US embassy cable - 05CARACAS293

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GOV TAKES ANTI-US TACK ON GRANDA AFFAIR

Identifier: 05CARACAS293
Wikileaks: View 05CARACAS293 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Caracas
Created: 2005-01-28 20:32:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KDEM VE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: GOV TAKES ANTI-US TACK ON GRANDA AFFAIR 
 
REF: SECSTATE 11483 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  Venezuelan officials shifted from the battle with 
Colombia over the capture of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda to 
anti-US criticism January 19.  The officials took advantage 
of comments regarding Venezuela by the Secretary designate in 
her Senate confirmation hearings and began painting the 
Granda affair as an imperialist affront to both Andean 
countries.  Chavez mocked the Secretary designate after a 
GoV-sponsored march on 23 January and blamed the US for 
instigating the Colombia-Venezuela crisis.  The GoV position 
had centered on asserting that Colombia had violated its 
sovereignty following President Hugo Chavez's demand for an 
apology from his Colombian counterpart January 14.  As 
Colombia maintained its position and international actors 
sought to calm tensions, the GoV has resorted to tried and 
true tactics:  get all your people out on message, and have 
that message include blame for the United States.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  Following the Secretary designate's January 18 
testimony in her Senate confirmation hearings, the GoV began 
to accuse Washington of participating in the capture of FARC 
leader Rodrigo Granda in Caracas.  Most GoV public statements 
portrayed the US as trying to arrest Latin American 
unification by sowing discord between Colombia and Venezuela. 
 On January 19, Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez and 
Information Minister Andres Izarra lambasted the secretary 
designate's remarks on Venezuela, and National Assembly first 
vice president Ricardo Gutierrez said the tone of her remarks 
served to try to justify the "kidnapping."  National Assembly 
president Nicolas Maduro told the legislature that "the black 
hand of the United States" was behind the 
Colombian-Venezuelan conflict. 
 
----------------- 
Bandwagon Jumpers 
----------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Chavez supporters--some with direct orders from the 
GoV--have since rushed to echo the party line on alleged 
sovereignty violations and US complicity in the Granda case. 
Aragua Governor Didalco Bolivar told the DCM that the 
administration sent him a letter urging him to rally his 
supporters against the sovereignty violation.  Other sectors 
of Chavismo have added their voices to the administration's 
new spin.  For example, a group of pro-Chavez retired 
military officers delivered a protest note, which alluded to 
US complicity in Granda's capture, to the Colombian Embassy 
in Caracas on January 19.  Titina Azuaje, the national 
coordinator of "Clase Media En Positivo," an NGO of 
pro-Chavez professionals, appeared on the Government 
television channel for the first time in months to protest 
Colombian sovereignty violations. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Chavez and the US:  The Gloves Come Off 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U)  The anti-US recriminations culminated at a Sunday, 
January 23 "march for sovereignty" to Miraflores, the 
presidential palace.  The GoV brought by bus people from most 
regions of the country to attend the protest, press reports 
noted.  Some marchers carried anti-US banners decrying 
"Yankee imperialism and the Colombian oligarchy."  According 
to press reports, some members of the Government-sponsored 
march shouted support for Granda and demanded that Colombia 
return him to Venezuela.  A simultaneous--although much 
smaller--opposition march protested the presence of insurgent 
groups in Venezuela. 
 
5.  (C)  Having hinted at the involvement of the USG 
("hegemonic groups") in the Granda affair during the previous 
Sunday's "Alo Presidente" address, Chavez pulled no punches 
in his 90-minute speech to marchers at Miraflores.  He 
taunted the Secretary designate, using highly offensive 
language, and called the crisis over Granda's capture a 
"provocation" from Washington.  State and local leaders also 
participated in the march and offered the press conspiracy 
theories about US participation in the Granda capture. 
"Forget about the FARC," said Miranda Governor Diosdado 
Cabello, "the fundamental issue is (US designs on) Venezuelan 
oil." 
 
------------------- 
Diplomacy Discarded 
------------------- 
 
6.  (U)  The Chavez administration has either spurned or 
ignored diplomatic efforts by third parties to resolve the 
impasse.  Despite arbitration offers by the OAS, Mexico, 
Peru, and Brazil, Chavez during his speech to the marchers 
threatened to freeze relations with Bogota, reiterating a 
January 14 demand that the GoC recognize it made a mistake 
and promise it would never again violate Venezuela's 
sovereignty.  Chavez also issued on January 14 a moratorium 
on all bilateral economic projects, such as a planned oil 
pipeline.  His statement generated panic at the border until 
the Venezuelan military and locals realized his words did not 
signal an end of trade.  Border commerce remained stunted, 
however, as the GoV began enforcing checkpoints to deter the 
smuggling of subsidized Venezuelan gasoline into Colombia. 
The press reported January 26 that Venezuelan authorities had 
been holding up 150 trucks carrying 6,000 tons of Colombian 
coal destined to be exported to the United States via the 
port of Maracaibo. 
 
7.  (C)  During his January 24 visit to Maracaibo, econcouns 
found business leaders grouped in the local Chamber of 
Commerce extremely concerned about the prospect of an 
interruption in trade with Colombia.  (Zulia state, of which 
Maracaibo is the capital, has an extensive border with 
Colombia).  They noted that trade between the two countries 
is relatively balanced, and the pain would be felt on both 
sides of the border.  However, they thought that Chavez was 
counting on the fact that while Venezuela mainly sends raw 
materials to Colombia (oil, steel, aluminum), Colombia sends 
mainly finished products to Venezuela, and thus has more jobs 
directly at stake. 
 
8.  (U)  After demanding proof from Colombia that terrorists 
were active in Venezuelan territory, Vice President Rangel 
dismissed a list of ten guerrillas supplied by the GoC, 
calling it "irrelevant."  Maduro blasted the list as a US 
attempt to destabilize Latin America.  Rangel also called a 
US diplomatic note asking foreign capitals to urge Venezuela 
to deal with the problem of terrorism within its borders 
"severed from reality" because, unlike the United States, 
Venezuela enjoyed wide respect in the international 
community.  MVR deputy William Lara said in response to the 
US note that the GoV would send groups throughout the United 
States and Latin America to spread the GoV's version of the 
story. 
 
------------------------ 
It's Sovereignty, Stupid 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (U)  After the National Assembly failed to garner 
unanimous support for a resolution on the defense of 
Venezuelan sovereignty on 18 January, Rangel met with 
National Assembly deputies and told them not to "confuse and 
manipulate the issue by arguing about terrorism."  On January 
20, the resolution passed with the backing of opposition 
parties COPEI, MAS, La Causa R, UNT, and Solidaridad after 
the change of some wording, including the removal of 
references to the Colombian President and Defense Minister. 
Opposition parties AD, Primero Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, 
and Bloque Social Democratica abstained from voting, arguing 
that the document was flawed because it did not condemn the 
presence of terrorists in Venezuela. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  The Granda affair has sparked muted criticism of 
the GoV from throughout the political spectrum.  Granda's 
Venezuelan citizenship resonated with the opposition, which 
was resentful of his protection by Venezuelan law, and the 
left, which was troubled by rumors that the GoV had sold out 
a compatriot.  In response, the Chavez administration has 
succeeded in keeping much of local discourse on Venezuelan 
sovereignty and off terrorism.  The hype of both the march 
and Chavez's follow-on diatribe eclipsed a press report 
issued the same day that Colombian police had captured 
another Colombian guerrilla with a Venezuelan citizenship 
card near the Venezuelan border.  Chavez has resorted to his 
typical tactics for confronting a seemingly intractable 
problem.  He successfully distracts the public from issues at 
hand because he is adept at turning out all of his supporters 
to hammer home a unified message:  the United States is to 
blame. 
 
11.  (C)  Chavez's effort to show up the GoC has eliminated, 
at least for the near term, the possibility of a face-saving 
end to the standoff for either party, as Colombian Foreign 
Minister Carolina Barco affirmed following a January 27 
meeting with Rodriguez that Colombia would not apologize. 
Chavez probably intends his vaguely worded threat to freeze 
relations to serve, in the words of former Colombian 
President Ernesto Samper, as "economic blackmail."  Yet 
Chavez, for whom politics always trumps economics, would not 
be above cutting off trade with Colombia, even though the 
cost of such a move to the Venezuelan economy would be 
substantial. 
 
12.  (C)  Chavez's moves have reassured Chavistas and the 
left, and his use of sovereignty and anti-US banners has 
limited the ability of the opposition to seize on this issue. 
 Chavez has lost ground, we think, with most Latin American 
governments.  We see no indication Chavez would seek a large 
scale military incursion into Colombia.  He may, however, be 
contemplating an abduction or lure operation against 
Colombian military or police officers. 
BROWNFIELD 

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