US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI825

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, EAID, PREF, ASEC, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: NEPAL SITUATION "WORST CASE SCENARIO" FOR INDIA 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 792 
     B. AMCONSUL CALCUTTA E-MAILS 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  King Gyanendra's decision to dissolve the 
government is a "worst case scenario," driving the Maoists 
and the political parties together, undermining the monarchy, 
and muzzling politicians rather than the Maoists, MEA Joint 
Secretary (Nepal and Bhutan) Ranjit Rae told PolCouns and 
 
SIPDIS 
Poloffs on February 2.  India remains concerned about the 
situation there, including reports that political leaders 
outside Kathmandu are being arrested and detained, that the 
army had assumed responsibility for the security of 
government leaders, and that Nepalese were fleeing across the 
border into India.  Rae was pleased with US and Indian 
cooperation thus far and said India was still considering 
whether to dispatch a special envoy to the King who would 
threaten, among other things, to curtail military assistance 
to Nepal.  He repeatedly asked about section 508 of the 
Foreign Appropriations Act, and whether it would apply in 
this case.  Rae said he was unsure of the Chinese role in the 
developments in Nepal.  The local press and non-government 
contacts generally praised India's tough stance, but argued 
that the US and New Delhi should have taken a firmer line 
with the Palace at an earlier date.  See action request 
paragraph 8.  End Summary. 
 
The Worst Case Scenario 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Describing the King's actions as the "worst case 
scenario," Joint Secretary Ranjit Rae told PolCouns that 
Gyanendra may have undermined not only multiparty democracy 
but the monarchy itself.  He worried that the political 
parties and the Maoists would now unite against the Palace, a 
move Rae observed was already beginning.  Calling the 
implications "pretty serious," he hoped the King had not made 
a "terrible misjudgment," seeking to curtail the Maoists but 
only muzzling the political parties. 
 
3.  (C) Citing "worrying" reports from the Indian Embassy in 
Nepal, Rae said that the army was not only arresting 
political leaders in Kathmandu but was also detaining 
politicians in the Terai, Jhapa, and other areas.  Some of 
these detainees may have been relocated.  He reported that 
the army had assumed responsibility for protection of 
political leaders, a function once reserved for the police. 
 
4.  (C) In a private conversation on February 1, Foreign 
Secretary Saran expressed concerns to the DCM regarding 
 
SIPDIS 
reports that many Nepalese, including politicians, had been 
crossing the border into India.  AmConsul Calcutta followed 
up with contacts near the Bihar border who noted that 
although border security had been stepped up in recent weeks 
because of increased Maoist activity and the February 3 State 
Assembly elections in Bihar, the communication shutdown and 
generally porous border made it difficult to determine how 
many Nepalese had fled to India. 
 
US-India Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Rae expressed satisfaction with the convergence of 
the US and Indian approaches to Nepal thus far, and requested 
that the two countries continue to cooperate.  Rae told 
PolCouns that India was privately sending "very strong" 
messages to the King, and was considering appointing a 
Special Representative for this purpose.  He hoped that the 
upcoming phone call between NSA Hadley and his Indian 
counterpart would produce a consensus on additional sources 
of leverage to use vis-a-vis the Palace, and noted that India 
was might curtail its considerable assistance to the Royal 
Nepal Army (RNA), but had not yet reached a decision on the 
matter.  Rae asked repeatedly about Section 508 of the 
Foreign Appropriations Act (an issue we had not raised in 
discussions with the GOI) and whether it would apply in this 
case.  PolCouns responded that we had not yet received 
guidance on this topic, but that we would get back to him. 
The Role of China 
----------------- 
 
6.  (C) Asked about the role of China, Rae stated that he did 
not "know what to make of the Chinese statement" in which the 
PRC called developments in Nepal an internal matter.  In an 
article in "The Pioneer" Retired Major General Ashok Mehta 
speculated that the King may be "trying to play the China 
card."  Specifically, this theory holds that the King is 
counting on unstinting support from Beijing to ride out 
pressure from Delhi, Washington, and London. 
 
US and India Should Have Done More 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Foreign policy commentators, retired diplomats, and 
academics with no knowledge of our private diplomacy, 
continue to weigh in on the situation in Nepal, arguing that 
India and the US should have taken a firmer stance against 
the Palace before the King acted.  Former Ambassador to Nepal 
KV Rajan described the US and Indian statements as "a step in 
the right direction" and urged both countries to continue to 
call publicly for a restoration of democracy.  He also 
underlined the need for greater track II dialogue, saying 
it's a little late for that, "but it would still be a good 
start."  Foreign affairs strategist C Raja Mohan argued in 
"The Indian Express" that India would now need to match its 
strong words with purposeful actions, and observed that the 
King had gambled that India would reluctantly support the 
monarchy when faced with a choice between the Maoists and the 
Palace.  General Ashok Mehta argued that the King's actions 
reflect his obsession with power, and said it was unlikely 
that that the King would ever restore democracy. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
8.  (C) Given the MEA's interest in the outcome of 
deliberations on section 508 of the Foreign Appropriations 
Act, we would appreciate specific guidance on its 
non-applicability to the situation in Nepal. 
MULFORD