US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI719

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FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT SIGNIFICANT

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI719
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI719 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-01-28 13:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KDEM IN CH India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000719 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IN, CH, India-China 
SUBJECT: FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT 
SIGNIFICANT 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4145 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 6787 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The January 24 strategic dialogue between 
China and India "did not accomplish much," but did provide 
insight into China's view of the world, Indian Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM on January 27.  From New 
 
SIPDIS 
Delhi's perspective, the dialogue illustrated China's 
willingness to engage with India as a global power, including 
on issues that traditionally fall into Beijing's orbit, such 
as North Korea, and underlined China's view (as conveyed to 
New Delhi) that India is not a rival in Asia.  It also 
contributed to the overall positive atmosphere of the 
bilateral relationship, which FM Natwar Singh's January 27 
speech at a conference on Asian Security reinforced.  Despite 
this goodwill, India remains concerned by the PLA military 
buildup on the Tibetan Plateau and growing Chinese influence 
in Burma.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) During the first-ever strategic talks between India 
and China, held in New Delhi on January 24, the two sides 
discussed globalization, democratization of international 
relations, UNSC reform, energy security, non-proliferation, 
terrorism and "the situation in the Korean Peninsula," 
according to an MEA press release.  The dialogue, led by 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Foreign 
Minister Wu Dawei, also included discussions on the March 
visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi, an event 
the MEA predicted would be a "major milestone in bilateral 
relations." 
 
An Emphasis on Multilateralism 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) Offering a readout of the strategic dialogue, Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM that although the 
 
SIPDIS 
discussions "did not accomplish much," they provided insight 
into China's view of the world.  The dialogue also 
illustrated Beijing's perspective on India-China relations in 
the context of the "emerging Asian architecture."  According 
to Saran, Wu emphasized multipolarity and multilateralism as 
the only legitimate means of addressing regional and global 
challenges and said that China does "not, underline not" see 
India as a rival in Asia.  They agreed that Asia was large 
enough to allow both countries to play significant, 
multilateral roles. 
 
Enough Space for Both 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) FM Natwar Singh continued to promote the feeling of 
goodwill generated by the strategic dialogue in a January 27 
speech at a New Delhi conference on Asian Security.  With 
comments reminiscent of the June 2004 Panchsheel celebration 
(Ref A), Natwar emphasized the two countries' shared 
interests, noting that "while there are differences between 
us, there is also an increasingly greater realization that 
there is enough space and opportunity in the region for both 
India and China to prosper."  However, Natwar also sought to 
demonstrate India's vested interests in China's neighborhood, 
emphasizing that "developments in East Asia are of direct 
consequence to India's security and development." 
 
Focus on Terrorism 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C)  Although Beijing had not been willing to discuss 
counterterrorism in the past, during the strategic dialogue 
Wu displayed a much higher level of concern about the issue, 
Saran said, remarking that Wu was even willing to exchange 
information.  Saran speculated that the PRC's changed 
demeanor resulted from the feeling that global terrorism 
posed an increasing threat to China, and said he was 
impressed by Beijing's heightened focus on the subject. 
 
No Direct Endorsement on UNSC Seat 
---------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Although Beijing continued to avoid directly 
supporting India's bid for a permanent Security Council seat 
(Ref B), Saran cited "strong indications" and "allusions" 
that the PRC would ultimately support a seat for India.  Both 
countries agreed that India should play a more important role 
in international affairs, he stated. 
 
Saran Committed to Boundary Talks 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Saran said that the two sides had not specifically 
addressed the boundary question during the strategic 
dialogue.  He emphasized, however, the GOI's belief that the 
boundary dispute should be resolved in the context of larger 
Indo-Chinese strategic and political concerns, and remarked 
that India was prepared to work with China to find solutions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) The accomplishments of this first-ever strategic 
dialogue between the two countries were modest but 
significant.  Conversing with China about problems in the 
PRC's immediate neighborhood, such as North Korea, reflected 
India's ever broadening strategic horizon and its desire to 
project influence in areas in which it has not been active in 
the past.  It also allowed India to showcase itself as an 
equal to China, able to engage on issues of global 
importance, including those in East Asia.  The talks also 
demonstrated New Delhi's growing comfort level with Beijing. 
Despite the outward expressions of goodwill, serious 
reservations remain, including an on-going lack of trust 
fueled by the PLA's military buildup on the Tibetan Plateau 
and concern about Chinese influence in Burma.  Such issues 
will ultimately need to be addressed in order for genuine 
long-term cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing to occur. 
MULFORD 

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