US embassy cable - 05ANKARA373

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2030 
TAGS: PREL, CY, TU, MARR 
SUBJECT: TURKS MULLING NATO/EU PROBLEM BUT NOT YET READY 
FOR COMPROMISE 
 
REF: 04 ANKARA 6402 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Our recent conversations with MFA and TGS 
officials reveal that some thought is being given to how to 
resolve the impasse created by Turkey's strict interpretation 
of NAC decisions that excludes from Berlin Plus-related 
discussions those EU members who are not parties to a NATO 
security agreement nor members in PfP.  While officials 
working on alliance matters understand the negative impact 
Turkey's position is having on NATO-EU relations, their 
seniors are still putting more weight on the Cyprus issue. 
Ankara's disappointment that the EU has not lived up to its 
expectations to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots 
and the GOT's displeasure at Nicosia's attempt to use the EU 
to force Turkey's recognition of Cyprus will need to 
dissipate further before the GOT will be ready to consider 
compromises.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The DCM raised the NATO-EU impasse over the 
participation of Cyprus and Malta when he called on the new 
MFA Director General for International Security Affairs Tomur 
Bayer on Jan. 18.  Bayer, who has long experience working on 
NATO affairs, asserted that the wording of the North Atlantic 
Council decisions setting out the conditions for non-alliance 
members to participate in discussions of Berlin-Plus issues 
were carefully considered and came the day after the EU 
issued its own decisions on the subject.  Thus, allies 
understood and intended the differences between the NATO and 
EU decisions.  That said, Bayer conceded that NATO-EU 
relations were suffering, weakening the transatlantic 
relationship and risking duplication of EU and NATO efforts. 
Therefore, "we want to find a way to deepen NATO-EU 
relations," he said.  The problem was being considered "at a 
technical level" Bayer continued.  MFA was consulting with 
"other authorities" (read: the military) and would likely 
have to consult with ministers.  At this stage, it was not 
possible to give an indication of what Turkey might be 
willing to do or when it might do it. 
 
3. (C) The DCM acknowledged that relevant NATO and EU 
documents were not totally in agreement.  That said, the 
continued impasse only served those who wanted greater 
divisions between NATO and the EU.  The Berlin Plus 
arrangements were designed for a specific set of activities. 
For issues unrelated to Berlin-Plus, Turkey should find a way 
to permit cooperation between the two institutions.  Bayer 
took the point, but recalled that on issues like Dafur and 
the Ukraine, certain statements (not further defined) from 
European Commission officials made compromise difficult.  The 
DCM concluded by noting that as Turkey thinks about ways to 
resolve this issue the USG stood ready to assist in the 
brainstorming. 
 
4. (C) Earlier conversations with other MFA officials suggest 
that brainstorming is occurring among NATO policy officials. 
Judging by his comments to visiting EUR DAS Kennedy on 
January 12, Deputy Undersecretary Ahmet Uzumcu, formerly 
Turkey's permrep to NATO, is also contributing to the process 
despite neither NATO nor Cyprus being in his new portfolio. 
Uzumcu said the MFA would probably come up with some 
progress, but it would be less than expectations.  In fact, 
NATO Department Head Alper Coskun told PolMilCouns on January 
10 that his department was gaining little traction in moving 
this issue with senior officials who are still smarting about 
Nicosia's efforts against a Cyprus settlement.  He and his 
staff were trying to come up with some creative ideas to get 
around the opposition, lamenting that suggestions from 
Europeans to date had been no more than "just let the 
Cypriots participate."  He thought some more time would be 
needed to dissipate the anger felt toward Cyprus over its 
refusal to approve the settlement on the island last Spring. 
The same is evidently true in the military -- on January 13 
TGS/J5 LtGen Aydogan Babaoglu told the DCM, "the NAC decided 
the matter; we are happy with that." 
 
5. (C) Comment:  Unfortunately, progress on Cyprus is 
unlikely to contribute towards resolving the NATO/EU problem. 
 Turkish MFA thinking on Cyprus is unable to get around the 
political obstacles posed by the perceived lack of positive 
international response to Turkish Cypriot approval of the 
April referendum.  MFA Deputy U/S Apakan, whose portfolio 
includes Cyprus, told DAS Kennedy January 12 that the GOT is 
exchanging internal views on next steps to try to get the 
settlement process re-started, but cannot see how it could 
accept less than the Annan Plan as voted on April 24.  MFA 
Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs acting DDG Bilman 
consistently tells us that perceived lack of measures to 
ameliorate Turkish Cypriots' isolation undermines 
pro-settlement sentiment in the GOT and the bureaucracy and 
prevents Turkey from offering further concessions. 
 
6. (C) Comment cont.:  The way the EU and Turkey are 
interacting adds to the problem.  The EU members feel 
aggrieved at Turkey's stonewalling on Cyprus at its December 
summit.  Similarly, the EU's handling of the Cyprus issue at 
the summit rekindled Ankara's resentment of Nicosia's 
blocking of a Cyprus settlement and of the EU for not doing 
enough to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.  For now, 
many in Ankara see barring Cyprus from NATO/EU activities as 
one of the few sticks it has to use against the ROC.  With 
time, this may pass.  However, the extremely legalistic GOT 
would be more likely to concede Cypriot participation in an 
activity that clearly was not covered by Berlin Plus and that 
would not require the discussion of classified information. 
Anything more, we fear, would require changing the NAC 
decisions, something Turkey is unlikely to consider in the 
current environment.  End comment. 
EDELMAN