US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI111

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THREAT LETTER

Identifier: 05DJIBOUTI111
Wikileaks: View 05DJIBOUTI111 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2005-02-02 10:51:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER ASEC DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 000111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/ICI/PII, DS/CC, DS/ITA, DS/IP/AF 
CJTF-HOA FOR J2X, ATFP, KBR, MARCENT S-2 AND MARCENT ATFP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2025 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, DJ 
SUBJECT: THREAT LETTER 
 
REF: SPOT REPORT DATED 02/01/2005 
 
Classified By: RSO MARC RAMOS FOR REASON 1.4(F) AND (G) 
 
1. (SBU)  - BEGIN SUMMARY- On 02/01/2005 at 1100 hours, the 
Embassy's Human Resources assistant passed an envelope to the 
RSO indicating that enclosed in the envelope was a threat 
letter.  After careful review of the letter, RSO immediately 
notified Post Management, Host Nation security services and 
U.S. Military personnel at Camp Lemonier.  The Djiboutian 
National Security Service is pursuing the nature and validity 
of the threat and will continue to keep the RSO informed of 
any updates. - END SUMMARY- 
 
2. (SBU) On 02/01/2005 at 1100 hours, RSO was notified by the 
Human Resources assistant that a letter was discovered in the 
employment application box located outside of the compound 
perimeter adjacent to the Compound Access Control (CAC). 
This box is readily available to the public after visitors 
have been screened by perimeter security.  The letter is 
written on the front and back of two sheets of note paper 
enclosed in a standard letter envelope and post marked in 
Djibouti on 12 January, 2005. 
 
3. (S) The letter is addressed to the U.S. Embassy's local 
address and the return address reads, "from Mohmed Elmi, C/O 
Mued Souban, P.O. Box 7474, Djibouti".  The letter is written 
in poor English, but the writing is legible and neat.  At the 
top of the first page of the letter is written "From 
President of Association Jobless Men of Local Djiboutians; 
Address Rue 2 Q7 Biss, Tel. 34-15-33, Djibouti City". 
Underneath the address in large letters are the words 
"Warning to US".  Although the writing is difficult to make 
sense of, it is clear that the author is attempting to 
threaten the Embassy and Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR - DOD 
contractor located at Camp Lemonier for the results of both 
organizations employment procedures.  Several warnings are 
written in the letter to include "we will destroy you,"  "he 
who warned you - has not yet killed you," and "warning to 
U.S. citizen."  Another telephone number, 83-22-55, is 
written on the third page as the point of contact number. 
 
4. (S) Upon receipt of the letter, RSO immediately notified 
the Djiboutian National Security Service (DNSS) and requested 
that swift action be taken to identify, detain and question 
the individual(s) responsible for the letter.  As of the 
morning of 02/02/2005, the DNSS had not located the 
individual(s), but do feel confident that they will be 
successful.  In an effort to not scare away the suspects by 
contacting them directly, the DNSS has requested that RSO 
assist in a ruse to lure the suspect to the Embassy.  RSO 
will make attempts to contact the individual via the 
telephone numbers provided and schedule a meeting to hear his 
complaint at which time DNSS officers will detain the 
individual outside of the Embassy compound. 
 
5. (S) RSO assessment - RSO Djibouti does not believe this 
particular threat to be of much value.  On several occasions, 
disgruntled former KBR employees have voiced their discontent 
with the employment practices of the labor brokers that KBR 
must contract with, but no complaint has ever resulted in 
anything more than empty threats.  Although the bulk of the 
labor problems is focused at KBR, the perception of the local 
people is that the Embassy is the official representation of 
the U.S. Government and should act to correct any injustice. 
There are no indicators that Americans are at threat from a 
local uprising.  RSO believes that this letter is the product 
of a disgruntled employee who believes that by airing his 
issues to the U.S. Embassy he will gain more attention. RSO 
will follow up with the DNSS to resolve this issue as quick 
as possible. 
 
6. (SBU) RSO requests that DS conduct all appropriate checks 
of the telephone numbers provided.  RSO will provide updates 
via DS Spot Report as soon as available.  In addition, 
scanned copies of the letter will be provided upon request. 
 
7. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 or 253-35-09-49 
(secure). 
RAGSDALE 

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