US embassy cable - 05ANKARA426

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EU/SE DOUG SILLIMAN, PM DAS KARA BUE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2029 
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, MARR, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN.31-FEB.1 VISIT OF UNDER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUG FEITH TO ANKARA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 242 
     B. ANKARA 356 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric. S. Edelman, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Your visit will extend a series of January 
visits by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, NATO Supreme 
Allied Commander General Jones and Commander of Central 
Command General Abizaid, and will provide an opportunity to 
echo their pledge that the US will fight all forms of 
terrorism in Iraq and to confirm the Secretary of Defense's 
commitment to a strong security partnership between the US 
and Turkey.  Turkish government and public unhappiness with 
the coalition effort in Iraq and the failure of the US to 
live up to perceived promises to combat the PKK threat in 
northern Iraq, together with Turkey's focus on achieving its 
EU membership aspirations, have created strains in a 
bilateral relationship that has not completely recovered from 
Turkey's March 1, 2003 vote against allowing a northern front 
for coalition efforts in Iraq, and the July 4, 2003 arrest of 
Turkish Special Forces near Suleymania.  Despite these 
tensions, however, Turkey has remained supportive of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), offering troops for Iraq, 
allowing the transport of fuel and humanitarian supplies to 
Iraq, refueling operations for both Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and troop 
transit from Iraq at Incirlik, accepting the command of ISAF 
VII in February, and establishing a Center of Excellence for 
the Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT).  Turkey is poised to 
play an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
and continues to encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear 
weapons ambitions.  Military equipment sales suffered in 2004 
with the cancellation of three tenders but these are being 
re-issued and US firms may participate.  Turkey is also 
upgrading most of its F-16 fleet.  End Summary. 
 
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THE DOMESTIC SCENE 
------------------ 
 
2. (C)  You arrive in Turkey as we are recalibrating our 
bilateral engagement.  Iraq-related issues will top your 
Turkish interlocutors' agendas.  The GOT shares our goals of 
a stable, democratic, unified Iraq, but our intervention 
there is unpopular and has generated Turkish concerns over 
lack of US action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish 
separatism and designs on Kirkuk, and attacks against Turkish 
truck drivers.  Bilateral relations were poisoned by grossly 
distorted media coverage of the Fallujah operation late last 
year.  Turkey has given valuable help on Iraq; however, our 
security relationship is fragile.  The EU's December decision 
to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October will 
help keep reform moving forward, but Turkey faces a long, 
difficult path to accession. 
 
3. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP by the 
military and other elements of the secular elite, Erdogan 
appears unassailable; he has a two-thirds majority in 
parliament; he remains highly popular; his government 
continues to reform Turkey's political and social space -- at 
least on the books; and he has pursued an activist foreign 
policy.  The only effective opposition is the military, and 
TGS Chief Ozkok is reluctant to take on the government 
publicly for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and 
thereby losing popular support for the military.  Instead, 
his TGS has gone along with EU-mandated reforms which have 
reduced the military's institutional methods of applying 
political influence.  The lack of a credible political 
opposition means the military lacks an important tool to 
effect change behind the scenes as well. 
 
4. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of around 8-9 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity 
structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, and 
ordinary people have not felt much benefit from the overall 
macroeconomic improvement.  Macroeconomic success has also 
bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with 
difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the 
banking, social security and tax systems, all of which are 
being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby program. 
 
5. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment 
now that the EU has decided to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey in October 2005.  However, this is unlikely to 
materialize unless more is done in the area of structural 
reform.  In addition, there appears to be a lack of 
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder 
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession 
will affect nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in 
the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU 
directives in environmental protection and other areas. 
 
---------------------- 
Bilateral Relationship 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Over the last year, US relations with Turkey, which 
had not fully recovered from the March 2003 parliamentary 
vote against allowing the passage of the 4th ID into Iraq, 
and the July 2003 arrest and hooding of Turkish Special 
Forces near Suleymania, Iraq, slipped further.  MFA 
Undersecretary Tuygan told the Ambassador January 18 that the 
only significant problem in Turkey-US relations was Iraq.  In 
fact, regular reports of the death of Turkish truck drivers, 
a barrage of media disinformation about coalition operations 
in Tal Afar and Fallujah, anger over perceived US inaction 
against the PKK, and suspicions about US support for Kurdish 
designs on Kirkuk and separatism in northern Iraq -- fanned 
by statements by PM Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul alleging 
excessive use of force and civilian casualties -- have 
whipped up already negative public opinion about the US. 
Last month, the government made some statements to try to 
alleviate the situation and the mission is making a concerted 
effort to encourage the government and media to speak on the 
basis of fact rather than fiction.  However, the Turkish 
General Staff has remained silent and the negative 
perceptions -- in the press, among the public and within the 
ranks of the bureaucracy and military -- persist, making 
bilateral cooperation in all aspects of our relationship 
harder to effect than in the past. 
 
7. (C) However, the EU decision on December 17 to begin 
accession negotiations with Turkey on Oct. 3, 2005, may have 
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible 
positive shift in relations.  While government officials 
still refrain from publicly supporting US policies or actions 
in Iraq, they have been adding less fuel to the fire.  In 
meetings with DepSecState Armitage and General Abizaid, both 
Turkish government and military officials reaffirmed the 
importance of our bilateral relationship and called for close 
dialogue on issues of mutual interest. 
 
------------------------- 
Iraq Dominates the Agenda 
------------------------- 
 
8. (S) You will arrive in Turkey one day after the Jan. 30 
elections in Iraq.  The Turkish government shares the goal of 
a unified, prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally 
and with its neighbors, and has contributed to international 
pressure on the Sunnis to participate in the elections. 
However, the Turks worry about long-term US staying power in 
Iraq, that events there could spiral out of control, and that 
Ankara could be faced with either a Shia-dominated government 
that they assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an 
intensified movement toward an independent Kurdish state 
emanating from northern Iraq, or both.  Turkish leaders will 
seek your assurance that the USG, and our military, remain 
committed to ensuring a stable -- and unified -- Iraq 
whatever the outcome of the elections. 
 
9. (C) Ninety percent of the Turkish public opposed the 
effort to oust Saddam Hussein and sentiment against coalition 
operations in Iraq still runs deep.  Most Turks get their 
information on events in Iraq from a press that is biased 
against the US-led effort and full of reporting based on 
unsubstantiated half-truths or lies, (much of it sourced from 
al-Jazeera or similarly biased sources) as well as a steady 
stream of reports on the kidnapping and killing of Turkish 
truck drivers (over 70 deaths as of January '05).  Despite 
the presence of Turkish Liaison Officers (LNOs) assigned to 
Task Force Olympia (TFO) and MNF-I who received up-to-date 
reports on the October 2004 coalition action in Tal afar, 
both the Turkish public and government expressed outrage at 
the operation, based on false stories of civilian casualties 
and violent US treatment of residents.  To address the 
misinformation, and in hopes that Turkish officials would do 
likewise, the mission established a system of providing 
periodic cleared information on coalition operations to 
Turkish government and military officials, and to the press. 
This effort may have contributed to Turkish military silence 
during the subsequent operation in Fallujah and the less 
vitriolic Turkish government response.  Your visit will make 
an important contribution to this effort. 
 
10. (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five Turkish 
policemen enroute to Baghdad to take up security duties at 
the Turkish Embassy shocked the country.  The Turkish 
government and military made a point to thank the US for the 
swift TFO response, including killing or capturing of some 
insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the bodies of 
the policemen killed.  Additionally, the Turkish military was 
quick to tell the mission that Turkish First Army Commander 
General Tolon's accusations of US responsibility did not 
reflect the Turkish General Staff position.  Turkish press 
reporting on the incident was generally factual.  The 
November establishment of trilateral (US/TU/IZ) talks on 
Turkish truck driver safety, with the participation of 
Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I), opened the door to 
cooperative information sharing and other efforts to support 
the drivers. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand 
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's 
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their 
agreement to host the Jan. 11 trilateral PKK talks was a 
positive sign that they will work together with the Iraqis on 
this shared problem.  Still, they, and the public at large, 
remain bitter over their perception that the US has taken no 
steps in Iraq to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge 
that that country will no longer be a base for terrorist 
operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain 
engaged in the effort.  Some in the military harbor the 
belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's 
presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports 
of US/PKK meetings.  However, when pressed, they are unable 
to provide any names or specifics. (NOTE:  We also know that 
the military uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel 
to needle the current AK Government.) 
 
12. (S) When confronted with this issue, you should make 
reference to the Jan. 11 trilateral talks where, with the US 
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks 
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for 
actions against the PKK, including establishing an 
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts 
meeting after the Jan. 30 elections to discuss issues related 
to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in northern 
Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who are 
arrested.  Septel we are providing suggestions on how to 
convey a more serious anti-PKK posture to the Turks, given 
our continuing inability to focus resources in Iraq on this 
problem. 
 
----------------------- 
Global War on Terrorism 
----------------------- 
 
13. (C)  Despite our policy differences, Turkey has provided 
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT.  Ankara offered 
to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003 (an offer 
we declined), approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both OEF 
and OIF, authorized the transit of US troops on rotation from 
Iraq, and permits the transit of fuel, coalition supplies and 
humanitarian goods (from its inception until the end of CY04, 
over USD 2.5 billion in coalition sustainment and 
humanitarian assistance.)  In addition to urging all Iraqis 
to participate in the Jan. 30 elections, Turkey is active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for 
Iraq, and training in Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and (as its 
contribution to the NATO training mission) Iraqi Security 
Forces.  Turkey will take command of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan from 
February to August 2005, during which time it plans to 
contribute over 1,600 troops.  Ankara is also ready to renew 
its offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
Afghanistan, but location is again proving to be a problem -- 
the GOT wants to take over a PRT in the north, while the 
Alliance needs PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion 
requirements. 
 
14. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey 
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
improving their abilities to protect important energy 
transport routes.  Turkey subscribes to every arms control 
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which it is 
considering hosting an exercise in 2006.  (We had hoped that 
the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given 
their own OAE-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their 
leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on 
prevention of trafficking.  However, they have been reluctant 
to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black 
Sea and the PSI exercise looks likely to occur in the 
Mediterranean.)  Ankara has also been supportive of 
international efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments 
to the IAEA, although they are more inclined to persuasion 
than coercion, fully backing the EU-3 dialogue.  Turkey has 
also taken seriously information about Turks' involvement in 
the AQ Khan network and is moving toward prosecution of these 
individuals. 
 
15. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training 
Center provides counterterrorism and other training to 
personnel from PfP partner countries.  The military is 
establishing a NATO COE-DAT that will provide more 
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner 
nations and Allies.  They have also offered training at the 
COE-DAT as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training 
mission. 
 
------------------ 
CYPRUS and NATO/EU 
------------------ 
 
16. (C) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed 
to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a 
major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and in our 
strategic vision for Turkey and the region.  However, before 
talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol 
extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU 
members, including the Republic of Cyprus.  Turkey is 
dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with 
several European leaders indicating publicly that extending 
the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus.  Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill 
its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots 
following their vote in favor of a settlement last April.  As 
a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into 
nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all 
its members.  Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North 
Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is 
blocking Cyprus from participating in NATO-EU fora, 
effectively stymieing dialogue between the two organizations. 
 While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and 
the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy 
has won out over alliance management considerations within 
the GOT. 
 
EDELMAN