US embassy cable - 05PARIS426

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000426 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, IZ, FR 
SUBJECT: GOF OFFICIALS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY CONCERNS, GOF 
OFFER TO TRAIN IRAQI POLICE, IRAQI OCV IN FRANCE 
 
REF: A. A) PARIS 299 
 
     B. B) 04 PARIS 9098 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: MFA A/S-equivalent for Middle East/North 
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault stressed GoF security concerns 
regarding its personnel in Baghdad, during an introductory 
meeting with Pol/MC January 21.  Noting that he had been 
instructed to raise the issue, Thibault asserted that 
increasingly stringent and arbitrary MNF-1 security measures 
at checkpoints at the Green Zone potentially endangered GoF 
personnel by keeping them waiting in cars for long periods at 
vulnerable intersections, and impeded French efforts to seek 
meetings with Iraqi officials, as well as at U.S. and EU 
missions located in the Green Zone.  Thibault also cited an 
incident in which the French ambassador to Iraq was prevented 
from taking his car and security detail into the Green Zone 
to attend a meeting with a visiting senior U.S. official. 
Thibault urged better coordination between MNF-1 and 
diplomatic missions in Baghdad, to avoid compromising the 
security of diplomatic vehicles or impeding necessary access 
to the Green Zone.  On other Iraq issues, Thibault waxed 
positive on the recent visit of IIG President Yawer to Paris 
and confirmed that a weeklong electoral training program for 
Iraqi political party representatives in Paris had given the 
GoF more optimism on potential cooperation among Iraqi 
politicians of varying backgrounds.  Thibault confirmed press 
reports that the GoF was prepared in principle to train up to 
1500 Iraqi gendarmes outside Iraq, but stressed that the 
scope and venue of the program would depend on the Iraqi 
response, which was still not forthcoming.  Thibault also 
confirmed that registration for out-of-country voting (OCV) 
for Iraqis resident in France was underway, with one polling 
center in central Paris for the estimated 3,000 to 8,000 
Iraqis residing in France.    End summary. 
 
 
DEMARCHE ON SECURITY CONCERNS 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) During an January 21 introductory call by Pol M/C, 
newly appointed MFA A/S-equivalent for Middle East/North 
Africa Jean-Francois Thibault opened discussion by noting 
that he had been asked to raise with us GoF concerns on 
security of its personnel in Baghdad, a demarche which French 
officials had also delivered in Washington and Baghdad.  The 
GoF was increasingly concerned over increased difficulties 
for its diplomats in gaining access to the Green Zone, due to 
more complicated and seemingly arbitrary security measures 
employed by MNF-1 at Green Zone checkpoints.  These security 
procedures, according to Thibault, had the effect of keeping 
French diplomats waiting for long periods in cars, at 
intersections known to be prime targets for car bombs; the 
French complaint was not with the wait, but with the 
vulnerability that this waiting created by keeping French 
diplomats waiting in vulnerable areas.  A second concern for 
the GOF was that the potential such restrictions on Green 
Zone access had on impeding GoF access to officials from the 
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Independent Electoral 
Commission of Iraq (IECI), as well as U.S. and EU member 
state diplomatic missions.  On the latter point, Thibault 
reported that meetings convened by the EU presidency in 
Baghdad took place in the Green Zone, giving the French 
ambassador in Baghdad another need for regular Green Zone 
access. 
 
3. (C) Citing specific incidents in particular, MFA Iraq desk 
officer Renaud Salins reported that French Ambassador to Iraq 
Bertrand Bajolet, en route to a meeting with visiting EUR A/S 
Jones in early January, had been required to wait for a long 
period at a Green Zone checkpoint and was told that his 
security detail and car could not accompany him in the Green 
Zone.  As a result, Bajolet had to walk about 2 kilometers 
from the checkpoint to the meeting place at the Rashid Hotel; 
the French complaint was not that the ambassador had to walk, 
but that he was placed in a potentially vulnerable position 
and separated from his armed security detail for an extended 
period.  In closing, Thibault expressed regret that he had to 
bring up a negative issue, and expressed hope that the USG 
could facilitate better coordination between MNF-1 and 
diplomatic missions in Baghdad, perhaps through clarification 
of new procedures or issuance of updated identification cards 
which would be recognized by MNF-1 checkpoints throughout the 
city.  In passing, he noted that the GoF had similar concerns 
over restrictions on access to the Baghdad airport road.  He 
also made clear that the GOF did not believe that French 
officials were being singled out for any kind of special 
treatment. 
 
YAWER VISIT, TRAINING OFFER 
----------------------- 
 
4. (C) Turning to more positive issues, Thibault described 
the January 12-15 visit of IIG President Ghazi al-Yawer (ref 
a) as a "rich and friendly" exchange of views, with "no 
taboos."  Echoing comments to us from the Elysee (ref a), 
Thibault described Yawer as an impressive interlocutor with 
an excellent command of internal and regional issues. 
Asked for details on the French offer to train Iraqi police 
outside of Iraq, Thibault offered few specifics.  He 
acknowledged press reports (sourced to Iraqi officials) that 
the GoF was prepared to train up to 1500 Iraqi police at a 
still undetermined venue, but stressed that there was 
"nothing new" about the French idea.  The GoF had informed 
the IIG of the training offer some time ago, and Chirac used 
the occasion of the Yawer visit to remind the IIG of the 
idea, with more precision on what France could do.  Thibault 
emphasized that it was still up to the Iraqi government to 
tell the GoF what it wanted; the training could take place in 
France, or in a country neighboring Iraq, or both.  For 
instance, if the Iraqi government was more interested in 
training high-level police officers, training could take 
place largely in France at the St Astier gendarme academy. 
Thibault summed up that the Iraqi government appeared 
interested in the French police training offer, but to date 
had not responded or opted to send a delegation to Paris to 
discuss the issue further, as suggested by Chirac (ref a). 
The GoF presumed that an Iraqi government response would be 
forthcoming after the January 30 elections and formation of 
the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). 
 
5.  (C) Thibault also described in upbeat terms the January 
10-14 visit of 14 Iraqi political party representatives for a 
weeklong GoF-sponsored training session on the electoral and 
constitutional process (ref b).  The Iraqi delegation was 
received by FM Barnier and Thibault, and met separately with 
representatives of the Socialist, Communist, and center-right 
UMP and UDF parties.  The group also received a briefing on 
the French constitutional process from the officials at the 
"Council of State" (French Supreme Court-equivalent) and took 
part in an elections simulation organized by the Ministry of 
Interior.  Thibault commented that the delegation -- which 
included representatives of all of Iraq's major parties 
(including Allawi's Iraqi National Accord) as well as two 
parties boycotting elections, the Iraqi Islamic Party and the 
Muslim Arab Socialist Party -- got along "remarkably well," 
which gave the GoF some renewed hope on the potential of 
Iraqi politicians to work together after elections. 
 
6.  (C) Thibault summed up that the GoF viewed Iraq's January 
30 elections as a defining moment, in which credibility of 
the ballot was of paramount importance.  The GoF remained 
worried over the prospects for voter participation and 
whether Iraq's Arab Sunni population would vote in large 
numbers.  The GoF would continue to contribute as much as it 
could to support the elections, with GoF limits (in putting 
personnel on the ground in Iraq). 
 
OUT OF COUNTRY VOTING ON TRACK 
------------- 
 
7.  (C) Asked for an update on Iraqi OCV in France, Thibault 
confirmed that one OCV voting center, in the 13th 
arrondisement in Paris, would serve all of France's Iraqi 
voters.  The voter registration process had started slowly, 
but was on track.  Iraq desk officer Salins commented that it 
was difficult to estimate with precision the number of Iraqis 
in France, which is generally thought to range from 3,000 to 
8,000; he commented that the GoF did not "know well" its 
Iraqi population and communities were generally divided on 
ethnic and sectarian lines, with Iraqi Kurds more affiliated 
with Kurds from neighboring countries.  (Note: The Iraqi 
embassy DCM informed us separately that the central Paris 
voting center will also serve Iraqi voters coming from Spain 
and Switzerland, and that he had received complaints from 
Iraqis based in southern France over the requirement that all 
voters come in person to register, first, and later, to vote 
on January 30.  End note.)  Thibault affirmed that the GoF 
would provide ample security  protection for the voting 
center, for which the location had been moved once to take 
security factors into account.  He added that logistical 
planning for OCV with the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) had been slow and somewhat of a headache, 
largely because IOM had no office in France. 
 
BIO NOTE: 
--------- 
 
8. (C) Comment/Biographic Note: Thibault took up his new 
functions as French NEA A/S equivalent January 10, after 
serving since May 2003 as the Minister of Defense's Senior 
Advisor on International Cooperation and Arms Exports.  His 
resume is not typical for attaining such a key position in 
the French diplomatic hierarchy; unlike most senior MFA 
officials, Thibault did not attend the elite "Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration" (ENA) and instead graduated from law school 
and the prestigious "Langues Orientale" institute (majoring 
in Arabic literature) before entering the diplomatic corps in 
1973.  After postings which included Rabat, Manama, and New 
York, he left the MFA for a five-year detail in the late 80's 
with ELF-Aquitaine.  He later served as French Ambassador to 
the UAE from 1997 to 2001 and Ambassador to Mauritania from 
2001 to 2003.  Thibault opened his discussion with us by 
stressing his strong desire for regular and close cooperation 
with the USG, and he strikes us as a more open interlocutor 
than his predecessor, current French Ambassador to Lebanon 
Bernard Emie.  Given Thibault's important position and stated 
readiness to build ties with U.S. officials, we believe it 
would be worthwhile for senior NEA officials, who may be en 
route to the region in coming months, to consider stopping in 
Paris to establish contact with Thibault. 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
Leach