US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO228

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR DORMANDY 
 
E.O. 12958:    DECL:  01-28-14 
TAGS: PGOV, AEMR, EAID, PTER, CE, Tsunami, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka:  Post-tsunami Political Landscape 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 138 
-      (B) Colombo 94 
 
(U) Classified by Charge' d'Affaires James F. Entwistle. 
Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As Sri Lanka begins to pick up the 
pieces one month after the tsunami, politicians are 
calculating the impact of the disaster on the bitterly 
divisive zero-sum game that is Sri Lankan politics.  For 
now, the enormous sympathy generated for Sri Lanka-as 
well as repeated calls for national unity and an end to 
partisan politics-seem to most directly benefit President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga and her government.  Her habitual 
adversaries, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the 
opposition United National Party and nominal coalition 
partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, on the other hand, are 
at a relative disadvantage, scrambling to regain lost 
ground by competing with the Government in the 
relief/reconstruction effort.  Kumaratunga risks 
squandering the good will her government has garnered, 
however, if she fails to begin reconstruction quickly and 
equitably.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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CALCULATION OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE . . . 
------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) One month after a devastating tsunami struck the 
northern, eastern, southern and parts of the western 
coastline, the extent of the damage wrought by the 
greatest natural disaster in modern Sri Lankan history is 
gradually becoming clearer.  According to the Center for 
National 0perations (CNO), 30,957 people have been 
confirmed killed in the tragedy, while another 5,644 
remain missing.  In addition, 396, 170 people have been 
displaced, with 229,207 staying with friends and 
relatives and 166,963 staying in 320 temporary camps. 
78,407 houses were completely destroyed; another 41,097 
were partially destroyed.  168 public schools, 4 
universities and 18 vocational schools were damaged.  92 
clinics, hospitals and drug stores were either damaged or 
destroyed.  An estimated 5 percent of the national road 
network was damaged, and a 20 km stretch of the Southern 
Rail Corridor, which carries 78,000 passengers daily, was 
rendered inoperable. 
 
3.  (U)  A Preliminary Needs Assessment prepared by the 
Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency and 
the World Bank estimated the cost of damages from the 
tsunami at between $900-930 million.  Moreover, an 
 
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estimated 380,000 jobs were lost as a result of the 
catastrophe.  Combined with the loss of output projected 
from this damage, the entire cost of the disaster is 
estimated at about 7 percent of GDP.  To recoup these 
losses, the Assessment calculated Sri Lanka's overall 
financing needs at between $1.4-1.5 billion. 
 
4.  (SBU) The international and national responses to 
this overwhelming tragedy have been tremendous.  Private 
Sri Lankans from all across the country and from all 
walks of life have been involved in unprecedented numbers 
in a variety of philanthropic endeavors, most of them 
individual and spontaneous.  Private corporations and 
state-owned enterprises have also pitched in, with 
garment manufacturers providing pallets of the infant 
rehydration fluid Pedialyte and Sri Lanka Telecom 
employees donning work gloves to help clear rubble 
littering the southern coast.  By early January, 
according to the World Bank, bilateral donors had already 
pledged $22 million in aid, while by mid-January the UN 
had received just about as much in response to its Flash 
Appeal. 
 
5.  (U) After an initially chaotic start (exacerbated by 
the micro-managing President's absence from the country 
in the first few days of the crisis), the Government of 
Sri Lanka (GSL) has improved its response to the 
disaster.  The Center for National Operations (CNO), 
headed by Education Secretary and Presidential confidant 
Dr. Tara De Mel, was established at the Presidential 
Secretariat to coordinate relief and reconstruction.  In 
 
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addition, the President also set up three task forces, 
composed of senior civil servants and prominent members 
from the private sector, to address different aspects of 
the GSL reconstruction effort.  The Task Force for Rescue 
and Relief, chaired by Dr. De Mel, facilitates all 
rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities and 
coordinates assistance from international donors and 
NGOs.  The Task Force to Rebuild the Nation, chaired by 
Presidential Advisor Mano Tittawella, addresses 
reconstruction of infrastructure.  The Task Force for 
Logistics and Law and Order, chaired by Public Security 
Secretary Tilak Ranaviraja, coordinates logistical 
 
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aspects of relief work and is responsible for ensuring 
the safety of tsunami victims "from harassment and 
exploitation," according to the CNO website. 
 
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 . . . AND POLITICAL CASUALTIES 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) But with calculations of physical and economic 
damage more or less complete, observers are beginning 
another cost assessment--evaluating the relative gains 
and losses experienced across the political spectrum by 
different key players.  The consensus is, for the time 
being at least, that President Chandrika Kumaratunga, her 
dubious political fortunes boosted by the unprecedented 
tide of international and local good will, appears to be 
the overall net winner.  For now, the unparalleled scale 
of the national tragedy-and the repeated appeals to rise 
above partisan politics and divisiveness-have boxed her 
habitual adversaries, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), the opposition United National Party (UNP) 
and even her Marxist chauvinist coalition partner the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), into making at least a 
semblance of cooperating with their long-term rival. 
While recognizing the short-term need to appear to play 
well with others, behind the scenes Sri Lanka's political 
actors predictably continue to seek opportunities to 
undercut the President's performance and up their own 
capital. 
 
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LTTE UNDER PRESSURE TO COOPERATE WITH GSL, 
CARE FOR CONSTITUENTS 
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7.  (C) The tsunami, while inflicting (unknown) losses on 
LTTE cadres, supplies and installations, also washed away 
a key political trump card for the Tigers:  the claim 
that Kumaratunga was purposely stalling the peace process 
to mollify the JVP and secure her own political future. 
Moreover, the typical Tiger plaint of Tamil victimization 
rings hollow in this crisis, which seems to have affected 
every ethnic community with equal virulence.  Most 
important, the LTTE has had to stow for now its demand 
that its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA) form the sole basis for resumed negotiations-a 
demand that the Tigers knew was politically untenable for 
Kumaratunga and which they hoped would paint her as 
inflexible and self-serving to the international 
community. 
 
8.  (C) The tsunami has alleviated some of the immediate 
pressure on the GSL for progress on the peace front, and 
the Tigers know it.  Despite its repeated accusations 
that the GSL is not distributing aid equitably to 
affected communities in Tiger-controlled territories, the 
LTTE apparently recognizes that international sympathy 
for these claims-especially with so many INGOs deployed 
in the field who can attest to the contrary-is low. 
(UNICEF reports of Tigers attempting to conscript child 
tsunami victims as guerrilla fighters have also done 
 
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little to boost LTTE stock lately.)  For now, LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran seems to have decided, rather than trying to 
beat Kumaratunga, to join her on the moral high ground 
her calls for unity and compassion have gained her. 
 
9.  (C) At the same time, the Tigers cannot afford to 
allow the focus off the peace process-or the GSL to be 
perceived as leading the relief effort-for long.  From 
the LTTE standpoint, any GSL success in providing for 
Tamil tsunami victims would belie the LTTE mantra of 
institutionalized GSL discrimination against Tamils and 
the organization's long-standing claim to be the sole 
legitimate representative of the Tamil people.  Reported 
tensions between representatives of the pro-LTTE Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and the GSL's Special 
Task Force (STF) guarding camps for internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in the east point to Tiger concerns that 
relations between Tamils and the security forces may 
improve as a result of tsunami relief efforts.  For the 
Tigers, the best bet for PR purposes may be to echo 
public calls for unity in the face of crisis-and to 
continue quiet cooperation at the local and national 
levels (Ref B)-while demanding that aid in Tamil areas be 
channeled through LTTE proxies like the TRO. 
 
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OPPOSITION ON HOLD 
------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Before the tsunami struck, the UNP had been 
gleefully watching the economy stumble and the cost of 
living rise, planning to launch a concerted attack on the 
GSL around April, when consumer discontent was expected 
to peak.  Since December 26, however, the Opposition 
instead has had to watch national and international 
support rally around the President and to second her 
appeals to put partisan politics aside for the time 
being. 
 
11.  (C) So far the UNP has put on a brave public face, 
accepting GSL calls to cooperate on the reconstruction 
effort.  In private, however, Opposition Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe is highlighting what he perceives as 
shortcomings in the GSL response.  In a January 26 
meeting with Charge, the former PM lamented that the 
"relief mechanism is not working properly" and that the 
GSL is squandering international aid and good will 
through disorganization and inefficiency.  Relief efforts 
should be decentralized, he said, to the Government Agent 
(GA) level and below, and special care should be taken to 
reinject cash into local economies by restoring 
livelihoods destroyed by the tsunami.  In addition, the 
GSL has overestimated the damage done to the LTTE's 
defensive capabilities and erred in putting the military 
in charge of IDP camps, he opined.  He has requested a 
meeting with the President to share these views. 
 
12.  (C) The President is also attempting to make 
political capital out of the crisis, Wickremesinghe 
complained.  As an example, he cited her public statement 
on January 19 that there would be no elections for the 
next five years.  Even though her office had since issued 
a clarification that she was referring to parliamentary, 
rather than presidential, elections, he said he knew for 
a fact that she had been trying to mobilize support among 
influential Buddhist clerics for a moratorium on 
presidential polls because of the tsunami. 
 
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JVP CHAUVINISM ALSO A CASUALTY? 
-------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Despite its status as a coalition partner, the 
JVP cannot be counted as a GSL ally, and prior to 
December 26 its indefatigable campaign against the peace 
process in general and the ISGA in particular had 
hamstrung Kumaratunga's ability to move back to the 
negotiating table.  Like the LTTE, however, the JVP has 
seen the appeal of its ethnically divisive rhetoric 
diminished in the wake of the national disaster.  To 
compensate (and to blunt any political advantage the GSL 
might gain through its disaster response), the JVP has 
turned its consummate organizational apparatus to 
grassroots relief work.  An American journalist commented 
to poloff that the southern coast was blanketed with red- 
bereted JVP cadres energetically dispensing relief and 
organizing clean-up crews.  In the ethnically diverse 
east, the party faithful are out in force as well, 
clearing debris, cooking food for IDPs, conducting 
medical camps and, from time to time, confronting the 
LTTE.  According to observers, JVP altruism carries 
distinct ideological overtones, however, and party 
members take pains to differentiate themselves and their 
efforts from the GSL.  For example, at a January 22 
meeting in Kalutara, JVP activists heckled a local civil 
servant attempting to explain the GLS compensation 
package to tsunami victims. 
 
14.  (C) But even if the JVP senses (correctly) that 
post-tsunami humanitarian concerns have made its 
Sinhalese chauvinist message less appealing, it has not 
necessarily moderated its anti-ISGA rhetoric.  On the 
pretext of thanking donors for their emergency 
assistance, the JVP leadership has recently been making 
the rounds of the diplomatic circuit, asking foreign 
envoys not to deal directly with the LTTE or allow the 
Tigers to exploit the crisis to establish a de facto 
separate state.  (We have made clear to the JVP our 
policy of not dealing directly with the LTTE.)  The 
implication, of course, is that the GSL, except for the 
vigilance of the JVP, would let this happen. 
 
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COMMENT 
--------- 
 
15.  (C) Even her critics agree that the post-tsunami 
tide of sympathy has helped President Kumaratunga.  For 
now, the crisis has pushed any dissatisfaction with her 
performance on the peace process and the economy off the 
front pages.  The tsunami has provided a pretext for a 
fresh start on the near-moribund peace process, and 
GSL/LTTE cooperation on reconstruction could pay big 
dividends in building confidence between the two mutually 
mistrustful parties.  Moreover, because the disaster 
struck all ethnic communities, reconstruction efforts, if 
handled properly, could help unify Sri Lankans and 
provide an opportunity to remedy past inequities. 
 
16.  (C) That said, the road ahead contains numerous 
pitfalls into which Kumaratunga, with her well-known 
penchant for disorganization and her reluctance to 
delegate responsibility, may stumble.  The massive influx 
of aid and the GSL's announcement of an ambitious $3.5 
billion reconstruction plan have raised enormous 
expectations, and Kumaratunga will have to move fast to 
ensure that aid is distributed equitably and 
transparently.  Otherwise, the reconstruction effort, 
however well intentioned, could backfire and end up 
exacerbating ethnic tensions.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
ENTWISTLE