US embassy cable - 05MANAMA101

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PARM, ASEC, KISL, BA, IR, IZ, KICC, IAEA 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON'S JANUARY 
30 VISIT TO BAHRAIN 
 
REF: A. 04 USUN 2176 
 
     B. 04 STATE 268185 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) We warmly welcome your visit to Bahrain.  On the key 
issues of Iran, counter-terrorism, and Article 98, you will 
find the Bahraini government to be fully supportive of U.S. 
foreign policy objectives and interests.  However, on CT and 
Article 98, you will find that there are specific areas that 
the GOB has yet to adequately address.  Your visit can help 
push Bahrain's leadership to understand that taking action in 
these areas is in both our countries' interest and will 
stabilize the bilateral relationship in critical 
security-related areas. 
 
2.  (S) We have requested meetings with Foreign Minister 
Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Minister of Defense 
LTG Shaikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, and Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs/Minister of Information Mohammed 
Abdul Ghaffar.  You met with Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammed 
on the margins of the UNGA in September 2004 (Ref A) and with 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Abdul Ghaffar in 
November 2004 (Ref B). 
 
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The Iranian Threat 
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3.  (S) Bahrain has historically worried about the Iranian 
threat to Bahrain and the region, and supports a strong 
policy of containing Iran.  Given that Bahrain's population 
is 70 percent Shia, the GOB is deeply aware of possible 
Iranian interference in Bahrain's domestic affairs.  Bahrain 
understands that the presence of the U.S. Navy in country is 
the best means to deter Iranian expansionism.  In meetings 
with visiting U.S. officials, Bahrain's senior leadership has 
offered encouragement and support for U.S. efforts to contain 
the Iranian nuclear program.  They have voiced concern that 
Bahrain is within range of Iranian ballistic missiles. 
 
4.  (S) The GOB is deeply suspicious of the Iranian role in 
Iraq.  Senior officials have spoken about the entry of "a 
million" Iranians into Iraq to vote in the January 30 
elections.  They fear the regional instability that would be 
caused by a Shia government in Iraq that is allied with Iran 
and its potential impact on Shia-majority Bahrain. 
 
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Counter Terrorism 
----------------- 
 
5.  (S) Since July 2004, when the (then) six Sunni extremist 
terrorism suspects were re-arrested, Bahraini officials from 
Prime Minister Khalifa and Crown Prince Salman down have told 
us that the GOB would conduct a thorough investigation and 
aggressive prosecution of the case.  Most recently, in a 
January 3 meeting with the King, the Ambassador said that the 
United States wants the GOB to pursue the prosecution of the 
remaining four suspects energetically. 
 
6.  (S) The court case against the four is inactive for the 
time being while the constitutional court addresses a motion 
by the defense team contesting the constitutionality of the 
charges against the four for conspiracy to commit terrorist 
attacks.  The constitutional case could take months, and the 
suspects will remain outside of detention for the period of 
the trial, per the order of the judge.  Bahraini security 
forces are keeping the suspects under heavy surveillance.  We 
are concerned that anything other than a vigorous prosecution 
of the suspects will send a signal that Bahrain is not fully 
committed to fighting threats to public order, particularly 
from domestic Sunni extremists.  You will want to emphasize 
this point. 
 
7.  (S) On a related CT issue, Bahrain is sending a special 
forces company embedded in the UAE military contingent in 
Afghanistan.  The Bahrain Defense Force has taken practical 
steps with both us and the Emiratis to prepare for a 
projected deployment date of April 2005. 
 
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Hung Up on Article 98 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (S) Despite having signed an Article 98 agreement with us 
in February 2003, the GOB has not yet taken steps to bring it 
into force.  Our primary interlocutor on Article 98, Minister 
of State Abdul Ghaffar, has told us repeatedly that Bahrain 
would never deliver an American citizen, whether civilian or 
military, to a third country.  He contends that ratification 
of the agreement would have to go through the Council of 
Representatives (COR), and he could not guarantee the COR 
would pass the agreement.  The Ambassador has suggested that 
Bahrain bring the agreement into force by way of an exchange 
of diplomatic notes.  The Ambassador delivered draft text of 
a proposed exchange of notes (provided by the Department) to 
Abdul Ghaffar on January 4.  Abdul Ghaffar said he would look 
carefully at the materials and get back to us. 
 
ZIADEH