US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA269

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A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC AND BWC

Identifier: 05OTTAWA269
Wikileaks: View 05OTTAWA269 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ottawa
Created: 2005-01-28 17:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM CA CWC BWC Arms Control FAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000269 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: PARM, CA, CWC, BWC, Arms Control, FAC 
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH CANADIANS ON CWC 
AND BWC 
 
REF: (A) OTTAWA 124 (MISSILE DEFENSE) (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY.  During consultations in Ottawa on January 
11, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker 
and AC/PDAS Frank Record discussed with Canadian Foreign 
Affairs (FAC) and National Defense officials progress on the 
BTWC and CWC.  Discussion of Canada's prospective 
participation in ballistic missile defense,  FMCT and the 
Conference on Disarmament, differences on landmine policy, 
the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and space security are 
reported septels (ref A).  END SUMMARY. 
 
OPCW 
---- 
2. (C) FAC Director General for International Security Paul 
Chapin saw no fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and 
Canada regarding the OPCW.  He observed that there was 
greater impetus on the industry side to deal with chemical 
weapons issues and acknowledged the USG-driven focus on 
anti-terrorism and the need down the road to address the 
question of non-lethal weapons.  Chapin voiced concern for 
the financial well being of the institution, stating that 
changes to the financial rules would help the significant 
arrears. Member states should honor their declaration 
obligations and their financial obligations, he said. 
 
3. (C) A/S Rademaker said the U.S. was pleased with the 
direction in which the OPCW is headed.  He indicated that he 
and OPCW Technical Secretariat Director General Rogelio 
Pfirter had exchanged views on the future of the 
organization.  It seemed unlikely that Russia would meet the 
2012 deadline for destruction of all CW stocks.  Rademaker 
noted that unanticipated legal, environmental and technical 
challenges had slowed U.S. progress on its own destruction 
efforts, though USG was still hoping to make the deadline. 
Toxic waste was an ongoing issue of concern.  Albania and 
Libya had come clean.  In short, there was no great risk the 
OPCW would run out of things to do in the near future. 
Regarding U.S. arrears in payments to the OPCW, Rademaker 
noted that the  U.S. Congress had not appropriated sufficient 
funds.  It was the subject of some debate within the U.S. 
government. 
 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
--------------------------------------- 
4. (C) On the BTWC, Nonproliferation, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Director Rob McDougall said that his government 
was pleased with the inter-sessional work program process, 
and noted Canada's submission of eight papers to date. 
Canada had found the dialogue useful and was engaged in 
"forward planning" for the 6th Review Conference in 2006. 
McDougall thought that the BTWC could be improved to deal 
with additional challenges, such as terrorism.  Advocating 
acceptance of "modest" proposals (e.g. science and technology 
body) to move the agenda forward, he cited Russia's 1992 
acknowledgment of some of its bio-weapons facilities to 
illustrate the success of the annual confidence building 
measures submission towards development of stronger 
compliance and verification mechanisms in the BTWC. 
 
5. (C) A/S Rademaker said the USG was satisfied with the work 
progress of the last two years and did not have any 
conclusions about the objectives for or outcome of the 6th 
Review Conference.  Nonetheless, there was apprehension that 
many ideas being put forth were designed to resurrect the 
Protocol negotiations that had failed in 2001.  U.S. 
experience of the past decade had made us extremely cautious 
on this count, Rademaker said.  McDougall asserted that 
high-priority, limited "variable" things could lead to 
strengthening of the regime.  It was in Canada's interest to 
"make it happen," he said.  It was important to move forward, 
not necessarily back to the Protocol. 
 
6. (C) Observing that one more year remained under the 
existing work program, Rademaker welcomed any observations 
from Canada's access to facilities in the former Soviet 
Union, including on the re-employment of former bio-weapons 
scientists.  Arms Control Deputy Director Marina Laker said 
that Canadian officials had sought and gained access to some 
facilities in Russia through Global Partnership  efforts and 
the ISTC.  They had concluded from these visits that former 
scientists really wanted cooperation.  McDougall and Chapin 
offered to organize de-briefs for U.S. arms control experts 
by their Canadian counterparts. 
 
7. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Rademaker. 
 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON 

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