US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV544

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR ADAM SCHEINMAN, RICHARD GOOREVICH, AND TODD PERRY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, IS, ECONOMY AND FINANCE, ENVIRONMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS 
SUBJECT: DOE DELEGATION DISCUSSES EXPORT CONTROLS WITH 
ISRAELI OFFICIALS 
 
REF: 04 UNVIE VIENNA 0699 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz; Reasons: 1.4 (B) 
and (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Israeli officials briefed a visiting DOE 
delegation on nuclear export-control measures during meetings 
in Tel Aviv on January 18-20.  In recognition of their 
adherence to the NSG Guidelines and promulgation of new 
export control legislation, the Israelis requested U.S. help 
in obtaining NSG denials or other sources of information. 
They also queried the U.S. delegation on the possibility of 
U.S. exports of low-level health and safety equipment for use 
at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center. Officials from the 
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) briefed the U.S. team 
on lessons learned from the A.Q. Khan network, proliferation 
threats relating to fuel cycle facilities, and ways in which 
export controls could be used to improve the efficiency of 
safeguards.  The Israelis provided a briefing on their new 
export-control regulations and requested assistance in 
arranging visits by Israeli export control agencies to the 
United States for consultations or training.  Following the 
meeting, the Israelis presented the U.S. delegation with a 
written summary of discussions (text in paragraph 15).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
NSG Topics 
---------- 
 
2. (S) The DOE delegation briefed the Israelis on new 
challenges facing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), recent 
NSG achievements, and the current NSG agenda.  In a 
subsequent restricted meeting, IAEC Deputy Director for 
Policy Eli Levite said that Israel "needs help" from the USG 
and NSG to make its export-control order a success.  He 
maintained that Israel requires access to denials or other 
information sources to implement its commitments as an 
adherent to the Australia Group and NSG.  He urged the USG to 
assist Israel in its efforts to establish some sort of formal 
status as "adherents" in the NSG; such a step would help 
Israel demonstrate its non-proliferation credentials to the 
international community, he said.  The DOE group replied that 
other parts of the USG would be better able to respond to the 
request for information sharing.  Levite pressed for a point 
of contact in Washington; the DOE delegation promised to 
relay this request to the State Department. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Israeli Inquiry About Nuclear Safety Material 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (S) Levite urged the USG to reconsider its position on the 
export of low-level health and safety equipment to be used at 
the Soreq Nuclear Research Center.  The DOE delegation 
responded that export of even EAR99-type items  to nuclear 
facilities in non-NPT countries raises serious difficulties, 
but reminded Levite that such applications are reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis.  When the DOE group asked whether the 
Israelis had specific items or projects in mind, the Israelis 
agreed to pass a list through AmEmbassy Tel Aviv (list faxed 
to DOE on January 25). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
The A.Q. Khan Network: Israel's Lessons Learned 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (C) Liran Renert of the IAEC's policy staff briefed the 
group on implications drawn from the A.Q. Khan network.  He 
said the network's activities had loosened long-standing 
proliferation taboos, reduced the time needed to acquire 
nuclear weapons, negated the requirement for proliferating 
states to have their own industrial capability, and increased 
the difficulty in intercepting proliferation activities.  As 
a result, Renert suggested that the international community 
develop better intelligence gathering and information 
sharing, revise export control regimes, improve tracking of 
financial transactions, involve other countries and 
government agencies in the non-proliferation effort, tag key 
elements during the manufacturing process, expand PSI, and 
scrutinize free trade areas and flags of convenience. 
 
------------------------------ 
Fuel Cycle Proliferation Risks 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) After an update by the U.S. delegation on Iranian 
efforts to circumvent IAEA controls, IAEC Non-proliferation 
Director Gil Reich and Director of Arms Control Merav Zafary 
gave presentations on uranium conversion facility (UCF) 
proliferation risks and Israeli thinking with regard to 
El-Baradei's nuclear fuel cycle task force.  Zafary said 
Israel's preference is for an international agreement to 
offer states that forego further deployment of national fuel 
cycle facilities assistance with building light-water 
reactors and assured fuel leasing.  She added that Israel 
would like the IAEA to extend and expand the June moratorium 
on new enrichment initiatives in additional states, work on 
assuring an adequate fuel supply, and give further thought to 
safeguarding spent fuel.  She reiterated that Israel supports 
President Bush's position on the issue, but also said that 
there is "some value" in points raised by France. 
 
6. (C) Reich said the key to limiting proliferation risks is 
controlling access to feed material.  He noted that uranium 
oxide (U3O8) is easily replaceable and therefore unsuitable 
for strict controls.  Instead, he recommended that the IAEA 
focus on enriched uranium oxide (UO2 and UO3) as well as 
uranium fluoride (UF4 and UF6). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Using Export Controls to Improve Safeguards 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) IAEC Director for International Affairs Chen Zak 
suggested a number of areas in which export controls could 
improve the efficiency of safeguards.  She proposed that 
adherence to the Additional Protocol be adopted as a 
condition for countries wishing to export any item on the 
trigger list and annex II of IAEA information circular 
(INFCIRC) 540.  She outlined possible steps to tighten export 
guidelines, including ensuring that importers are signatories 
to the NPT or a nuclear-weapons-free zone, are in good 
standing with the IAEA's Board of Governors (i.e., open to 
monitoring and not under BOG review or in a state of breach 
or non-compliance), and have effective export controls based 
on UNSCR 1540 guidelines. 
 
8. (C) Zak also discussed possible limitations on end users. 
For example, states could agree that they would not allow 
exports unless the end users agreed that any outstanding 
issue before the BOG would result in an immediate freeze on 
the use of the imported materials; the end users could also 
agree to continued safeguards in the case of withdrawal from 
the NPT.  Zak raised the possibility of granting the IAEA 
observer status at NSG meetings, as well as making NSG 
denials and approvals available to the IAEA.  She urged that 
the IAEA provide assistance to states in implementing and 
enforcing UNSCR 1540. 
 
---------------------------- 
Israeli Report on UNSCR 1540 
---------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Anna Getmansky of the IAEC outlined Israel's recent 
submission to the UNSC on resolution 1540.  She reported that 
Israel has implemented its new export-control order, 
supported the IAEA guidance on the Export and Import of 
Radioactive Sources, ratified the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, contributed to the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Fund, endorsed the IAEA Code of Conduct on 
the Safety and Security of Materials, supported U.S. 
initiatives such as PSI and GTRI, and increased participation 
at international conferences focused on non-proliferation. 
 
-------------------------------- 
New Israeli Export-Control Order 
-------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor representative 
Ohad Ornstein and MFA Deputy Legal Adviser Keren Ben-Ami 
briefed the DOE group on Israel's new export-control 
legislation.  Ben-Ami explained that the export-control 
order, which has been in effect since July 2004, covers 
chemical, biological, and nuclear material in Israel and the 
Palestinian areas.  MFA Deputy Director for Security Alon Bar 
noted that missile-related goods are not included, and are 
subject to Ministry of Defense controls. 
 
11. (C) Ben-Ami said that the order makes it illegal to 
export any (even non-listed) items if the supplier knows that 
the material is intended for use in a WMD program.  Exporters 
must apply for a license with the Ministry of Industry, 
Trade, and Labor, which sends copies of the applications to 
the Ministry of Defense and MFA.  An interagency group 
advises the exporter of a decision within 20 days; exporters 
have 14 days to appeal decisions. 
 
12. (C) Ben-Ami described an exception to the licensing rule 
for items on the list that meet four criteria: 1) the end 
user is a medical facility or school of higher education; 2) 
the items contain no nuclear material; 3) the purpose of the 
export is for diagnostic or lab work; and 4) the end user is 
located in an Australia Group state.  She noted that the GOI 
is not subject to the export-control order, but GOI-owned 
companies are.  According to Ben-Ami, exporters with a 
license must report to the GOI once a year (the validity of 
the license), while exporters of exempted items must report 
every six months.  She said that violators of the order are 
liable for administrative (license suspension) and criminal 
(imprisonment and/or fines of up to three times of the value 
of the exported goods) sanctions. 
 
13. (C) Ornstein admitted that the GOI has yet to receive a 
single application for an export license and is still "in the 
learning stages."  He said the GOI is experiencing 
difficulties educating exporters, codifying the various lists 
of controlled items, and reaching out to academia.  Rafael 
Harpaz, the MFA's export control coordinator, called the 
order "just the beginning" and stressed its political 
importance, maintaining that it will benefit Israeli efforts 
to increase participation in international fora. 
 
14. (C) The DOE team presented a number of case studies to 
illustrate how technical agencies can support the export 
control process and an introduction to Commodity 
Identification Training (CIT).  Officials from Israeli 
customs said that their inspectors are "starting from zero" 
and need basic training on identifying suspect shipments for 
closer scrutiny.  IAEC indicated their readiness to receive 
NNSA training to assist Israeli customs in this way.  Harpaz 
noted that the Israeli Embassy in Washington will soon 
request assistance in arranging a visit by GOI export-control 
personnel to U.S. agencies, including DOE, DHS, and DOC. 
Harpaz also asked whether a visit to a customs port could be 
arranged so that Israel can see "how it's done."  Itschak 
Lederman, the senior director for CTBT affairs at the IAEC, 
said that recent discussions with DOE on the Megaports 
initiative had included training for Israeli customs officers 
in Washington State.  The DOE team agreed to help make the 
Israeli trip to the U.S. a success, and to confer with 
Megaports on how customs training efforts might be combined. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Israeli Summary of Discussion Paper 
----------------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Text of Israeli paper titled "IAEC-DOE Nuclear 
Export Control Dialogue, January 19-120, 2005, Summary of 
Discussions:" 
 
The third Israel-U.S. technical exchange on nuclear export 
controls took place in Israel on January 19-20, 2005. This 
meeting was a part of the ongoing dialogue on issues of 
mutual interest conducted under the Letter of Intent (LOI) 
between the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).  The meeting was led by the 
IAEC and the DOE personnel, with the participation of the 
representatives of the Israeli Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Labor, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Customs (sic). 
 
The meeting took place after the entry into force of the 
Israeli Export Control Order pertaining to nuclear, chemical 
and biological items.  It focused on the implementation of 
nuclear export controls, and specifically on the issues of 
license review practices, compliance by industry and 
scientific institutes and commodity identification training 
to aid enforcement. 
 
During the meeting the sides have exchanged views on 
international initiatives and developments in the area of 
export controls. 
 
The sides have agreed on the following future steps: 
 
-- The IAEC-DOE nuclear export control meetings will be held 
on an annual basis.  The IAEC, on behalf of all the relevant 
authorities in Israel, expressed Israel's appreciation for 
the export control dialogue with the DOE. 
 
-- The IAEC and the DOE will coordinate the public affairs 
aspects.  The sides have agreed that the attached press 
release would be published on the IAEC's website after the 
visit.  (Embassy note: press release in paragraph 16.  End 
note). 
 
-- The DOE will provide further information about the 
training for the Israeli customs personnel, including the 
possibility to coordinate it with the DOE proposal under the 
Megaports project. 
-- To facilitate the effective implementation of the Israeli 
export control legislation, the IAEC requested the DOE's 
assistance in establishing channels for exchange of 
information on export denials and entities of concern. 
 
-- The IAEC and the DOE will continue their dialogue on 
efforts to update the Nuclear Suppliers Group and related 
measures to strengthen international nuclear export 
controls. 
 
End text of Israeli paper. 
 
16. (U) Begin text of Israeli release posted on the IAEC 
website: 
 
Israel and the US continue cooperation on nuclear export 
controls. 
 
The third Israel-U.S. technical exchange on nuclear export 
controls took place in Israel on January 19-20, 2005.  This 
meeting was a part of the ongoing dialogue on issues of 
mutual interest conducted under the Letter of Intent (LOI) 
between the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the US 
Department of Energy (DOE). 
 
The last meeting focused on the implementation of nuclear 
export controls, and specifically on the issues of license 
review practices, compliance by industry and scientific 
institutes, and commodity identification training to aid 
enforcement. 
 
In July 2004 Israel has put in place an Export Control Order 
pertaining to nuclear, chemical and biological items. 
 
The IAEC and the DOE have agreed to continue their 
cooperation in order to promote the implementation of nuclear 
export controls and to assist in developing the necessary 
implementation and enforcement tools. 
 
During the meeting the sides have also exchanged views on 
international initiatives and developments in the area of 
export controls. 
 
End text from website. 
 
17. (U) The U.S. delegation consisted of Adam Scheinman, 
Richard Goorevich, and Todd Perry from the Department of 
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, Jeffrey 
Bedell from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Basil Picologlou 
from Argonne National Laboratory, and an Embassy notetaker. 
The Israeli side was led by the IAEC's Director for 
Non-proliferation Gil Reich, and included numerous officials 
from the IAEC, National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Defense, customs service, Soreq National 
Research Center, and Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor. 
Scheinman and Goorevich also met separately with IAEC Deputy 
Director for Policy Eli Levite on January 20. 
 
18. (U) This cable was cleared by the DOE delegation. 
 
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