US embassy cable - 05AMMAN585

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, JO 
SUBJECT: ANOTHER CABINET SHAKEUP EXPECTED 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 571 
     B. AMMAN 187 
     C. 04 AMMAN 6160 
 
Classified By: Charge David Hale, Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  The three-month old cabinet's 
non-performance has sparked speculation about another shakeup 
soon, possibly to include a change of prime ministers.  While 
PM Fayez's limitations are self-evident, a likely successor 
is not.  Rumors in elite west Amman focus on intelligence 
chief Khayr or Royal Court Minister Rifai for the role. 
While both bring as many liabilities as advantages, this 
trend in speculation reflects the fact that a) those are the 
two predominant voices around the King and b) their 
harder-line view toward the political opposition (reftel A) 
prevails.  The irony is that while the King wants a cabinet 
that can manage parliament, the poor talent pool in the house 
keeps him from making the otherwise obvious choice of an MP 
to lead the next government.  The long-term solution requires 
more fundamental reform of parliament and the political 
process.  But the immediate reaction will be to go slowly. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Only three months old, the reshuffled Fayez cabinet 
is already facing widespread handicapping of its longevity, 
with most bets we hear placed on a March/April termination. 
The speculation in part arises from salon boredom, in part 
from recognition that cabinet shuffles and changes are a 
frequent device of Jordanian kings, but most significantly 
from the plain evidence that the government is a dud.  It was 
widely hoped that the October reshuffle would strengthen the 
hand of the cabinet's reformers.  In fact the appointment of 
a number of small-bore East Bank figures, aimed at appealing 
to various factions close to the Prime Minister, has if 
anything sharpened the division in the cabinet between 
traditionalists and reformists .  One reforming minister told 
us that last week only three cabinet colleagues joined him in 
voting support for a package of draft laws needed to 
implement the good governance initiative spearheaded by 
Deputy Prime Minister Muasher. 
 
3.  (C) If the reformers fare so poorly in cabinet ) and 
with an initiative clearly blessed by the King ) how can the 
government succeed in getting its legislation through 
parliament, critics ask?  In fact, the cabinet may have been 
reflecting an assessment that the legislation is too 
ambitious for a parliament that wants to be loyal to the 
King, but not at the price of reforming away the tools of 
patronage, tribal favoritism, protection from economic 
competition, and limited women's rights ) all the 
traditional furnishings that comprise the known world to a 
remarkably conservative group of MPs. 
 
4.  (C) The looming test is the government's budget, 
submitted to parliament two weeks ago (reftel B).  Some 
observers believe parliament will reject the bill not because 
of any substantive objections, but as an assertion of 
parliamentary power.  Multiple non-binding recommendations to 
last year's budget bill went unheeded by the government, 
angering many MPs.   A provisional law designed to strengthen 
women's rights met this fate last year as several MPs cast 
their opposing votes solely to spite the government, not 
necessarily because they opposed the legislation (reftel C). 
Parliamentary dynamics are driven by four competing blocs, 
the Islamic Action Front (with a clear philosophy and policy 
line) and three secular groups which are vehicles for the 
personal ambitions of their leaders but are otherwise 
indistinguishable to the outside observer.  On almost any 
given issue, a marriage of convenience emerges between the 
IAF and one or more of the secular blocs, in opposition to 
the government.  Apart from the budget and the new reform 
bills, there are more than 150 temporary laws still awaiting 
consideration, many of which laid the foundation for Jordan's 
WTO and FTA agreements.  Their passage requires mobilization 
of the cabinet, a task which seems beyond Fayez, ministers. 
One difficulty the government faces is the legacy of its own 
behavior.  Last year's budget passed only after significant, 
direct cash payments were made to members.  With this 
vote-buying precedent set, the cabinet now faces the 
ever-inflating demands of MPs for more.  Earlier this month, 
the PM announced an undistinguished list of dozens of 
sub-cabinet appointments, which seemed to mark a return to 
East Bank cronyism as a substitute for good governance ) a 
step which discouraged the reformers but is unlikely to 
impress parliament. 
 
5.  (C)  Further fueling speculation is the sense that the 
King is losing patience with Fayez.  Although averse to 
challenging personally his close associates (among whom Fayez 
once numbered), and philosophically inclined toward longer 
government tenures to improve performance, Abdullah does show 
in private signs of being fed up.  In November, he told 
Charge that if ministers did not show performance within 
three months, they'd be out.  The three month mark has been 
reached, and the PM himself has little to show.  The 
difficulty, of course, is that a decision to sack a prime 
minister must also entail a decision on a successor.  The 
options are not enticing.  Each factional leader in 
parliament may think his behavior shows that as  prime 
minister he could deliver parliament, but in fact their 
obstructionism and self-promotion makes them improbable 
candidates.  Jordan's elder statesmen, who gave King Hussein 
a set of plausible choices depending on domestic trends, have 
largely been cashiered.  Furthermore, they are out of step 
with the King's swift, results-oriented style and suffer 
other generational liabilities.  Two leading cabinet 
reformers, the (Christian) Deputy Prime Minister Muasher and 
the (Palestinian) Planning Minister Awadallah suffer 
sectarian burdens, and neither would be able to improve on 
the government's performance in pushing through legislation. 
 
6.  (C) This hypothetical process of elimination leaves the 
King with a choice between his two closest advisors at the 
moment, GID chief Saad Khayr and Royal Court Minister Samir 
al-Rifai.  Khayr brings a proven reputation for telling 
people what to do, and getting them to do it.  However, 
regardless of Khayr's actual behavior, the selection of the 
head of the security services would signal at best a lack of 
conviction in political liberalization.  While the title of 
Prime Minister would appeal to Khayr's vanity, in many ways 
it would not be a real promotion (and, for the conspiracy 
minded, therefore all the more enticing for the King, who has 
brought the ambitious Khayr down a peg or two in recent 
months).  He should be able to manage parliament more 
successfully than Fayez, but in a way which would move the 
country away from the reform vista.  Rifai's inheritance (he 
is the third generation of a family that has built its 
fortunes ) political and otherwise -- on loyal service to 
the Hashemites) and smooth performance make him an almost 
inevitable prime minister, like father and grandfather.  He 
is the single Jordanian most reflective of the King's 
thinking, and as royal court minister he has in fact taken 
over management of the cabinet when ministers have strayed 
from the King's desires or common sense.  But he may be the 
first to realize that successfully maneuvering the anteroom 
politics of the palace is not sufficient seasoning for the 
prime ministry ) and there is the cautionary example of 
Fayez himself, who made a similar move from Court Minister to 
PM.  More executive, ministerial experience would be the 
logical next step for Rifai. 
 
7.  (C) As happened last fall, the King may seek sweeping 
changes out of frustration, but his limited options may bring 
him around to extending Fayez, political life.  This will 
reinforce the tendency of the palace and GID to do the 
cabinet's job for it, reinforcing the paradox of Jordan's 
palace-led reform.  Jordan has a shallow pool of political 
talent.  The long-term solution to this problem, as it is to 
a number of others here, is to open up the political system 
and permit real parliamentary politics.  Unfortunately, in 
the near term the regime seems more likey to use the dearth 
of talent as a reason to go slowly. 
Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
HALE