US embassy cable - 05MANAMA111

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, BA, IZ 
SUBJECT: THE IRAQ FACTOR:  BAHRAIN'S SHIA OPPOSITION 
RETHINKING POLITICAL BOYCOTT 
 
REF: MANAMA 0024 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Bahraini Shia supporters of participation in the 
domestic political process have begun to state their views 
publicly in an environment heavily influenced by Shia 
political empowerment in Iraq.  In early January, the 
independent Al Wasat newspaper launched a campaign explicitly 
urging Bahrain's Shia to drop their boycott of the political 
system and to participate in elections scheduled for spring 
and fall of 2006.  Al Wasat Editor-in-Chief Mansour Al Jamry, 
himself a formerly exiled Shia activist leader, has railed 
against the "phony slogans" of the boycotters and ran a full 
page interview with top Lebanese Shia cleric Mohammed Hussein 
Fadlallah, who said Bahraini Shia should "enter parliament, 
object to the constitution, and call for amendments." 
 
2.  (C) Summary continued:  Bahraini Shia scholar and popular 
columnist Sayed Dhiya Al Mousawi wrote in his regular column 
that the boycott did not achieve anything and Shias should 
"try (their) luck this time with participation."  Shaikh Ali 
Salman, president of leading Shia opposition society Al 
Wifaq, did not address the issue directly but stated in a 
January 4 speech at the Al Wifaq annual conference, covered 
by Bahrain's media, that the country's political leadership 
had "extended its arm" to all those willing to engage in the 
King's reform process.  In the absence of an urgent domestic 
reason for addressing elections at this time, we believe that 
attention on the elections in Iraq, and what Bahrain's Shia 
consider will be potential Shia electoral gains, have led 
them to take a page from their Iraqi brethren's book and 
advocate for political participation.  End Summary. 
 
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Al Wasat Campaign on Political Participation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The independent Al Wasat newspaper has printed 
numerous articles and columns since the beginning of the 
month urging Bahrain's Shia to participate in the country's 
political system.  There are no elections scheduled until the 
municipal elections in spring 2006 followed by parliamentary 
elections in fall 2006, but it is noteworthy and unusual for 
any newspaper, but particularly Al Wasat, which is strongly 
tied to the Shia community, to be addressing the question of 
political participation so directly and relatively early. 
 
4.  (C) Al Wasat editor-in-chief Mansour Al Jamry was among 
the Shia exiles who returned to the island under a general 
amnesty following the ascension of King Hamad to the throne 
in 1999 and the launch of his reform program.  During the 
last parliamentary elections, in 2002, most Shia abided by 
the call of Al Wifaq, the preeminent Shia opposition 
political society, to boycott.  Al Wifaq's position stemmed 
from what the organization considered to be the King's 
duplicity regarding legislative branch powers.  In their 
view, the King offered a powerful elected lower house of 
parliament (the Council of Representatives - COR) in the 
National Action Charter, a reform proposal that was approved 
by public referendum in 2000.  Then, in the 2001 
constitution, the King made the COR weaker than the appointed 
upper house (the Consultative, or Shura, Council).  To 
protest, Al Wifaq urged Bahrain's Shia, who represent some 70 
percent of the population, to boycott the 2002 elections. 
While not all Shia heeded the call, the boycott campaign 
significantly dampened Shia participation in the elections 
and meant that those Shia elected could not legitimately 
claim they represented the Shia constituency. 
 
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Fadlallah Promotes Shia in Politics 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Three years since then, Al Jamry and Al Wasat's 
editorial board have taken a public stand against the "phony 
slogans" of the boycotters.  The paper published a full-page 
interview January 3 with prominent Lebanese Shia cleric 
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, who criticized Bahraini Shia 
opposition for boycotting the 2002 parliamentary elections. 
In the article, titled, "The Boycott is an Unrealistic 
Approach to Reform," Fadlallah addresses the Shia tendency to 
view issues in black and white without appreciating the gray. 
 He says politics is not absolute, like a fatwa (religious 
opinion), but is nuanced and must be studied.  Shia should 
work to change the system from the inside, even if they 
consider the system to be unfair. 
 
6.  (SBU) Turning directly to Bahrain, Fadlallah told 
interviewer Sayed Dhiya Al Mousawi that Bahraini Shia should 
"enter parliament, object to the constitution, and call for 
amendments."  He claims to have pushed Lebanon's Hizballah to 
participate in politics and run for parliament.  He asks, 
"what has the opposition changed during their absence from 
parliament?  You are on the side (lines) when everyone else 
is playing on the field."  He justifies his position by 
citing the example of Ali, the Prophet Mohammed's cousin who, 
Shia believe, should have become Caliph following Mohammed's 
death rather than Mohammed's companion Abu Bakr.  When Abu 
Bakr became Caliph, Ali continued to offer guidance and 
advice rather than walk away from the system, says Fadlallah. 
 He says that the focus should be on the country, not the 
positions of the sects, and authorities should not view Shia 
as trouble makers. 
 
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Al Jamry, Al Mousawi Amplify the Message 
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7.  (SBU) Al Jamry and Al Mousawi have maintained an almost 
daily drumbeat echoing Fadlallah's message of encouraging 
Shia to participate in politics.  On the same day as 
publication of the interview, Al Jamry wrote that he hopes 
the interview will "encourage the silent majority" to express 
their views publicly instead of "succumbing to the unilateral 
views" of the boycotters.  The opposition must participate 
and "try to make changes from within the system."  Al Mousawi 
reported on January 4 that the public displayed a "massive 
positive reaction" to Fadlallah's comments.  "The solution to 
the situation in Bahrain," he continued, "is not another 
petition, but to try our luck this time with participation. 
We tried the boycott and look where we stand now." 
 
8.  (SBU) On January 8, Al Mousawi wrote that boycotting the 
elections "did not further issues important to Bahrain such 
as education, fighting discrimination, and combating 
corruption."  He asks on January 9, "Which is better, a 
country without a parliament or a country with a parliament 
that has limited authority?  Of course, the second option is 
better."  On January 10, he adds, "After three years of 
boycott, (the boycotters) proved to all that they had no 
strategy to tackle the hot unresolved issues.  They focused 
on conferences, rallies, petitions, and statements," when 
they could have pressured the government on key national 
issues. 
 
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Cleric Qassem Cites Benefits of Participation 
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9.  (SBU) An interview with Bahrain's leading Shia cleric 
Shaikh Isa Qassem was published in the January 12 edition of 
Al Wasat.  He said, "participating in the upcoming elections 
falls under the category of 'benefits'" that bring more help 
than cause harm.  He added, "resuming negotiations and 
reaching positive results on unresolved issues will... 
enlarge the circle of public participation... and consensus." 
 When asked whether he would assist in developing a Shia 
election list for the 2006 parliamentary elections, like 
Ayatollah Sistani did in Iraq, Qassem replied that 
participation would be decided "in light of national and 
religious interests" and there was no one model for political 
participation. 
 
10.  (SBU) On January 11, Al Wasat provided space for an 
opponent of political participation to voice his opinion. 
Political activist Abdul Hadi Al Khawaja, who was convicted 
of public incitement and harming the reputation of the state 
before being released by order of King Hamad in mid-November 
2004, complained that if Al Wasat had been objective it would 
have permitted others to write about the boycott and the 
reasons for it.  He said that "each group (i.e., supporters 
and opponents of the boycott) is talking to itself whereas 
the decision of participation or boycott must be taken based 
on what people think will be in the public interest and what 
serves human rights." 
 
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Salman Recognizes Leadership's "Extended Arm" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) President Shaikh Ali Salman opened Al Wifaq's second 
annual conference January 4 with a speech addressing Al 
Wifaq's activities and plans for the coming year.  He did not 
directly refer to the question of political participation, 
but he publicly acknowledged the GOB's "blessing" for holding 
the event.  (Note:  In their January 3 meeting, the King told 
the Ambassador that the government was supporting the 
conference and he expressed his pleasure that Al Wifaq had 
invited people like former Lebanese PM Salim Al Hoss and 
Kuwaiti thinker Muhammad Al Rumaihi to participate rather 
than the "radicals from Qom." (Reftel)  End Note.)  Salman 
also said that, in confronting society's problems, "it is 
possible to rectify the situation if the people have the will 
and cooperate with the leadership, which has extended its arm 
to all those willing to engage in the King's reform process." 
 
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Split Inside Al Wifaq 
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12.  (C) Nizar Al Baharna, a former Al Wifaq board member who 
formed the Justice and Development political society in 
September 2004, told PolOff January 18 that he welcomes Al 
Wasat's campaign.  He said that his new society advocates 
full participation in the 2006 elections with a goal of 
blunting some of the political influence of Sunni 
conservatives in the Council of Representatives.  Al Wifaq 
member Nizar Al Qari told PolOff January 18 that of the 30 
members on the society's political committee, all but four 
support participation in the 2006 elections.  He said that 
the two most outspoken advocates for boycotting the political 
process are Al Wifaq Vice President Hassan Mushaima and Al 
Wifaq spokesman Abdul Jalil Singace.  (Note:  Mushaima and 
Singace visited Washington in December 2004 and spoke at the 
National Endowment for Democracy.  End Note.)  Al Qari said 
that the issue of participation is a "constant" topic of 
conversation among Al Wifaq's leadership, and several board 
members are pushing valiantly to convince the hardliners to 
drop their opposition.  Even though Ali Salman has garnered 
overwhelming support in favor of participation, he does not 
want to "show his cards" to the government at this point, 
according to Al Qari.  Al Qari anticipates a split in Al 
Wifaq between Salman and Mushaima, calling the development 
"inevitable." 
 
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Comment:  Iraq Election Rhetoric Promotes Participation 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
13.  (C) According to Abbas Bu Safwan, a reporter at Al 
Wasat, Al Mousawi interviewed Fadlallah in September 2004, 
but Al Wasat delayed publication of the interview until early 
January.  Our contacts have not commented on the decision to 
run the story at this time, but we believe publicity related 
to the election in Iraq helped create the right political 
environment for Al Jamry to launch his campaign.  Bahrain's 
newspapers have run many stories about Ayatollah Sistani, 
Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, and others urging Iraq's Shia to 
participate in the January 30 elections, pointing out that 
the elections represent a golden opportunity for Shia to have 
a strong voice in governing Iraq.  There is no other 
compelling reason for Al Jamry to publicize this issue at 
this time, with no elections scheduled until spring 2006. 
But the press campaign, launched in the context of Iraq's 
elections, has ignited a public debate that may require a 
year before Shia leaders take firm decisions on participation. 
 
14. (C) Comment continued:  While Bahrain's Shia represent 
some 70 percent of the country's citizens, only seven of the 
COR's 40 members are part of the Shia-only Al Islamiya bloc, 
known as the "sleeping bloc" because of its sluggishness. 
(Note:  There are a few Shia in the COR who are independents 
or are associated with other blocs.  End Note.)  The Sunni 
conservative Al Minbar and Al Asala blocs, which total 12 
members, are much more active and set the agenda in many 
ways.  Dissatisfaction with the COR's activities, and Sunni 
conservative deputies' focus on "moral" issues, has prompted 
some sectors of society that were not involved in the 2002 
elections to decide to engage in politics.  The Bahrain 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced recently that it 
had established a committee and $2.5 million fund to support 
business-friendly candidates in the 2006 elections (septel). 
 
15.  (C) Comment continued:  With the obvious parallels 
between Iraqi and Bahraini demographics - that is, majority 
Shia populations - and Bahraini expectations that Shia will 
do well in Iraq's elections, some of Bahrain's Shia leaders 
are taking advantage of what they view as a favorable 
political environment to advocate dropping the unproductive 
boycott.  We do not know how far this will go, and would be 
surprised if Ali Salman and Al Wifaq took a formal position 
to drop the boycott, at least this early in the game.  But Al 
Baharna's Justice and Development society, which was 
initially seen as a competing alternative to Al Wifaq, may 
prove to be an allied organization that serves as an Al 
Wifaq-sanctioned means to Shia political participation.  The 
public debate has just begun, but the conditions are 
improving for more robust Shia participation in Bahrain's 
political system. 
 
16.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
ZIADEH