US embassy cable - 05ANKARA561

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000561 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO ANKARA 
 
 
(U) Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  You arrive in Turkey as we begin to 
recalibrate bilateral relations emphasizing renewed dialogue 
on areas of mutual concern to maximize achievable 
cooperation.  We are working with a different democratizing 
Turkey as elites rotate and under the impact of widespread, 
and disaffection with U.S. policy in Iraq and Turkey's 
absorption with EU accession negotiations.  Our task is 
complicated by the sharpening difference between a government 
unwilling to reaffirm the value of the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship in consistent, bold, public terms and a General 
Staff (TGS) which is steadily, rationally, and publicly 
signaling a desire to make the relationship work.  End 
summary. 
 
MAIN ISSUES 
----------- 
 
2. (C) Iraq-related issues top your Turkish interlocutors' 
agenda.  The U.S. intervention remains sharply unpopular as a 
result of instinctive Muslim/Sunni, solidarity or left-wing 
anti-American sentiment, depending on the segment of Turkish 
society; the Turkish media, government, and main opposition 
party have all contributed to heightening the negative view 
in Turkish public opinion.  The Turks see the positive Jan. 
30 Iraqi elections through the prism of Kurdish aspirations 
for independence and the belief that we are essentially 
handing over Kirkuk to the Kurds with negative implications 
for Iraqi and Turkish stability and interests. (While they 
supported the elections, their statements (pre- and post) 
were heavily tinted with the view that they won't like the 
outcome and an assertion that it will add to tension and 
violence.)  Moreover, the high level of official and 
media-generated disinformation has nourished Turkish 
conspiracy theories over lack of U.S. action against the PKK 
in northern Iraq, perceived U.S. favoritism toward the Kurds 
(e.g., on Kirkuk) and toward the Shi'a, perceived 
discrimination against the Turkmen minority, and perceived 
U.S. coldness toward Iraqi Sunni Arabs.  Bilateral relations 
were further poisoned by al-Jazeera style media distortion of 
the fall 2004 Fallujah operation and related anti-U.S. 
statements by PM Erdogan and FM Gul. 
 
3. (C) Other issues on which your Turkish interlocutors will 
focus include Cyprus, where the Turks expect the U.S. and UK 
to take the lead in ending the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots and bringing the Greek Cypriots back to the 
bargaining  table; and EU accession negotiations.  The EU's 
December 17 decision to open the accession process with 
Turkey in October 2005 should spur continued internal reform, 
at least on paper, but implementation remains a chronic 
problem and Turkey faces a long, difficult path to membership. 
 
ERDOGAN, AKP:  UNASSAILABLE, OR OVERCONFIDENT? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4. (C) Despite resentment and suspicion of ruling AKP by a 
waning Kemalist elite, Erdogan still appears unassailable for 
the time being.  He remains highly popular in the heartland 
owing to the widespread conviction that he is the tribune of 
the common man and because the common man says, "He looks 
like us."  Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament 
and faces no meaningful opposition from other parties, 
especially given main opposition CHP's wallowing in bitter 
infighting.  Indeed, Turkey is functioning as a quasi-one 
party state, which is slowly bringing other problems to the 
fore. 
 
5. (C) Unfortunately, Erdogan suffers from a lack of 
competent, worldly advisors and, given the lack of 
competition from opposition parties, we see a measurable 
drift in policy- and decision-making:  he has found it 
impossible to choose a chief negotiator with the EU and he is 
unable to organize a Cabinet reshuffle.  That has 
periodically been on his agenda for almost two years.  His 
effective policy direction has come either from the EU (the 
Copenhagen Criteria) or from the IMF (standby agreements). 
Erdogan does not have effective control of either the 
entrenched State bureaucracy or his own party, owing in part 
to his continual absence from Ankara -- he has made 
approximately 75 foreign trips in two years and is otherwise 
traveling around Turkey.  He has failed to forge effective 
working relations with either the Presidency or core 
institutions of the State (armed forces, judiciary).  And he 
faces a growing problem of corruption in AKP. 
 
TURKEY'S PROBLEMATIC VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
6. (C) Erdogan appears to accept the idea in principle that 
maintaining good relations with the U.S. is important.  He 
and Gul have taken some verbal steps to reaffirm the 
relationship (mixed with damaging emotional outbursts), but 
Erdogan has no vision of how to re-energize and expand 
relations from Turkey's side.  Gul has Islam-influenced views 
behind his seeming affability and Ahmet Davutoglu, the 
Islamist foreign policy adviser to both Gul and Erdogan, is 
inclined to distance Turkey from the U.S., in directions 
familiar from Erbakan's days in the Prime Ministry (1996-97). 
 President Sezer is a narrow-minded statist with a tin ear 
for politics and little enthusiasm for good relations with 
the U.S. -- he maneuvered to prevent U.S. troop deployment 
through Turkey for OIF and has been effusive in his response 
to Putin.  CHOD Ozkok is a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior 
commander.  Deputy CHOD Basbug (apparently in line to become 
CHOD in 2008), whose repeated emphasis on the breadth, depth, 
and importance of relations with the U.S. was a highlight of 
his January 26 press conference, agrees, although he is 
somewhat more reserved.  Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try 
to bring more modern thinkers into senior ranks, but 
left-nationalist sentiments are strong at lower ranks. 
 
SECURITY RELATIONS 
------------------ 
 
7. (C) The GOT says it shares our goals for a secure, stable, 
democratic Iraq, united and territorially whole, but your 
interlocutors continue to complain that we do not listen to 
their input or concerns.  At the same time they have few 
concrete proposals for next steps beyond keeping the Iraqi 
Kurds in line or dealing with the PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
Nonetheless, Turkey has provided valuable assistance on Iraq. 
 Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on 
rotation out, and permits the transit of supplies for our 
forces and humanitarian goods.  The GOT says it reached out 
to all major Iraqi groups to encourage participation in the 
elections.  Turkey is active in reconstruction efforts, 
including providing electricity for Iraq, and training in 
Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni political groups and, as its 
contribution to the NATO training mission, Iraqi security 
forces.  Lower level officials have suggested Turkey could 
cut support, like the logistics transits to get our attention 
on Kirkuk or Kongra-Gel. 
 
8. (C) U.S. military leaders worked hard to repair the damage 
caused by Turkey,s failure to approve passage of the 4th ID 
in March 2003 and our arrest of Turkish Special Forces 
personnel in Suleymania in July of that year.  Nonetheless, 
the security relationship remains fragile.  Recent requests 
to increase our use of Incirlik AB (e.g., establish a 
logistics air hub, increase training deployments) have been 
delayed as Turkish officials remain concerned the hub 
proposal may be part of a larger U.S. request to move F-16s 
permanently to the base as part of the Defense Posture Review 
Initiative.  Some Turks suspect we desire to use Incirlik AB 
to stage strikes on neighbors Iran or Syria.  We are seeking 
confirmation of some local press speculation that the Turks 
may offer you Incirlik as a logistics air cargo hub in 
response to our long-standing request. 
 
9. (C) The preoccupation with Iraq overshadows good bilateral 
cooperation in other aspects of the GWOT:  since 9/11 and the 
November 2003 Istanbul attacks, our intelligence and law 
enforcement cooperation has improved, although greater 
Turkish attention to Al-Qai'da link support elements here 
would be beneficial. Our militaries coordinate assistance to 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect 
important energy transportation routes.  Turkey subscribes to 
every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join, 
including the Proliferation Security Initiative.  Ankara has 
been supportive of international efforts to press Iran to 
meet its commitments to the IAEA, although strongly favoring 
persuasion over coercion, while Gul and Erdogan have stressed 
publicly good neighborliness and Iran's "credible" denials of 
nuclear activity. The Turkish military provides 
counterterrorism and other training to personnel from 
Partnership for Peace partner countries and soon to Allies as 
well.  And Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in 
Afghanistan in February for a six-month period during which 
they will significantly increase their contribution to this 
important NATO mission. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
------------ 
 
10. (U) Since 1991, Turkey has adopted eight wide-ranging 
packages of legal reforms and two sets of constitutional 
amendments aimed at meeting EU-related human rights 
standards.  The legal reforms are designed to crack down on 
torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, reduce 
the political influence of the military, and expand religious 
freedom.  Implementation of the laws has been slow.  Elements 
of the military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have 
criticized some of the reforms as threats to national 
security, and have resisted implementation.  In some cases, 
bureaucratic offices have drafted highly restrictive 
implementing legislation.  For example, Parliament lifted 
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the 
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict 
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned 
media outlets. 
 
11. (SBU) Turkey faces a long, difficult path to full EU 
membership.  Many here do not recognize how wrenching the 
changes ahead will be.  The EU has made it clear that it 
expects accession talks with Turkey will take at least 10 
years, and a number of Turkish officials privately 
acknowledge the GOT will need that time to adopt the full EU 
acquis.  Turkey is expected to face difficulty in a number of 
areas, including environmental standards, but the key is 
still likely to be Turkey and the EU's adoption of real 
religious freedom and tolerance. 
 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
12. (C) Under FM Gul's influence, Turkey has sought to 
improve relations with Iran and with Arab neighbors, 
including Syria, over the past year.  PM Erdogan visited Iran 
in July 2004 and Syria in December.  Gul visited Israel and 
Palestine in January 2005, a visit both Turkey and Israel 
portrayed as an end to Turkish-Israeli public tensions in 
2004, and Erdogan says he will visit Israel soon.  Abu Mazen 
is due in Turkey Feb. 1.  Turkey still views itself as a 
potential mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, but 
has so far failed to produce any results.  For now, bilateral 
economic relations and intel cooperation remain strong. 
 
13. (C) The GOT is a working partner in the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI).  Turkey is a 
co-sponsor, with Italy and Yemen, of the BMENAI's Democracy 
Assistance Dialogue (DAD).  While Gul consistently says the 
right thing on the need for economic and political reform in 
the region, we need to press them to develop an active 
program to move the Democracy Dialogue forward.  However, 
most of the Turkish public, and even many Turkish politicians 
and academics, believe BMENAI is a U.S. plan to control 
Middle East oil and convert Turkey into a moderate "Islamic 
state" as a "model" for the region. 
 
14. (C) Turkey made a major policy shift on Cyprus to support 
the Annan Plan in spring 2004, but feels aggrieved because 
little has been done to ease the economic isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots.  Relations with Greece continue to warm, 
despite recent Greek complaints about Turkish air activity in 
the Aegean.  Greece gave firm public support to Turkey's EU 
candidacy. 
 
15. (C) Trade relations with Russia have ballooned in the 
past several years.  Turkey is strongly dependent on Russian 
natural gas; during a December visit Putin reminded the Turks 
of their energy dependence on Russia and proffered a 
strategic partnership alternative to Turkey's ties with the 
U.S. and EU.  PM Erdogan immediately followed up Putin's 
visit by visiting Moscow in January, again focusing on 
expanding energy and commercial ties; Putin again proffered a 
strategic alternative.  Turkey has strong ties to Azerbaijan 
and backs Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.  Turkey 
will not open its border with Armenia or restore diplomatic 
relations absent Armenian recognition of the border with 
Turkey and concessions on occupied Azerbaijani territories. 
The Turks publicly support Georgia's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, but have not been forceful vis-a-vis 
Russian designs in Georgia. 
 
16. (C) Believing that the incidence of HIV/AIDS is low and 
is limited to sex workers and intravenous drug users, Turkish 
officials are complacent about the AIDS threat, arguing that 
Turkey's traditional family values make transmission to the 
general population unlikely.  However, high HIV infection 
rates in neighboring countries (Russia, Ukraine and Romania) 
pose a serious threat to Turkey.  Although the Global Fund 
has granted $300,000 to Turkey for public education programs 
for high risk groups, the proposed creation of a regional 
information and best practices sharing network among Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation forum countries has not moved 
forward. 
 
ECONOMY 
------- 
 
17. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of around 8-9 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity 
structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, and 
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the 
overall macroeconomic improvement. Turkey remains too reliant 
on Russian energy sources (a point the Russians are trying to 
use as leverage for political gain). Macroeconomic success 
has also bred a sense of complacency about the need to 
persist with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and 
reform of the banking, social security and tax systems. 
These reforms are being addressed in the new three-year 
standby program that the IMF and GOT have just agreed to. 
 
18. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in 
the wake of the EU,s December decision to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey in October.  However, this is 
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of 
structural reform.  In addition, there appears to be a lack 
of appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will 
shoulder in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU 
accession will affect nearly aspect of their lives, and that 
it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with 
EU directives in environmental protection and other areas. 
EDELMAN