US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU515

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000515 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID -DCHA/OFDA -RAY DIONNE 
 
LONDON FOR RIEGEL 
 
E.O. 12958:    N/A 
TAGS: EAID, PTER, PGOV, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN COSTS OF MAOIST INSURGENCY 
 
REF:  KATHMANDU 0450 
 
1. Since early 1996, Maoist insurgents have been waging 
an increasingly bloody "People's War" aimed at toppling 
the constitutional monarchy and democratically elected 
government of Nepal.  Although initially centered in 
impoverished, underdeveloped districts of the west and 
mid-west regions, the insurgents have successfully 
spread their violent campaign to affect all of Nepal's 
75 districts, including those long considered "safe" 
from Maoist influence. 
 
2.  Besides attacking members of the security forces, 
the Maoists have traditionally also targeted local 
government officials, teachers, mainstream party 
activists, and other perceived representatives of 
central government authority living and working in the 
remote, rural areas where insurgent activity and 
influence have typically been heaviest.  In addition, 
the insurgents impress children into service as porters, 
cooks, and sometimes as armed cadre.  In some cases, 
girls so conscripted have been sexually assaulted by 
Maoist cadre (Reftel) and are unwilling or unable to 
return home.  Maoist threats, extortion, arson, 
abductions, beatings, torture, and murder have long 
spread terror through such communities, creating untold- 
-and undocumented--numbers of displaced persons unable 
to return to their homes.  Countermeasures by the 
security forces have also contributed to the involuntary 
movement of people. 
 
3.  Since halting negotiations with Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba and unilaterally breaking a four-month 
ceasefire November 23, however, the Maoists have sharply 
increased both the frequency and the intensity of such 
attacks against military, police, and civilian targets. 
The Human Rights Report for 2001 documents the 
increasing number of incidents and their victims. 
Every day, Tribhuvan University Hospital in Kathmandu 
admits an average of two victims of Maoist violence from 
across the country; an unknown number of others are 
treated in smaller district hospitals.  Many of the 
victims suffer from shattered limbs, multiple stab 
wounds, and even amputations.  Of the more than 3,000 
people killed by both sides in the insurgency over the 
past six years, over half have been killed in just the 
three months since the ceasefire was broken. 
 
4.  The families of those killed, injured, or otherwise 
intimidated often flee their homes in fear, leaving 
behind their property and businesses, to seek the 
comparative safety of the district headquarters, the 
capital, or the homes of relatives in other areas. In 
the face of severe budgetary constraints, the Government 
of Nepal (GON) makes no provision for such individuals, 
who must depend on relatives or the limited number of 
charitable institutions active in Nepal for assistance. 
No GON office--including the Disaster Management unit in 
the Home Ministry--has set up a central system to 
register such cases or to maintain data on the number of 
such internally displaced persons, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests a conservative estimate could reach 
well over the thousands. 
 
5.  The Embassy's own quick survey of conditions in 
selected districts revealed the following.  The Chief 
District Officer (CDO) in Baglung knows of 70 families 
who have left their homes and are now staying at 
district headquarters; the CDO in Salyan knows of 100; 
while in Surkhet there are 128 known cases.  The local 
chapter of the Red Cross in Rukum, meanwhile, counts 90 
displaced families.  The CDO in Lalitpur in Kathmandu 
Valley (where many displaced persons seeking refuge in 
the capital turn up) says about 80 people from across 
the country have registered with his office.  Since 
civil servants often live above their offices in the 
districts, a number of families were made homeless when 
the insurgents burned down government buildings and some 
private homes in the Feb. 17 attack in Achham District. 
The Nepal Maoist Victim Association, a charity 
affiliated with the Nepali Congress Party, meanwhile, 
has documented 452 killings and 916 injuries  of 
civilians by Maoists.  At least 1,000 individuals have 
sought the Association's support over the past few 
years.  The Embassy was unable to verify statistics in 
another 12 heavily affected districts, where telephone 
service has been cut by Maoist attacks on repeater 
stations. 
 
6.  T.R. Onta, Executive Director of the Nepal Red Cross 
Society, says his organization has provided assistance 
to some of the victims of Maoist-related violence, 
including to 300 families in Achham.  He would like to 
do more to help the displaced, but is constrained by a 
lack of resources, as well as by the lack of information 
from the GON.  Onta has asked the local Nepal Red Cross 
chapters, which operate in all 75 districts, to carry 
out an assessment of the number of displaced and their 
needs so that the Society can better plan its efforts to 
respond.  While generally responsive and proactive in 
the event of natural disasters, the Home Ministry does 
not recognize the chronic displacement of average 
Nepalis from their homes as a disaster and has therefore 
not responded. 
 
6.  Comment:  Spectacular Maoist assaults like the 
attack on Achham receive wide press coverage here, and 
the GON has publicly appealed for aid to rebuild the 
demolished district headquarters.  But little is being 
done to address the quieter, more pervasive everyday 
tragedy of individual families being forced from their 
homes because their government can no longer guarantee 
their safety.  Families fleeing violence lose their 
livelihoods, their property, and, often, the chance to 
educate their children.  Other casualties of the 
conflict, like children recruited--and, in some cases, 
sexually abused--by the Maoists also suffer 
displacement.  Civilian survivors of violence cannot 
count on GON support to cover medical costs, many of 
which include long-term hospital stays.  The number of 
these victims is likely to continue to climb as security 
forces expand cordon and search operations  and as the 
Maoists, under pressure from security forces on the more 
conventional battlefield, resort to increased terror and 
intimidation among helpless civilian populations.  The 
GON is clearly not equipped to address the mounting 
needs of these victims and must work with the donor 
community to take immediate action to stem this 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
MALINOWSKI