US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI342

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TAIWAN'S CONTAINER PORT SECURITY ABOVE AVERAGE

Identifier: 05TAIPEI342
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI342 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-01-27 08:52:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: ASEC ECON TW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS FOR EAP/RSP/TC, AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC, ECON, TW 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN'S CONTAINER PORT SECURITY ABOVE AVERAGE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation's Volpe Transportation Systems Center visited 
the ports of Kaohsiung and Taichung from January 11-21 2005 
to assess Taiwan's current container terminal port security 
practices.  The representatives noted that security in both 
ports is "above average," and cited Taiwan's police-issued 
port employee I.D. cards and dual security checkpoints at 
port entrances and container facilities as best practices. 
Areas for improvement identified by the Volpe team include 
better use of security technology and enhanced security 
responsibilities for customs inspectors. End summary. 
 
2. (U) Charles McCarthy and Jack Publicover, representing the 
Volpe Transportation Center, visited Kaohsiung and Taichung 
port facilities to survey Taiwan's current container port 
security environment and identify best practices.  The Volpe 
Center is currently conducting a study of International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) implementation 
practices and compliance levels at international container 
terminal ports.  The ISPS Code was developed by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to deter maritime 
terrorist and criminal incidents by providing ports with a 
standardized framework for assessing risk.  During the summer 
of 2005, the Volpe Center will publish an ISPS best practices 
report that will be shared with container terminal ports 
throughout the world. 
 
Taiwan's current port security - "above average" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
3.  (SBU) Volpe Center representative Charles McCarthy called 
Taiwan's port security practices "above average" in relation 
to those he has observed at other ports visited during this 
study.  The representatives identified two notable best 
practices in Taiwan: 1) At both Kaohsiung and Taichung, 
people and vehicles entering port facilities must pass 
through two security gates; one operated by the harbor 
police, and another operated by the container terminal 
company.  This provides an extra layer of security between 
the port and the public.  2) In Taiwan, harbor police bureaus 
are responsible for issuing ISPS I.D. badges for all port 
staff.  In most countries, port employees do not undergo 
criminal background checks and are issued I.D. cards by 
container terminal companies rather than police. 
 
Improvements needed to achieve full ISPS compliance 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Although Taiwan's port security environment is 
better than average, Volpe Center representatives stated that 
additional steps must be taken in order to achieve full ISPS 
compliance.  The representatives noted that in general, 
Taiwan's container ports do not make use of the latest 
security technology, including wireless integration and 
container tracking devices.  Many container terminal 
companies in Taiwan continue to rely on paper records and 
homegrown computer systems to track containers. 
 
5.  (SBU) The Volpe Center representatives reported that in 
some cases, container terminal companies had installed 
appropriate security equipment, but it was not being used 
properly.  In one facility, representatives noted that 
surveillance cameras were in use, yet the lighting and lenses 
were inappropriate for the type of camera installed. 
Furthermore, no one was responsible for viewing the 
surveillance videos.  In another case, a container terminal 
company had installed optical character recognition devices 
at a gateway to assess the security of containers entering 
and exiting by truck. These devices could be used to record 
the truck's license plate number, the driver's I.D., and the 
container number.   However, at present, the devices are only 
being used to capture and record vehicle license plate 
numbers. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Volpe team also noted that the distinct roles 
of customs and harbor police could lead to gaps in 
identifying and opening supicious containers.  In Taiwan, 
harbor police officers are responsbile for general security 
issues, whereas customs officers are responsible for 
identitfying and inspecting containers that may contain 
smuggled cargo.  Under this structure, if customs officers do 
not suspect smuggling, cargo that might be suspicious for 
other reasons is unlikely to be further inspected. 
 
APL Kaohsiung: A Model Container Terminal Operation 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7.  (SBU) The Volpe team called APL's Kaohsiung container 
terminal a "model" security operation.  APL's best practices 
include employee security training, regular drills and 
exercises, and quarterly security audits.  APL also makes 
good use of available security technologies such as handheld 
tracking devices.  Volpe representatives further noted that 
APL's security processes are well defined and understood at 
all levels of the organization. 
PAAL 

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