US embassy cable - 05PARIS619

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AVIATION SECURITY: DOES NO-FLY MEAN "NO FLY?"

Identifier: 05PARIS619
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS619 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-02-01 16:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: EAIR PTER FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE-JLEVIN, EB/TRA-ARADETSKY, S/CT-KAGILAR, 
EUR/ERA 
DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE, CHINN AND AVIATION OPS 
ICE FOR FOREIGN OPS DIVISION 
CBP FOR COMMISSIONER RBONNER, OIA-KTHOMSEN 
FBI HQ WASHINGTON FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION-SSA 
KVONKLEINSMID AND INTL OPERATIONS-SAC TFUENTES 
FBI NY FOR SAC CFRAHM AND CSSA NDONOVAN 
CIA FOR CTC 
BRUSSELS FOR TSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: AVIATION SECURITY:  DOES NO-FLY MEAN "NO FLY?" 
 
REF: 1/21/05 AGUILAR-WHITE E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: HOWARD LEACH, AMBASSADOR EMBASSY PARIS 
FOR REASON 1.4B 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Embassy Paris applauds Washington agencies' 
development of joint criteria for the inclusion of names on 
the Transportation Security Administration-managed No-Fly 
list (REF EMAIL).  Rigorously applied criteria should greatly 
enhance the credibility of the list while ensuring it is an 
effective counterterrorism tool.  Until joint criteria are 
finalized and communicated to all agencies and posts 
worldwide, we offer here an Embassy perspective on management 
of No-Fly boardings and, based on our experience, some 
additional thoughts for consideration to better target the 
fight against terrorism at home and abroad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FRANCE-U.S. NO-FLY BOARDINGS 
----------------------------- 
2.  Since November 2004, Embassy Paris has managed five 
incidents of No-Fly boardings plus multiple false alarm 
notifications to post's legal attache.  In four of the five 
boardings, U.S. authorities allowed the flights to land as 
scheduled and determined that none of the No-Fly listed 
passengers presented a threat to civil aviation.  All were 
allowed to enter the U.S.  Only one flight was diverted.  In 
that case, the passenger initially identified as on the 
No-Fly list was in fact not the No-Fly listee but was refused 
entry into the U.S. because of a revoked visa.  In a sixth 
No-Fly related case, a U.S. citizen was denied boarding in 
Paris because his name was on the No-Fly list.  U.S. agencies 
subsequently rapidly determined that the passenger did not 
meet the criteria for inclusion on the No-Fly list and that 
his name should be removed. 
 
3.  (C) While we do not wish to diminish the responsibility 
of the airlines concerned in boarding No-Fly passengers 
contrary to applicable Emergency Amendments, the above 
incidents seem to indicate that the current parameters of the 
No-Fly list are quite broad and that the list includes people 
who do not threaten civil aviation.  We consider it a very 
positive development that common criteria for including a 
name on the No-Fly list, which all contributing U.S. agencies 
would apply, are under consideration in Washington.  As that 
discussion goes forward, and until agencies and posts are 
apprised of the joint criteria, Embassy Paris offers its 
perspective for consideration and welcomes other Embassies' 
views on this issue. 
 
PERSPECTIVE 
------------ 
4.  (C) The No-Fly list has grown to over 45,000 names and 
continues to grow.  Although a new-format list with 35,310 
names is available for airlines, at least one foreign carrier 
finds the list unwieldy and impractical and has told us that 
the 11 megabyte database, updated multiple times per day, 
heavily taxes their computer system.  More importantly 
though, the list's inclusion criteria so far have not been 
restricted to identifying individuals who could pose a threat 
to a flight and prevent them from boarding.  As such, No-Fly 
procedures increasingly appear to hamper legitimate 
travelers, while perhaps not facilitating our ability to 
discern who is a true threat to air travel. 
 
5.  (C) The French Government provides excellent cooperation 
to the U.S. on counterterrorism measures, however, it has 
recently privately called into question the purpose of the 
No-Fly list and our procedures in this regard.  The GOF views 
flight diversions or flight delays for the purpose of further 
questioning a passenger who turns out not to be a threat as 
an indication that the No-Fly list serves more as an 
investigative tool to track individuals for law enforcement 
purposes rather than as an effective way to ensure secure air 
travel.  The criteria question goes to the heart of the U.S. 
objective of preventing terrorism in the skies.  In order to 
maximize counterterrorism cooperation, our information and 
procedures should generate confidence in host governments and 
foreign carriers.  Our goal should be a No-Fly list that is 
an efficient tool because it is manageable, accurate, and 
credible.  As it now stands, relevant agencies at Embassy 
Paris indicate that their combined lists of terrorists would 
total a number far below the 45,000 names on the current 
No-Fly list.  In our experience we have also noted that the 
amount of staff time here and in Washington devoted to 
individuals who should not be on the list, both during and 
after the incident is typically greater than time spent on a 
legitimate No-Fly case. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
------------- 
6.  (C)  We believe that it would be enormously helpful and 
serve our objective of secure air travel if the future joint 
criteria clearly identifies the category of names to be 
included and strictly restricts the list to such names.  By 
its very name, the No-Fly list leads one to believe that 
anyone named on it should not be allowed to board an aircraft 
headed for U.S. airspace under any circumstances.  If this is 
not what the list means, names not representing immediate 
threats to air transport should become "Selectees" as opposed 
to "No-Fly" listees with the lists modified accordingly.  In 
addition, once the joint criteria for inclusion on the No-Fly 
list are established, it may be helpful for DHS (where the 
list manager is housed) to serve as the clearinghouse at the 
Washington level to ensure rigorous enforcement of the 
criteria.  Such a unit could make sure each name that 
contributing agencies propose for entry into the No-Fly list 
passes the criteria test. 
Leach 

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