US embassy cable - 05MAPUTO128

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MOZAMBIQUE: FM SIMAO ON A SUDAN TRIBUNAL AND IRAQ ELECTIONS

Identifier: 05MAPUTO128
Wikileaks: View 05MAPUTO128 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Maputo
Created: 2005-01-26 15:21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KAWC MZ ICC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAPUTO 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
FOR AF/S - HTREGER, AF/FO, S/WCI, NEA 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KAWC, MZ, ICC 
SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE: FM SIMAO ON A SUDAN TRIBUNAL AND IRAQ 
ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 13609 
B. STATE 12757 AND PREVIOUS 
Classified By: Ambassador Helen La Lime, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) The Ambassador delivered the demarche on the Sudan 
tribunal concept (ref A) in the early afternoon of January 
26, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Simao. The Foreign 
Minister responded to the demarche by pointing out that 
work toward any tribunal "would be difficult" at this 
juncture because it might discourage involved parties from 
"finishing the Abuja peace process." In any case, he 
thought both sides would insist on some sort of amnesty 
prior to any agreement. In his view, the time to find a 
way forward on the tribunal issue would be after a peace 
agreement had been signed, not now. 
 
2. (C) Turning to the matter of the ICC's role, he doubted 
that the Europeans would accept a non-ICC role for any 
tribunal, since the ICC was "their brainchild." If both 
the US and the Europeans persisted in forcing the issue 
now, Mozambique would find itself in the uncomfortable 
position of "being squeezed from both sides," he said, 
something he hoped could be avoided. He assured the 
Ambassador that the matter of punishing those responsible 
for atrocities would not be forgotten, but reiterated that 
dealing with them ought to be done at a later, less 
sensitive stage. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador took the opportunity to underscore 
for Foreign Minister Simao the importance of the upcoming 
Iraqi elections (ref B). Simao responded positively by 
endorsing many of the points made and adding that there was 
"no alternative" to holding elections at this stage, that 
elections were "the only solution." He predicted, however, 
that turnout would be very low. Nonetheless he thought 
that the elections would help give the government more 
legitimacy and that those left outside the process, 
particularly the Sunnis, could be brought into the 
government after the vote. 
 
4. (C) Comment: The Ambassador's call on Simao took place 
under somewhat unusual circumstances. Earlier in the day 
the GRM announced that all ministers and governors would be 
"dismissed" effective midnight January 26, in preparation 
for the handover to the incoming government of 
president-elect Guebuza, who will be sworn in on February 
2. Simao suggested that the announcement was really for 
public consumption only, saying that, in fact, government 
officials would be at their desks up to the very end. He 
noted, however, that under these conditions the meeting 
with the Ambassador was his last official one as Foreign 
Minister. 
LA LIME 

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