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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI342 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI342 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-01-27 08:52:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ASEC ECON TW |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000342 SIPDIS STATE PASS FOR EAP/RSP/TC, AIT/W E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, ECON, TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN'S CONTAINER PORT SECURITY ABOVE AVERAGE 1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives from the U.S. Department of Transportation's Volpe Transportation Systems Center visited the ports of Kaohsiung and Taichung from January 11-21 2005 to assess Taiwan's current container terminal port security practices. The representatives noted that security in both ports is "above average," and cited Taiwan's police-issued port employee I.D. cards and dual security checkpoints at port entrances and container facilities as best practices. Areas for improvement identified by the Volpe team include better use of security technology and enhanced security responsibilities for customs inspectors. End summary. 2. (U) Charles McCarthy and Jack Publicover, representing the Volpe Transportation Center, visited Kaohsiung and Taichung port facilities to survey Taiwan's current container port security environment and identify best practices. The Volpe Center is currently conducting a study of International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) implementation practices and compliance levels at international container terminal ports. The ISPS Code was developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to deter maritime terrorist and criminal incidents by providing ports with a standardized framework for assessing risk. During the summer of 2005, the Volpe Center will publish an ISPS best practices report that will be shared with container terminal ports throughout the world. Taiwan's current port security - "above average" --------------------------------------------- -- 3. (SBU) Volpe Center representative Charles McCarthy called Taiwan's port security practices "above average" in relation to those he has observed at other ports visited during this study. The representatives identified two notable best practices in Taiwan: 1) At both Kaohsiung and Taichung, people and vehicles entering port facilities must pass through two security gates; one operated by the harbor police, and another operated by the container terminal company. This provides an extra layer of security between the port and the public. 2) In Taiwan, harbor police bureaus are responsible for issuing ISPS I.D. badges for all port staff. In most countries, port employees do not undergo criminal background checks and are issued I.D. cards by container terminal companies rather than police. Improvements needed to achieve full ISPS compliance --------------------------------------------- ------ 4. (SBU) Although Taiwan's port security environment is better than average, Volpe Center representatives stated that additional steps must be taken in order to achieve full ISPS compliance. The representatives noted that in general, Taiwan's container ports do not make use of the latest security technology, including wireless integration and container tracking devices. Many container terminal companies in Taiwan continue to rely on paper records and homegrown computer systems to track containers. 5. (SBU) The Volpe Center representatives reported that in some cases, container terminal companies had installed appropriate security equipment, but it was not being used properly. In one facility, representatives noted that surveillance cameras were in use, yet the lighting and lenses were inappropriate for the type of camera installed. Furthermore, no one was responsible for viewing the surveillance videos. In another case, a container terminal company had installed optical character recognition devices at a gateway to assess the security of containers entering and exiting by truck. These devices could be used to record the truck's license plate number, the driver's I.D., and the container number. However, at present, the devices are only being used to capture and record vehicle license plate numbers. 6. (SBU) The Volpe team also noted that the distinct roles of customs and harbor police could lead to gaps in identifying and opening supicious containers. In Taiwan, harbor police officers are responsbile for general security issues, whereas customs officers are responsible for identitfying and inspecting containers that may contain smuggled cargo. Under this structure, if customs officers do not suspect smuggling, cargo that might be suspicious for other reasons is unlikely to be further inspected. APL Kaohsiung: A Model Container Terminal Operation --------------------------------------------- ------ 7. (SBU) The Volpe team called APL's Kaohsiung container terminal a "model" security operation. APL's best practices include employee security training, regular drills and exercises, and quarterly security audits. APL also makes good use of available security technologies such as handheld tracking devices. Volpe representatives further noted that APL's security processes are well defined and understood at all levels of the organization. PAAL
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