US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU540

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/RA AND IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2012 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, NP, UNSC 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY REVIEW OF NEPAL'S UN COUNTERTERRORISM 
REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 11645 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON:PMAHONEY.  REASON 1.5(B,D) 
 
1.  (C) The Embassy has reviewed the Government of Nepal 
(GON) report on its implementation of UNSCR 1373.  For many 
of its responses, the GON cites the Terrorism and Disruptive 
Activities Ordinance (TADO), which has not yet been passed by 
Parliament and which narrowly interprets terrorism as acts of 
damage or destruction that undermine the sovereignty, peace, 
or security of the Kingdom of Nepal.  The TADO is directed at 
containing a violent domestic Maoist insurgency whose 
partisans seek to overthrow the constitutional monarchy. 
Virtually all of Nepal's limited security, law enforcement, 
and intelligence facilities are likewise focused on 
containing this domestic insurgency.  Because implementation 
of existing laws and regulations--whether related to 
terrorism or not--is generally weak and ineffective, we 
caution that adoption of new legislation does not necessarily 
imply greater ability to address potential acts of terrorism. 
 We do not question the GON's willingness to fight 
international terrorism; we question only its capacity to do 
so. 
 
2.  (C)  Response to Operative Paragraph 1: 
The GON has not taken any legislative steps--other than 
prohibiting extortion or robbery under the TADO--to suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts.  However, as we have passed 
on successive lists of organizations and individuals 
proscribed in Executive Order 13224, the GON, through its 
Central Bank, has routinely acted quickly to circulate that 
information, along with instructions to freeze any accounts 
of customers discovered to be on the lists, to commercial 
banks and other financial institutions.  We are unaware of 
any other action--other than passing on this information at 
our request--that the GON has undertaken on its own 
initiative in this regard.  Officials at the Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Central Bank tell 
us that no such accounts have been identified, and express 
general doubt, given the size of the economy and the limited 
nature of the banking system, that Nepal is a channel for 
terrorist financing.  If such accounts were identified, the 
Central Bank could, under existing regulations, freeze them. 
The Ministry of Finance has told us that it is not currently 
contemplating any new legislation to strengthen existing 
controls against terrorist financing.  In general, our sense 
is that, if confronted by another friendly government with 
compelling evidence of terrorist financing, the GON would 
gladly cooperate but is unlikely to initiate such an 
investigation or discover such evidence on its own. 
 
3.  (C)  Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraph a): 
No existing legislation specifically prohibits recruitment by 
terrorist organizations, other than broad prohibitions 
against terrorist activities in the TADO.  The Arms and 
Ammunition Act restricts the use and availability of 
firearms, but Nepal's inability to police its lengthy border 
with India and Tibet makes the smuggling of weapons 
comparatively easy.  Despite the report's claim that 
"mechanisms to share information . . . with countries in the 
region" are in place, we note that GON officials often 
complain that their Indian counterparts fail to cooperate and 
share information on Nepali Maoist insurgents believed to be 
living and/or traveling in India.  There is no institutional 
culture of intelligence sharing among the various security 
forces within the GON, as well as none between the civilian 
government and the military, a shortcoming that the newly 
established (March 8) National Security Council, comprised of 
representatives of the military, police, Armed Police Force, 
and domestic intelligence service, is the most recent attempt 
to overcome. 
 
4.  (C)  Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraphs b-f):  Despite 
GON's best efforts to prevent such activities, Nepal's 
territory has been used as a safe haven by terrorists. 
Indian government officials routinely complain that Pakistani 
terrorists use Nepal as a channel.  The GON has told us it 
has assured India that, once provided with firm evidence of 
such activities, the GON will take immediate action.  In 
fact, the GON has expelled three Pakistan Embassy staff 
members since 2000, reportedly for possession of explosives 
and/or counterfeit currency.  Nepal has cooperated with the 
United States and India to render or extradite suspected 
terrorists. 
 
5.  (C)  Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraph g):  Border 
controls between India and Nepal are lax.  At present, the 
GON does not require any documentation from Indian citizens 
crossing into Nepal by land, although bilateral discussions 
are currently underway, according to the head of the 
Immigration Department, to institute such requirements. 
Indian citizens arriving by air may present a citizenship 
certificate, driver's license, or a certification from their 
local District Administration Office, in lieu of a passport. 
Indian citizens may stay in Nepal indefinitely.  There are 
only 15 customs checkpoints along the border with India where 
goods and luggage are checked.  Indian citizens may also 
cross at numerous other points, which are manned only by 
police posts unequipped to check the integrity of travel 
documents.  The Immigration Department maintains a watchlist 
of individuals--including, presumably, known terrorists--to 
be denied entry into the country, but only immigration 
officials at the international airports have access to this 
database.  Nepali citizenship certificates, driver's 
licenses, and District Administration Office certificates 
contain no security features and could easily be forged, 
according to an immigration official. 
 
 
6.  (C) Operative Paragraph 3:  Nepal has generally 
demonstrated a willingness to be as helpful as possible in 
combating terrorism, despite its limited capacity and 
resources.  The GON tells us it is actively reviewing the six 
remaining Counter-terrorism Conventions it has not yet 
signed; review of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism appears to be the 
farthest along.  Nepal has not acceded to the UN Refugee 
Convention and has no domestic laws related to refugees, and 
thus has no legislative framework under which to address the 
question of the abuse of refugee status by terrorists.  In 
Nepal, refugee cases are handled under an informal agreement 
with UNHCR. 
MALINOWSKI