A.M.S. Kibria and reports of bomb blasts near the hotel in 
which the Prime Minister was scheduled to stay, factored into 
the GOI's decision. 
 
No Photos with Gyanendra 
------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Foreign affairs commentator, Jyoti Malhotra remarked 
to Poloff that both Nepal and Bangladesh influenced the GOI's 
decision, but King Gyanendra's actions in Kathmandu weighed 
more heavily.  Malhotra observed that the message for Nepal 
is that "India will not stand for this kind of behavior," 
adding that when in 1999 Pakistan's President Musharraf came 
to power through a coup, India did not attend the SAARC 
Summit for two years. 
 
4.  (U) Following the GOI's strong statement against 
Gyanendra for disposing with democracy (ref A), some foreign 
policy watchers had speculated that his attendance at the 
Summit would put India in "an embarrassing position."  The 
"Telegraph's" Pranay Sharma remarked that India's engagement 
with Gyanendra at the Summit would grant legitimacy to the 
King's undemocratic actions.  Foreign Secretary Saran was 
pushed hard on this question of who India was blaming at a 
February 2 press briefing, leading one journalist to conclude 
that Nepal was the "straw that broke the camel's back." 
 
5.  (C) After the GOI's announcement on February 2, Sharma 
told Poloff that the GOI can point to this decision as 
supporting both pro-democracy groups in Kathmandu and the 
opposition Awami League in Dhaka.  Malhotra concurred, noting 
that "India stood up for its Awami League friends."  Sharma 
commented that since the August 21, 2004 attack on opposition 
leader Sheikh Hasina, India had been thinking about taking 
some action with respect to Bangladesh.  After the January 27 
violence, some officials were urging a reconsideration of 
India's attendance at the Summit, and "Nepal just gave them 
another reason."  Indicative of the extent of the 
deliberations in calling off India's participation, PM Singh 
consulted former PM Vajpayee prior to making his final 
decision.  This encounter represented a rare gesture of 
foreign policy bipartisanship amid a bitter election season 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) The crisis in Nepal was apparently the prime 
motivator in New Delhi's decision to not attend the SAARC 
Summit, but certainly conditions in Dhaka did not help.  Not 
having the Summit could lead to further delay on the most 
important SAARC initiative, the South Asia Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA), which the members had hoped to roll out in January 
2006.  It also means that important air clearing bilateral 
meetings between PM Singh and Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz and 
Bangladeshi PM Zia, and the PM's first trip to one of India's 
neighbors, are all on the back burner for now.  For 
India-Pakistan relations there is some consolation in that FM 
Natwar Singh is scheduled to be in Islamabad later this 
month, but for ties with Dhaka, the sinking Summit carries 
more weight. 
MULFORD 

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