US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT481

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, PTER, KU 
SUBJECT: FM AND SENIOR MP TELL U/S BOLTON IRANIAN NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION A CONCERN; SAY ARTICLE 98 WILL PASS 
 
REF: 04 USUN 2176 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  During a January 29 visit to Kuwait, Under 
Secretary Bolton shared with FM Shaykh Dr. Mohammed and MP 
 
SIPDIS 
Mohammed Al-Sager U.S. concerns about Iran's nuclear 
activities and the firm belief that UNSC involvement is 
necessary.  Bolton said the U.S. was following the European 
negotiations with Iran, but was skeptical that any agreement 
could be reached when the two sides have opposing goals.  The 
U.S. continues to believe that the IAEA Board, when in meets 
in June, should recommend the matter to the UNSC, and 
welcomed assistance from the GOK with the board member 
countries that also belong to the OIC.  Dr. Mohammed and 
Al-Sager agreed that Iran poses a threat to the Gulf and said 
GCC members have been very blunt with the GOI about its 
nuclear aspirations.  Dr. Mohammed recommended exhausting all 
diplomatic channels, while Al-Sager favored "power and 
force."  Both, however, believed it was useful to continue 
U.S.-GOK consultations on Iran.  On other issues, Dr. 
Mohammed and Al-Sager promised passage of the Article 98 
Agreement, although Al-Sager called for a more active GOK 
role in advocating the agreement in Parliament.  They also 
expressed concern about recent security incidents in Kuwait 
and hoped for a peaceful election in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
There's Nothing Civil About Iran's Nuclear Program 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2.  (C)  Referring to their September meeting on the margins 
of the UNGA, Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security John R. Bolton told Kuwaiti Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah on 
January 29 that he was in Kuwait to follow up Dr. Mohammed's 
suggestion to talk about the threats posed by Iran's nuclear 
weapon and ballistic missile programs (reftel).  Bolton 
explained that Iran's nuclear aspirations are cause for 
concern, and equally troubling are measures to develop the 
capacity to deliver such weapons.  There is no need for such 
a high level of activity for purely civilian uses.  Moreover, 
reports that Iran is trying to fit a warhead into the nose of 
a Shahad III suggests a sophisticated interest in 
weaponization.  It is important that the international 
community address this threat and Iran's violation of 
obligations under the NPT.  Bolton added that the U.S. 
believes the time is right for UNSC involvement and left with 
Dr. Mohammed a non-paper on options for dealing with Iran's 
nuclear program in the UNSC.  He further stated there are 
no/no plans for military action against Iran and that the 
U.S. does not support an attack by Israel. 
 
 
UNSC Involvement Will Put Security Ahead of Commerce 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C)  Bolton told Dr. Mohammed that although the U.S. and 
its European partners had the same goals regarding Iran's 
nuclear program -- that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons --, 
we differed on approach.  Europe believes continued 
negotiation with the GOI will succeed.  The U.S. sees no 
reconciliation between Europe's insistence that Iran abandon 
its uranium enrichment program and Iran's clear refusal to do 
so.  As long as negotiations continue between the EU-3 and 
Iran, the IAEA will not refer the matter to the UNSC.  The 
June meeting of the IAEA Board may be crucial.  He welcomed 
the GOK's recommendations on how to approach the June meeting 
and how best to interact with the four OIC members on the 
board -- Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Pakistan.  In the 
interim, the U.S. would continue to encourage Russia not to 
ship fuel to the Bushehr reactor and China not to provide 
technical assistance.  Bolton reported that Russia is aware 
of Iran's activities, but is reluctant to cease all nuclear 
cooperation absent additional proof.  There has been some 
success with China through the enforcement of unilateral 
sanctions.  Nevertheless, UNSC involvement would be more 
effective given the authority vested in the body and the need 
for Council members to make decisions based on security and 
not their commercial interests.  Bolton also noted concerns 
about DRPK cooperation with Iran on missile development. 
 
Libya Can Be a Model for Iran 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Responding to Dr. Mohammed's questions about Libya's 
former capabilities, Bolton reported Libya had asked 
Pakistani national A. Q. Khan to provide all the technology 
and equipment to construct a weapon.  Nevertheless, since 
Qadhafi's December 2003 decision, the Libyan program was 
stopped at an early stage.  Libya's nuclear program now rests 
in the U.S. and the GOL has agreed not to purchase missiles 
outside of the MCTR constraints.  As a result, there has been 
increasing bilateral coordination.  Bolton noted that Iran 
could learn from the Libyan example. 
 
GOK and GCC Do Not Support Iran's Nuclear Goals 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  (C)  Dr. Mohammed welcomed the Under Secretary's comments 
and said the Gulf countries are extremely concerned about 
Iran's nuclear technology program and ambitions.  Iran's 
activities, according to the Foreign Minister, "present an 
uncertainty that we cannot live with."  This concern was 
expressed at the last GCC meeting.  He added that Kuwait's 
National Assembly recently questioned the GOK about the 
Bushehr plant and plans to protect Kuwait from a 
Chernobyl-like event.  Kuwait also fears Iranian development 
of chemical and biological weapons.  Additionally, Kuwait is 
deeply worried that Israel might launch a preemptive strike 
against Iran's nuclear facilities.  Despite these concerns, 
Dr. Mohammed reported that Gulf states want to give the 
Europeans time to reach a deal with Iran before resorting to 
the UNSC.  They believe diplomacy can succeed and have 
encouraged Iran to act responsibly.  Dr. Mohammed added that 
during FM Kharazzai's October 2004 visit to Kuwait, he 
cautioned Kharazzai that Iran is alone with regard to nuclear 
issues and there would be no support from the GOK or GCC. 
Dr. Mohammed opined that a large part of the problem is the 
Iranian psyche:  Iran is surrounded by neighbors that possess 
nuclear technology and developing such technology is a matter 
of national pride that transcends political, economic, or 
social schisms.  He added that press reports on possible 
military action against Iran muddied the issue and caused the 
GOI to dig in its heels.  Dr. Mohammed hoped a successful 
election in Iraq would exert pressure on Iran -- and others 
in the region -- on the need for reform, and may afford 
opportunities for "creative diplomacy". 
 
 
Kuwait to Focus on Home-Grown Terror 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  Turning to other security issues, Dr. Mohammed 
asserted Kuwait's determination to confront terrorists and 
prevent militants from crossing the borders.  He said Kuwait 
is focusing more attention on domestic threats, including 
financiers of terror activities, and working closely with its 
neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia.  He added the GOK 
followed with great interest news reports of a possible dirty 
bomb in Boston and was concerned about domestic use of a 
similar tactic. 
 
Skip Diplomacy; Iran Only Understands "Force and Power" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
7.  (C)  The Under Secretary relayed the same concerns on 
Iran to Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee Mohammed Al-Sager.  Al-Sager shared Dr. 
Mohammed's views about Iran's nuclear program, but said the 
GOI only understands "force and power."  He too was critical 
of articles in the U.S. press about military action against 
Iran and explained that the Arab world interprets these 
articles as U.S. support for Israeli interests. 
 
Article 98 Will Pass....Eventually 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Commenting on the status of the Article 98 
Agreement, Al-Sager said the agreement was still with his 
committee and he anticipated members would approve it and 
send it to the full Parliament within the month. 
Nonetheless, he criticized the GOK, saying it did not push 
hard enough for speedy ratification. He predicted that 
fundamentalists and Islamists would have a "field day" 
attacking the U.S. when the agreement goes to the floor, but 
that with pressure from the GOK, it would easily pass.  He 
encouraged Ambassador LeBaron to press Dr. Mohammed, who 
earlier told Bolton the Agreement was on the fast-track, on 
the need for the prompt and decisive action. 
 
U.S. Too Soft on Fundamentalists 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Turning to security developments, he said post-9/11, 
the U.S. did not place ample pressure on Islamist and 
fundamentalist groups.  He said there was too much pressure 
in other sectors, but recommend the U.S. press the GOK and 
other governments to respond more swiftly and firmly against 
political Islam.  He was particularly critical of Islamist 
universities, arguing that the Arab world needed doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, and computer programmers, not PhDs in 
Shari'a. 
 
Iraqi Elections:  A Learning Experience 
--------------------------------------- 
10.  (C)  Responding to Bolton's question about Iraqi 
elections, Al-Sager said he was opposed to the timing of the 
elections and did not believe the Iraqi people were ready. 
He, however, agreed with the Under Secretary that elections 
were a learning opportunity for the Iraqi people and would 
give them a greater stake in the future of the country.  He 
supported a significant Sunni presence in the elected 
government, hoped PM Allawi would be the one to form the new 
government, and recommended an increased focus on rebuilding 
the oil and gas sectors. 
 
11.  (U)  Under Secretary Bolton has cleared this message. 
 
12.  (U)  Baghdad:  Minimize considered. 
 
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