US embassy cable - 05RANGOON121

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, BM 
SUBJECT: IS THE BURMESE REGIME COMING UNGLUED? 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 105 
     B. RANGOON 104 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  At the end of a week of wild rumors and 
speculation involving the fate of the SPDC's top three 
leaders, there are no signs of unusual activity and by all 
appearances the Burmese regime is conducting business as 
usual.  We don't rule out that something could be amiss. 
Former PM Khin Nyunt and his military intelligence apparatus 
were the regime's primary enforcers of maximum control; his 
ouster and the subsequent purge of MI have clearly hampered 
the SPDC's ability to run a tight ship.  However, the 
regime's historical opaqueness, secrecy, and censorship 
(fueled by exile radio broadcasts that carry the latest 
rumors) are the primary sources of ongoing speculation that 
the SPDC is on the verge of imploding.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Rangoon is, during even normal times, a city of 
swirling rumors and wild speculation.  The opacity of the 
regime's decision making, rare public forays and 
pronouncements by the SPDC's top generals, and extreme 
censorship all combine to create a void of factual 
information perhaps like no other country in the region.  The 
result is incessant, and highly inconsistent, guesswork among 
local observers and Burmese citizens on the latest 
machinations of the secretive regime, often fueled by 
international radio services (especially the Democratic Voice 
of Burma and Radio Free Asia) that frequently broadcast 
unconfirmed street rumors. 
 
3. (SBU) This past week has been no exception.  Kicked off on 
January 21 by the mysterious "on duty" death of SPDC Vice 
Chairman Maung Aye's personal assistant (ref A), the days 
that followed buzzed with varying reports of a senior-level 
shakeup, each rumor more incredulous than the next that one, 
two, or all three top SPDC leaders (Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and 
Soe Win) had either been arrested, assassinated, or 
incapacitated from strokes or heart attacks. 
 
4. (C) Our assessment of January 25 (ref A) holds true as of 
COB January 28: there are no signs of unusual activity in 
Rangoon and by all accounts the regime is carrying on with 
business as usual.  On January 27, the chief of the Ministry 
of Defense's Foreign Liaison Office (FLO) read a prepared 
statement to a scheduled monthly gathering of the Defense 
Attache corps.  In an unusual move, the GOB acknowledged 
recent rumors and speculation about senior-level leaders, but 
declared that nothing extraordinary had occurred.  The FLO 
chief confirmed that Maung Aye's assistant, Col. Bo Win Tun, 
had committed suicide and made an appeal to "let the man rest 
in peace." 
 
5. (SBU) It is true, as foreign media sources have observed, 
that the top three SPDC leaders have made no public 
appearances in recent days (in itself, not an unusual posture 
for the Chairman and Vice Chairman).  However, there are 
numerous signs that would indicate the regime is conducting 
business as usual, including: 
 
--Senior Burmese officials attended official functions this 
week hosted by the Thai, Indian, and Australian missions (and 
attended by Emboffs), including SPDC member Lt-Gen Maung Bo 
as well as Foreign Minister Nyan Win; 
 
--Numerous SPDC members--including S-1 Lt-Gen Thein Sein, 
Lt-Gen Kyaw Win, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, and Lt-Gen Tin Aye--have 
been active all week on the ribbon cutting and inspection 
circuit in Rangoon and at upcountry sites; 
 
--The state-run New Light of Myanmar has, per standard 
practice, published throughout the week all routine 
correspondence between Senior General Than Shwe and Vice 
Senior General Maung Aye and their foreign counterparts; 
 
--The GOB and the Thai Embassy are continuing plans for a 
February 1 visit by Royal Thai Supreme Commander General 
Chaisit Shinawatra, and the Thai anticipate meetings with 
Than Shwe and Maung Aye. 
--GOB preparations remain underway for the National 
Convention (reconvening on February 17), Union Day (February 
12), and Armed Forces Day (March 27). 
 
--New military intelligence czar Myint Swe met with ethnic 
Kachin leaders on January 22 and S-1 met with the same group 
on January 23.  (Emboffs met with one of the Kachin leaders 
on January 28, who reported that their encounters with the 
SPDC officials were "entirely routine.") 
 
--Senior GOB officials are collaborating this week with ILO 
representatives to coordinate a late February high-profile 
visit of an independent ILO delegation (which will include a 
former Swiss and a former Australian head of state). 
 
Comment:  The Crazy Glue Has Evaporated 
 
6. (C) We don't rule out that something could be amiss among 
the military regime's top leaders.  The October ouster of 
former Prime Minister and MI chief Khin Nyunt, and the purge 
of his intelligence and business empire, has created a 
significant void within the regime.  As noted ref B, this has 
led to considerable paralysis with regard to decision-making 
and interaction with the international community. 
 
7. (C) Furthermore, and perhaps more significant, the demise 
of Khin Nyunt and MI, chief enforcers of SPDC control, has 
also severely hampered the regime's ability to maintain its 
vast network of spies and surveillance.  The previously 
omnipotent military intelligence apparatus was not only the 
mechanism that stifled dissent and opposition, but was also 
the eyes and ears that allowed senior SPDC leaders to make 
many key administrative decisions for the regime--and to keep 
full tabs on each other.  End Comment. 
Martinez