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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI315 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI315 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-01-25 23:23:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV TW Cross Strait Politics |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000315 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TW, Cross Strait Politics SUBJECT: TAIWAN LOSING CARIBBEAN TO PRC CHECK BOOK DIPLOMACY REF: BRIDGETOWN 00185 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal; Reasons: 1.4 (B/D) 1. (C) Summary. Beijing's efforts in the Caribbean resulted in another victory in the check-book diplomacy battle on Thursday January 20, when the PRC announced it had established diplomatic relations with Grenada. While Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials say they have not officially been informed of the change, they admit Grenada has been lost to the PRC. MOFA officials are also worried that Grenada's switch could mean Taipei's diplomatic partner St. Vincent and the Grenadines could be next in the Caribbean to recognize the PRC. The Dominican Republic and Haiti are also being heavily targeted by Beijing. The PRC has adopted a focused yet patient campaign in the Caribbean to take "one country at a time" from Taipei. National Security Council (NSC) officials assert that they will not engage Beijing in a bidding war and cannot offer Grenada or other diplomatic partners additional economic aid. They state that Taiwan has adopted a more accountable foreign aid system focused on real assistance and will no longer offer blank checks to leaders in exchange for recognition. Nevertheless, past bad behavior is haunting Taiwan's relations with Central American partners Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. Taiwan officials seem resigned to the fact that there is little Taipei can do in the face of Beijing's willingness and ability to outbid Taipei in the Caribbean. End summary. Grenada Already Gone -------------------- 2. (C) The announcement on Thursday that Grenada's Prime Minister (PM) Keith Mitchell had established formal ties with the PRC was not a surprise in Taipei. MOFA officials had been expecting the move after PM Mitchell announced he was shopping for additional aid after Hurricane Ivan struck the island last year. NSC Deputy Secretary General Parris Chang told AIT that Taiwan was willing to help and offered Grenada a USD 40 million aid package, but PM Mitchell told Taipei's Ambassador in St. George that the sum amounted to "chicken feed." Chang also said that PM Mitchell told Taiwan that he must help his people and was going to do whatever was necessary. According to Chang, the PRC viewed this as a golden opportunity and pounced. In December, PM Mitchell traveled to Beijing and in exchange for derecognizing Taipei, the PRC offered him a major assistance package with high-profile infrastructure projects including replacing Grenada's heavily damaged national stadium before the 2007 Cricket World Cup. Chang told AIT that PM Mitchell tried to play both sides after his trip to Beijing. Taipei protested this policy, but was not in a position to offer enough aid to keep Granada from straying. St. Vincent and the Grenadines Next? ------------------------------------ 3. (C) Some Taiwan officials are worried that the loss of Grenada will lead to more losses in the Caribbean and could signal the beginning of a gradual domino effect. MOFA Section Chief for Eastern Caribbean Affairs, Luis Yang, told AIT that if Grenada switched diplomatic ties to the PRC, then St. Vincent and the Grenadines would also soon follow and derecognize Taiwan. While Yang did not speculate on a timeline for this move, he cited Kingstown's close economic and political ties to Grenada as the major factor. Yang said that Beijing's diplomats have been active throughout the Caribbean and have been lobbying Taipei diplomatic partners with promises of aid and assistance if they switch to the PRC. He lamented that Beijing could probably offer an incentive package to St. Vincent and the Grenadines that Taiwan could not match. Full Court Press in the Dominican Republic ------------------------------------------ 4. (C) Taipei is also concerned over the number of recent delegations Beijing has sent to the Dominican Republic to pressure the Fernandez government. According to Hsie Miao-hung, MOFA's Section Chief for Central America and the Western Caribbean, the PRC has offered to buy government bonds and build infrastructure projects such as hospitals and roads. In addition, Beijing recently established a trade office in Santo Domingo which the PRC is using to pressure the government to sever ties with Taiwan. Hsie said that Beijing's representative is particularly active and managing a high-profile campaign complete with press coverage to encourage Santo Domingo to derecognize Taiwan. Hsie lamented that Taipei has been forced do more and more to maintain official ties with the Dominican Republic and that the situation is becoming more worrisome. 5. (C) While MOFA officials believe Santo Domingo will continue to recognize Taiwan in the short run, they privately admitted to AIT that the PRC has been gaining ground and are worried about the situation. Last fall President Leonel Fernandez announced that the Dominican Republic would open a commercial office in Beijing. In Hsie's mind, the first steps have been taken by the government to switch ties. Hsie told AIT that many officials in the Dominican Republic want to enhance relations with the PRC to reduce Santo Domingo's dependency on the U.S. Hsie claimed that she and her colleagues are not worried about an imminent switch, but expressed concern that in the long run "we can never tell with Beijing." (Note: MOFA is clearly preoccupied about the Dominican Republic because Hsie canceled two planned meetings with AIT and complained about her excessive work load of urgent meetings and a flurry of cables between her office and Taipei's Embassy in Santo Domingo. End comment). MOFA's Counter Attack ---------------------- 6. (C) Hsie said that MOFA is working on several fronts to counter Beijing's efforts in the Dominican Republic. She told AIT that Taiwan's foreign aid agency, the International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF), has various humanitarian projects in the country and it may consider stepping up aid projects there. Taipei is also providing financial aid to stabilize Santo Domingo's fragile economy and recently Taiwan constructed a new hospital for the country. Hsie added that the Fernandez government has asked for more aid, which Taipei government is considering. Hsie asserted that for several decades, Taiwan has been a stable supporter and ally of the Dominican Republic and it was her hope that Santo Domingo would take this into consideration. Haiti Also a Target ------------------- 7. (C) Hsie told AIT that the PRC has also turned up the heat on Haiti. Beijing, she said, has a delegation in Haiti right now that is putting pressure on the interim government, throwing into question Interim President Boniface Alexandre's commitment to continue to recognize Taipei. While President Boniface has refused to meet with the delegation, Hsie said MOFA is concerned that such visits allow the PRC to build support for increasing ties with Beijing once the interim government transfers power. Hsie believes Beijing has adopted a coordinated long-term campaign to gradually build support in Haiti to convince the next government to derecognize Taiwan. But No Bidding War ------------------ 8. (C) Grenada is the second Caribbean setback in the past year (Dominica switched in March, 2004). Both Hsie and the NSC's Chang maintained that the PRC has embarked on a patient yet aggressive campaign to take countries that still recognize Taiwan "one country at a time." Officials at both NSC and MOFA say they are adamant that Taiwan cannot and will not engage in check-book diplomacy. Chang told AIT that recent aid scandals involving Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama have had an impact on Taipei's approach. He added that there is more oversight in the aid process and that lump sums are not given out as freely to leaders as before. Rather, Taiwan's future foreign aid system will be more focused on real assistance that can make a difference in the country. Chang added, however, that, in any case, the PRC has more resources for check-book diplomacy than Taiwan. MOFA's Hsie offered a similar assessment, and added that Taipei is also trying to convince its partners of Beijing's unreliability versus Taiwan's steadfastness, and to highlight the differences between the PRC and Taiwan, such as Taipei's democratic values and experience in providing humanitarian aid. She said that the PRC often promises a lot, but cannot deliver in the long run. Comment: An Unwinnable War? ---------------------------- 9. (C) Whether Taipei's strategy to portray Beijing as an unreliable ally and emphasize Taiwan's attributes of democracy and humanitarian assistance will be effective is yet to be seen. Taiwan does have much to offer in the technical and financial assistance arena, but new strategies that promote this experience are not likely to be effective with its diplomatic partners. The majority of nations that recognize Taiwan are not concerned about technical assistance or Taiwan's democratic values. More often than not, the biggest factor in the recognition game is simply money and how much of it flows into the leadership's pockets. As long as Taipei continues to rely on a policy of focusing on micro-state nations that are typically poor and corrupt it will continue to lose the check-book diplomacy battle. PAAL
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