US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI344

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DPP'S SOONG STRATEGY

Identifier: 05TAIPEI344
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI344 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-01-27 10:05:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV TW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TW 
SUBJECT: DPP'S SOONG STRATEGY 
 
REF: TAIPEI 312 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Senior Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
officials say they will continue contacts with People First 
Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong as part of an effort to 
divide and demoralize the Pan-Blue coalition.  DPP 
strategists believe that the DPP and Soong share a number of 
short-term objectives, including protecting the PFP from a 
forced merger with the KMT and derailing any attempt by 
Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou to take over as KMT Chairman.  In 
exchange for boosting Soong's profile, the DPP administration 
hopes the PFP will cooperate on the Special Defense 
Procurement Budget and other major legislation during the 
Spring Legislative Yuan (LY) session.  However, they 
acknowledge that Soong's room for maneuver is limited by his 
support base's hostility to the DPP administration.  While 
the DPP plans to keep up back channel contacts with Soong, it 
is also reaching out to disaffected KMT members to undermine 
the PFP's attempts to secure the LY Vice Speaker position. 
The DPP has succeeded in keeping the Pan-Blue off balance, 
but its manipulations may cost the new Hsieh cabinet a 
measure of goodwill in the upcoming LY session.  End Summary. 
 
Denial and Deception 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C) DPP officials say they will continue to maintain back 
channel communications with PFP Chairman James Soong over 
possible tactical cooperation despite recent public 
affirmations of renewed Pan-Blue cooperation.  DPP political 
strategist and Executive Yuan (EY) Research, Development, and 
Evaluation Council (RDEC) Vice Minister Chen Chun-lin told 
AIT that the ruling party decided shortly after the December 
11 LY election that engaging Soong would help dampen Pan-Blue 
momentum coming out of the election.  "We wanted to exploit 
the high level of mistrust within the Pan-Blue to ensure we 
didn't have to face a united and energized LY majority," he 
added.  Chen and other officials say the DPP administration 
also plans to maintain contacts with Soong to secure specific 
policy and political objectives.  Chen Shui-bian confidante 
and Hakka Affairs Council (HAC) Minister Luo Wen-chia told 
AIT that the main channel of communications runs directly to 
Soong via the president's immediate political advisors 
(Comment: likely to mean Presidential Office Secretary Ma 
Yung-chen.  End Comment.). 
 
3. (C) Presidential Office Deputy Secretary General James 
Huang told AIT that the Chen administration's stated goal for 
reaching out to Soong is to secure a working majority in the 
LY to pass major legislation.  Huang noted that Soong's 
recent remarks on the Special Defense Procurement Budget 
suggest that he is willing to soften the PFP's pre-election 
stance against LY action on the budget.  Huang added that the 
president still hopes that Soong will accept his offer to 
chair the "Cross-Strait Peace and Stability Committee." 
 
4. (C) DPP Deputy Secretary General Y.Y. Lee told AIT that 
the likelihood of Soong chairing the cross-Strait committee 
was not as remote as it might appear at first glance.  "His 
party may abandon him at some point," Lee remarked, "so he'll 
need some sort of platform to keep his political career alive 
through 2008."  Lee predicted that Soong would not accept any 
position in the near-term.  "Given their (PFP supporters) 
current frame of mind," Lee added, "Soong would be pelted 
with eggs if he took a job with the DPP."  Chung Chia-bing, 
the DPP's other Deputy Secretary General, emphasized the 
point that the government's target is Soong, not the PFP as a 
party.  Chung noted that in the future, there will inevitably 
be a growing divergence between PFP politicians, who need to 
focus on their own political future, and their charismatic 
leader.  PFP Policy Chief Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao), a 
long-time Soong loyalist, told AIT that Soong does not rule 
out taking the cross-Strait post at some point in the future 
if the DPP were to offer policy concessions in return. 
 
Unholy Alliance 
--------------- 
 
5. (C) The EY's Chen commented that DPP efforts to boost 
Soong's standing may even help him stay within the Pan-Blue 
tent, an outcome that would also serve DPP long-term 
interests.  "We share the common goal with Soong, (LY 
Speaker) Wang Jin-pyng, and (KMT Chairman) Lien Chan in 
seeing that (popular Taipei Mayor) Ma Ying-jeou does not 
become KMT Chairman in August," Chen asserted.  Chen added, 
"if we're lucky, Soong will cut a deal with Lien and Wang to 
come back as KMT Chair, where he could really ruin Ma's 
chances for 2008." 
 
Divide and Conquer 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) DPP officials say that despite their ongoing efforts 
to woo Soong, and build a working relationship with the new 
Pan-Blue LY majority, they will continue to play the KMT and 
PFP against each other at every opportunity.  The DPP's Lee 
confirmed reports that the DPP was reaching out to anti-PFP 
members of the KMT LY Caucus to break ranks in the vote over 
the early February vote on the Pan-Blue's joint LY 
Speaker/Vice Speaker ticket.  The effort appeared to pay off 
on January 27, when the PFP delivered an ultimatum to the KMT 
that it either enforce party discipline on the Chung election 
or face a defection by PFP Members in the vote to re-elect of 
LY Speaker Wang. 
 
Comment: A Perishable Resource 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) While Soong's flirtation with the DPP has helped both 
sides undermine KMT morale in the wake of the party's 
surprise December 11 LY showing, there are limits to how far 
the relationship can develop.  Soong is playing a high-stakes 
game by trying to force concessions from all corners.  If he 
overplays his hand, he could soon find himself without a 
party to bargain with.  For its part, the DPP's attempts to 
play both the KMT and PFP off against each other could 
backfire by eroding prospects for building a modicum of trust 
between the opposition parties and the soon-to-be formed 
Hsieh cabinet.  At the very least, the DPP's flirtation with 
Soong raises questions over the DPP's commitment to Hsieh's 
promise to create a "new model" for cross-partisan 
cooperation (Reftel). 
PAAL 

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