US embassy cable - 05CARACAS219

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR TSHANNON AND CBARTON 
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ IN 2005 -- SCANT POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
 
REF: 04 CARACAS 3928 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for Reasons 1.4(b) 
. 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is unlikely to face 
significant political opposition in 2005.  The opposition 
political parties are in a re-building phase after being 
smashed in last year's presidential recall vote.  Civil 
society groups which railed against the President until 
recently are now little more than an irritant, with the 
possible exception of the NGO Sumate should it re-activate. 
The military is under control of commanders loyal to Chavez, 
who has given them a new mission and more money.  Organized 
labor will be mired down by internal elections and a worker 
base that is tempted for economic reasons to side with 
Chavez.  The Catholic Church's criticism of the GOV will 
continue, but will not likely have mass appeal. 
International organizations such as the OAS or International 
Labor Organization are unlikely to have the collective will 
or mechanisms to influence Chavez.  Most other foreign 
governments, too, are hesitant to challenge Chavez on his 
predilection for authoritarianism, though his attempts to 
assert influence may beg a reaction.  End summary. 
 
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A Convalescent Opposition 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) President Hugo Chavez will face scant political 
pressures in 2005 (Note:  Septel addresses possible economic 
pressures).  The Coordinadora Democratica, the political 
opposition's umbrella organization, no longer exists for all 
intents and purposes, having been shattered by the defeat in 
the August 2004 presidential recall referendum.  Heavy losses 
in the October 2004 regional elections further weakened the 
political parties that joined in the Coordinadora's efforts. 
Most parties are currently reorganizing and are ill-prepared 
to compete with Chavez in the National Assembly elections at 
the end of the year or in the National Assembly itself on 
crucial issues such as independence of the judiciary or the 
protection of human rights (ref).  Chavez can expect several 
months of calm on this front, perhaps up to the municipal 
elections scheduled for June, before the opposition parties 
approach readiness to challenge his political agenda.  Their 
launch date may be later, however, because they are more 
focused on the National Assembly elections scheduled for 
December as a challenge to Chavez.  COPEI SecGen and National 
Assembly Deputy Cesar Perez Vivas told A/DCM January 18 that 
Chavez opponents realize that the June contest presents an 
opportunity to mobilize Chavez opponents, but the December 
elections are "the important ones." 
 
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Civil Society Quiet 
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3. (C) Civil society groups associated with the opposition 
have mostly retreated into inactivity.  Neighborhood 
opposition groups like the Citizen Assemblies continue to 
meet, though with less urgency as when the referendum was 
looming.  Violent action by Chavez sympathizers, such as the 
killing of an opposition demonstrator in Caracas the day 
after the recall referendum, has successfully dampened the 
zeal of the citizenry opposed to Chavez to hit the streets. 
Mass street actions, the hallmark of the crisis years of 
2002-2004 are therefore less likely.  Indeed, the prime 
organizer of these mobilizations, former Miranda State Gov. 
Enrique Mendoza, recently told the Ambassador that he will 
instead pursue smaller, targeted demonstrations to show that 
the opposition is still alive.  The NGO Sumate remains the 
most potent of Venezuela's civil society groups despite the 
GoV's efforts to stifle the organization via the courts.  Its 
new plans to expand coverage on issues where Chavez's 
democratic credentials are questionable, however, are nascent 
and unlikely to become effective for many months.  Private 
media, once the opposition's most powerful ally, will be more 
cautious in its criticism in light of the media law passed in 
December and the changes to the penal code awaiting the 
President's signature. 
 
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Military Fat and Happy 
---------------------- 
4. (C) Chavez has also moved steadily to ensure control of 
the military after the events of April 2002 that temporarily 
removed him from power.  With three promotion cycles since 
then, Chavez now has loyalists in all key military positions 
and the prospects for the military finding the wherewithal to 
act against him is seriously diminished.  Dissidents still in 
the military are without assignments or have been reassigned 
to non-essential posts, former officers, some of whom 
participated in Chavez's temporary removal, are in hiding or 
in exile, and still others have been jailed and are facing 
prosecution.  Chavez also has assigned the military a new 
mission as the critical infrastructure for his "missions" 
social programs for Venezuela's poor.  He has raised salaries 
and benefits for officers and the enlisted, and, via the 
"missions," has created opportunities for graft and 
corruption.  While the military's loyalties are prone to 
sudden shifts with the political climate, Chavez has done as 
much as possible to maintain its allegiance in the event of a 
crisis. 
 
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Labor Tied Down 
--------------- 
 
5. (C) While Chavez has been unable to assimilate organized 
labor into his Bolivarian Revolution after being defeated in 
2001 by the pro-opposition candidates in the Confederation of 
Venezuelan Workers (CTV) elections, internal labor politics, 
and probably some bureaucratic harassment by the GOV, will 
keep organized labor occupied in the short-term.  The 
Ministry of Labor's politicized and preferential treatment of 
individual unions will also sap strength from Chavez 
opponents in organized labor.  Workers will be increasingly 
tempted to elect pro-Chavez leaders or join pro-Chavez 
parallel unions that get preferential treatment from the GOV 
in collective bargaining agreements.  To further undermine 
his opponents in the CTV, the Chavez dominated National 
Electoral Council voided the 2001 elections as the unions 
prepare for new elections in the first half of 2005.  That 
said, there will be several large collective bargaining 
contracts to be settled in 2005, and the Chavista unionists 
have a sense of entitlement. 
 
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Catholic Church Leadership Will Resist 
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6. (C) The Catholic Church is traditionally Venezuela's most 
credible institution.  Church leadership has been 
particularly strong in its criticism of the Chavez regime in 
recent years.  After keeping a low profile in the months 
following the referendum, it is showing new signs of 
political activism, notably in its year-opening meeting of 
Venezuela's Episcopal Council.  Chavez's strategy has been to 
attack the bishops for acting against social justice, appeal 
directly to Venezuela's poor (and largely pro-Chavez) 
Catholics, and don his own veneer of religiosity to compete 
with the Church's moral authority.  The Church hierarchy will 
be a persistent social critic and a thorn in Chavez's side, 
but will refrain from active leadership of the opposition, 
which the bishops believe is rightly the work of the 
country's political class. 
 
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International Organizations 
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7. (C) While we defer to USOAS' analysis, most local 
observers believe that Chavez is also unlikely to feel much 
pressure from the Organization of American States, in part 
largely due to his successful courtship of the Caribbean 
countries.  Additionally, the OAS' credibility is spent in 
Venezuela, both with Chavistas who see the organization as 
anti-revolutionary and with opposition members who feel 
betrayed by the OAS' endorsement of the recall referendum 
results.  Having the organization under temporary leadership, 
and with a U.S. citizen as interim Secretary General, has 
given the GoV more ability to question it and play down its 
legitimacy as a voice in Venezuela's affairs.  The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) may issue new 
condemnations of Chavez's treatment of labor groups, but 
Chavez has yet to feel domestic backlash for such rebukes. 
Human rights groups and international press associations are 
likely to continue their protests of Chavez actions, but GoV 
response is unlikely to differ from the disdain and disregard 
that it has demonstrated for similar criticism in the past. 
 
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Other Foreign Governments 
------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Foreign governments willing to speak out against 
Chavez's excesses are few, if any.  Countries that hold sway 
with Chavez (e.g., Cuba and China) are, of course, in 
agreement with or at least agnostic on Chavez's politics. 
The European Union's opinion and involvement in Venezuelan 
democracy has been important, but Spain's prominent change in 
direction after the election of a PSOE government is an 
impediment.  Brazil, the most important regional player for 
Chavez, has been hesitant to engage.  A variable in other 
governments' willingness to engage Chavez is his support for 
radical elements there.  Chavez has cultivated relationships 
with groups in practically every country in the region 
through his periodic Bolivarian Peoples' Congresses. 
Although we cannot judge from here their possible 
effectiveness at home, it appears that the elected leaders in 
those countries in various cases have had to contend with the 
possibility of being outflanked from the left, and we 
therefore can expect little from them. 
 
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Business Community Backs Off 
---------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  With the failure of the August 15 referendum 
Venezuela's businessmen have been trying to re-establish some 
semblance of a normal relationship with the Chavez 
government, which they expect to be in power for a long time. 
 Albis Munoz, President of umbrella private sector 
organization FEDECAMARAS has stressed the need to maintain 
dialogue, and sought to re-focus on economic rather overtly 
political issues.  While repeating the need for respect for 
free enterprise as the key to sustained growth, she has 
avoided confrontation, for instance, taking a relatively soft 
line on the GOV's "land reform" efforts, one which insists 
that they be undertaken lawfully and rationally, but does not 
challenge their underlying goals.  The heads of various 
sectoral chambers have all met with Chavez, Vice President 
Rangel, and/or individual ministers, pressing plans for 
economic reactivation (which entail GOV financial support). 
Individual businessmen are concentrating on taking advantage 
of the current economic recovery; they are unwilling to give 
more than token financial support to Chavez's political 
opponents many of whom they view as bereft of ideas and 
strategies. 
 
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Comment 
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10. (C) Chavez has only been strengthened by three years of 
confrontation with the opposition.  His opponents have grown 
weary of conflict, been debilitated by their own divisions, 
and been unable to articulate a vision on how to take on the 
Bolivarian President.  They have two opportunities -- the 
municipal elections mid-year and the legislative contests at 
year's end -- to mobilize anti-Chavez sentiment that marks at 
least 40% of Venezuelans.  More likely, however, Chavez's 
principal problems in the near future will largely be ones of 
his own making, such as governance failures, corruption 
within the revolution, cash flow problems, backlash from 
extreme public policies or political persecution, or fallout 
from attempts to export the Bolivarian Revolution. 
BROWNFIELD