US embassy cable - 05PARIS548

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GOF TO WELCOME IRAQI ELECTIONS AS IMPORTANT STEP

Identifier: 05PARIS548
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS548 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-01-28 18:20:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IZ FR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, FR 
SUBJECT: GOF TO WELCOME IRAQI ELECTIONS AS IMPORTANT STEP 
 
REF: A. STATE 12757 
     B. STATE 12610 
     C. PARIS 426 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The GoF is likely to welcome the January 30 
Iraqi elections as an important step, but not with the same 
adjectives as Washington.  French officials, while expressing 
concern over the conditions under which elections are taking 
place, stress that it is not in the GoF's interest to 
criticize the election results.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) We raised ref (a) talking points on Iraqi elections 
and urged the GoF to issue a strong public statement 
welcoming the elections with MFA Political Director Stanislas 
Laboulaye January 26, and January 27 with MFA DAS-equivalent 
for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan, who offered 
the more detailed response.  Sivan, while cautioning that it 
was premature to pronounce on the elections before they took 
place, suggested that the GoF would welcome the January 30 
election as an important step in Iraq's political transition. 
 The GoF response, according to Sivan, would also likely 
stress that further steps were needed to make Iraq's 
political process more inclusive, particularly to bring on 
board Sunnis who reject violence. 
 
3. (C) Sivan echoed the U.S. view that the elections would be 
imperfect and suggested a high level of GoF disquiet over the 
"deplorable" context of violence in which voting would take 
place.  He appeared doubtful on prospects for Sunni 
participation and for high voter turnout in Baghdad, due to 
security threats.  At the same time, he affirmed that it was 
not in the GoF's interest to criticize the election results, 
and that one could not judge the credibility of the election 
by the participation rate alone.  The GoF would be mindful of 
the Iraqi public response to the elections, and would seek to 
convey to Iraqis a message of confidence on this new stage of 
the political process.  In terms of GoF engagement with the 
new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG), Sivan said the 
French police offer to train up to 1500 Iraqi police remained 
on the table, and the GoF hoped the new government would 
respond soon at least by sending a team to Paris to discuss 
needs and requirements.  In terms of other GoF assistance, 
Sivan said the GoF was ready to expand Paris-based exchange 
programs, such as a recent electoral training program for 
Iraqi political party representatives (ref c).  At the same 
time, any assistance which involved sending French personnel 
into Iraq was out of the question, as long as security 
conditions remained difficult. 
 
4. (C)  Summing up, Sivan said the GoF would welcome the 
Iraqi elections, but without describing it as a "historic" 
occasion.  Poloff pressed Sivan on this point, asking him how 
he could not view Iraq's election as historic given Iraq's 
long history of oppression and the absence of similar free 
elections in other Arab nations.  Sivan conceded that this 
election would mark the first time the Iraqi public exercised 
voting rights, but said the GoF would view the result as 
historic only once a Iraq successfully completed the 
political process laid out in 1546, which would produce a 
sovereign, independent and permanent government and the 
withdrawal of foreign troops.  On the latter point, poloff 
pointed out that Iraq's government is already sovereign and 
independent, and that the expiration of the MNF-1 mandate by 
year-end is renewable, like all UN-authorized missions. 
Sivan conceded the latter point, but reiterated a preference 
for a troop withdrawal by year-end. 
 
5. (C) Comment: While we stressed that the U.S. favors no 
candidates and that election results are impossible to 
predict, Sivan and other MFA officials have appeared eager to 
solicit U.S. views on whom we see as front-runner parties and 
individuals in the January 30 ballot, and how long it might 
take before a new government is formed (i.e. whether elements 
of a new government will be apparent prior to the President's 
February 21-22 visit to Brussels).   UK embassy contacts have 
reported similar interest from the GoF and told us they see 
the GoF as hoping for "anyone but Allawi" as PM.  Our UK 
contacts see the French as especially keen on IIG Finance 
Minister Adel Abdel al-Mehdi, who served as SCIRI 
representative in France prior to the fall of Saddam and 
whose family resides in France.  GoF interest in who will 
lead the ITG suggests that the GoF is prepared to engage with 
the new government, hopefully to a greater degree than it did 
with the outgoing IIG.  End comment. 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
Leach 

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