US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU510

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2012 
TAGS: MCAP, NP, PGOV, MASS, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL ARMY CHIEFS DISCUSS ROLE OF THE ARMY AND 
COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 379 
 
Classified By: A/DCM HOZA.  REASON: 1.5 (B, D). 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
SUMMARY: 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
1.  (C)  RNA Chief General Rana and his deputy, Lt. General 
Thapa, went out of their way to underline their support for 
democracy at a February 28 dinner with emboffs.  Rana stated 
unequivocally that a coup by the RNA was "out of the 
question."   According to Rana, the RNA's role is to quell 
the Maoist insurgencuy, to restore public confidence in the 
GON's ability to provide security to its people, and to give 
the GON an opportunity to address widespread poverty and 
promote development.   His deputy, Lt. General Thapa, was 
surprisingly optimistic in the wake of the debacle at 
Mangalsen (Reftel A).  Thapa stated that the transition from 
a "ceremonial and peacekeeping" military to a 
counter-insurgency force would take time and that hard 
lessons would be learned.  He noted that the RNA had enjoyed 
several significant successes in the immediate aftermath of 
the Mangalsen attack, particularly through the use of 
helicopters.  Thapa stated that the RNA believes there is a 
growing split between the political and military leadership 
of the Maoists, and that the symptoms of that split include 
greater violence and intimidation of civilians.  While 
optimistic, Thapa made it clear that significant assistance 
from "Nepal's friends" would be necessary.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RNA CHIEF EMPHASIZES THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A COUP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) Chief of Army Staff Gen. 
Prajwalla Rana and Deputy Chief Lt. Gen. Pyar Jung Thapa took 
the opportunity of an  RNA-hosted dinner to engage U.S. 
embassy personnel on their view of the role of the RNA during 
the current state of emergency in Nepal.  The dinner was in 
honor of participants in the recent UN/PACOM-sponsored 
peacekeeping seminar here in Kathmandu.  Both the Chief and 
his Deputy went out of their way to underscore their views of 
the current crisis, specifically discussing the RNA's 
political perspective, prospects for operations against the 
armed Maoist insurgency, and the need for material 
assistance. 
 
3.  (C) Chief of Army Staff Gen. Rana went to great lengths 
to dispel fears of a coup by the RNA.   While forcefully 
stating that "the politicians" must work together for the 
good of Nepal, he was careful not to criticize the GON.  He 
stated unequivocally that a coup by the RNA was "out of the 
question" since the RNA cannot solve the country's problems. 
 The RNA could only rule through the imposition of martial 
law, and that this would only worsen the country's economy 
"even more than the current state of emergency."  Further, he 
feared that a coup would immediately result in "the US 
government and European governments withdrawing critical 
development assistance."   Therefore, Rana concluded, it is 
up to the RNA to neutralize the armed Maoists, to restore 
public confidence in the ability of the soldiers and police 
to provide security to the people, and give the GON an 
opportunity to address the serious development issues 
confronting the country.  He made it clear that the object of 
the RNA-Maoist conflict would be to encourage Maoists to 
surrender or defect, that the winning of hearts and minds was 
more important than the number of Maoists killed, and that 
the RNA must conduct a clean war with respect for human 
rights uppermost. 
 
4.  (C) Rana spoke with emotion regarding the RNA's critical 
role in the restoration of public order in the immediate 
aftermath of the palace tragedy of June 1, 2001.  If ever 
there had been a moment when the RNA could have taken power, 
said Rana, "that was it."  However, he said, the RNA had done 
its duty to the King and the Nepalese people, maintained 
public calm, returned the streets to the police, and returned 
the troops to their barracks.  Since then, Rana continued, 
the RNA has stood by the GON when its visible security 
presence foiled the Maoist call for a mass rally in Kathmandu 
in September 2001.  Since the attack on the RNA barracks in 
Dang in November, the RNA has been forced to engage the 
Maoists directly, but has only done so under a formal state 
of emergency properly established through constitutional 
mechanisms.   Rana noted that the RNA would far prefer seeing 
the Maoists surrender as they "do not want to kill them - 
they are Nepalis."  Rana spoke sincerely about the deplorable 
poverty, particularly in the countryside, and the need for 
development to improve the lives of the people. 
 
5.  (SBU)  BACKGROUND NOTES ON CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF RANA: 
Rana is a third generation army officer who began his career 
in 1961.  He was a young lieutenant in 1964 when the 
then-King dissolved the first democratic government and 
instituted the Panchayat system.  In 1990, when demonstrators 
forced the King to re-institute multi-party democracy, Rana 
was Director of Military Intelligence.  It is reported that, 
in the face of the popular demonstrations, the RNA had 
advised the King that they could suppress the demonstrators, 
that the soldiers would indeed follow orders, but that it 
would cost over a thousand Nepali lives.  The King relented, 
but not before at least forty demonstrators were killed by 
the police, backed by the RNA, at one demonstration  in front 
of the palace.  That event is often referred to as a searing 
experience for the RNA, and one that prompted the King, up 
until the time of his death last June, to keep the RNA away 
from the conflict against the Maoists.  Gen. Rana is 
scheduled to retire in September 2002, although rumors have 
arisen that he might be kept on.  He is expected to be 
replaced by his well-regarded deputy, Gen. Thapa. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RNA DEPUTY CHIEF SURPRISINGLY OPTIMISTIC 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Despite the psychological impact of the recent Maoist 
victory over the RNA reinforced platoon in Mangalsen, Deputy 
Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Thapa was surprisingly 
optimistic about the RNA's prospects for eventual success in 
quelling the armed Maoist insurgency.  In a wide-ranging 
discussion, Thapa outlined RNA operational thinking as they 
make the transition from a "ceremonial and peacekeeping" 
military to a counter-insurgency force.  "We will lose a few, 
and we will win a few," he stated, but the RNA is engaged and 
will make the transition necessary to defeat the armed 
Maoists.  Expanding on Rana's comments, Thapa stated that the 
RNA must maintain pressure on the Maoists, attack their 
morale, and encourage defections.  Thapa was optimistic about 
the prospects of severely degrading the Maoist military 
capabilities before the start of the monsoon in June.  At 
that point, he said, operations will necessarily slow down 
due to the weather, and it will be "up to the politicians" to 
resolve the conflict.   "If they fail, then we will be back 
at work after the monsoons." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MANGALSEN WAS A SETBACK, BUT LESSONS ARE BEING LEARNED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C)  When asked why the RNA was so optimistic only two 
weeks after the debacle at Mangalsen, Thapa made three 
points.  First, the contingent in Mangalsen was not prepared 
to defend itself.  "While we don't like to talk bad about the 
dead, the commander made many mistakes."  He went on to say 
that the garrison in Mangalsen had not prepared proper 
perimeter defenses, whereas the recent successful defense of 
a repeater tower by a similarly-sized garrison was a 
testimony to the importance of proper tactical preparation. 
The lessons of site selection, clear fields of fire, razor 
wire and trip flares were now being systematically passed on 
to all platoon and company commanders, according to Thapa. 
Second, Thapa claimed that the Maoist attacks in Achham 
district, including Mangalsen, were not a complete success. 
He claimed that it was the Maoist intention to hold the 
district capital for the entire day.  However, the Maoists 
were surprised by the arrival of RNA reaction forces by 
helicopter and were forced to leave the area in haste. 
Similarly, the subsequent Maoist attack on the police post at 
Salyan was disrupted by the arrival of an RNA helicopter. 
Third, Thapa continued, since the attack at Mangalsen, the 
RNA had achieved a number of successes throughout the country 
and inflicted heavy casualties on "hard-core" Maoist cadre. 
This was particularly true, he claimed, in the successful 
ambush of forty-plus heavily armed Maoists trying to return 
to Kalikot district from Achham.  According to Thapa, the RNA 
had four transport helicopters and two 'gunships' in the area 
in preparation for a planned cordon and search operation. 
When the RNA learned  that this Maoist contingent would be 
entering a pass between the two districts, he said, the 
cordon and search operation was called off and the force was 
quickly deployed ahead of the Maoist line of march.  This 
successful ambush, high body count, and recovery of 
significant weaponry did much to restore RNA morale. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
THE RNA CAN WIN, BUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WILL BE NEEDED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Thapa noted that more such raids will be conducted as 
the RNA makes the transition to a counter-insurgency role and 
takes the offensive.  It is difficult, however, because of 
the shortage of troops and the fact that it will be many 
months before the 5,000 new recruits can take the field.  He 
stated that they are further handicapped by a shortage of 
equipment that can make the difference, particularly 
helicopters and the ability to fly them at night or in poor 
visibility.  Thapa noted that the RNA had used what slim 
resources it had available to contract with an Israeli 
commercial firm to install some armor plating and fixed 
machine guns on their existing "scout" helicopters.   Thapa 
went on to say that he had recently had a meeting with the 
Governor of the Central Bank to determine what further 
financial resources will be available.  He declined to 
comment on the specific outcome of that meeting, but clearly 
intended to make the point that the GON Treasury is under 
strain and that "assistance from Nepal's friends" would be 
necessary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
THE RNA SEES SPLIT IN MAOIST LEADERSHIP AND SEEDS OF THEIR 
DEFEAT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Gen. Thapa confirmed the RNA's belief that there is a 
significant split between the Maoist political leadership and 
their military commanders in the field.  During the last few 
weeks, he claimed, communications between Maoist forces in 
the field and the political leaders have declined, and 
disagreements between field commanders and political 
commissars attached to Maoist military units has increased. 
Thapa characterized the conversations as criticism by field 
commanders that "they are doing all the suffering and the 
political leadership is enjoying all the perks."  Thapa did 
not specify whether his information came from actual 
communication intercepts or prisoner interrogations.  He 
insisted, however, that current intelligence has confirmed 
earlier rumors, dating back to November, of a major 
disagreement over the decision by the Maoists to abandon 
negotiations and resume military operations.  He went on to 
say that it is the RNA's assumption that this split has 
widened over the past three months.  As a result, the Maoist 
military campaign is now being directed to a large extent by 
relatively young and aggressive field commanders with limited 
intellectual, ideological, or policy grounding.  Symptoms 
include increasing use of violent terror tactics, forced 
recruitment, and an increasing disregard for the winning of 
the hearts and minds of the civilian population.  In some 
districts, according to the RNA, villagers are beginning to 
flee the Maoists, and significant numbers of Maoist fighters 
are becoming disaffected and may be vulnerable to 
opportunities to defect to the GON. 
10.  (C)  EMBASSY COMMENT:   Gen. Rana certainly said all the 
right things, and, while not necessarily insincere, was 
clearly playing to his audience.  While Rana avoided 
criticizing "the politicians," many of his colonels, majors 
and captains are openly critical of the GON and its perceived 
failure, in twelve years of democratic governance, to address 
the issues of poverty and corruption.  As for Gen. Thapa's 
optimism, the RNA will be hard-pressed to overcome the Maoist 
insurgency before the arrival of the monsoon in June. 
Despite the possible rift in the Maoist leadership, the 
political boss, Prachandra, has publicly called for a 
five-day bandh or strike to begin on the second of April.  As 
with the successful two-day bandh in February, the Maoists 
may well be planning another major attack like that in Achham 
to cow the populace into compliance.  Whether Thapa's troops 
can prevent another defeat, or better yet, disrupt Maoist 
preparations through offensive raids, remains to be seen. 
Both Rana and Thapa are saying the things "Nepal's friends" 
want to hear, and they may well be sincere about them.  They 
will indeed need foreign assistance to disarm an increasingly 
violent and ruinous Maoist insurgency.  Whether the GON can 
capitalize on an RNA victory by addressing the very real 
issues of poverty and corruption is a much larger question. 
However, that question will not have a chance to be answered 
unless the RNA can win this round. 
 
MALINOWSKI