US embassy cable - 05ANKARA357

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CENTCOM CDR AND FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS IRAQ, REGION

Identifier: 05ANKARA357
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA357 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-01-22 14:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000357 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2030 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: CENTCOM CDR AND FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS IRAQ, 
REGION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  GEN Abizaid and Foreign Minister Gul agreed 
on the goal of a stable, democratic and unified Iraq during 
their January 11 meeting in Ankara.  Gul reiterated Turkey's 
support of elections in Iraq occurring on time with the 
fullest possible participation.  Turkey is reaching out to 
Sunni Arabs with limited success; other Arabs could be more 
effective than Turkey, opined one MFA official, but they are 
reluctant to advocate democracy since they don't practice it. 
 General Abizaid encouraged Turkey to continue working on the 
Iraqi Sunni Arabs and reassure them that the US is their 
natural ally, not their enemy.  He praised Turkey's 
cooperation on Iraq and urged that it expand, including our 
use of Incirlik Air Base (IAB) for logistic support.  Gul 
acknowledged the importance to Turkey of the coalition's 
success in Iraq, but did not offer a definitive response to 
our proposal to use IAB as a logistics hub.  Gul expressed 
the usual Turkish concerns about Kurdish ambitions and 
possible ethnic conflict in Kirkuk.  He also advised against 
using Peshmerga in Mosul.  GEN Abizaid welcomed Turkey's 
increased contribution to ISAF with its assumption of command 
in February.  Gul said Turkey was again considering leading a 
PRT; other officials indicated that Ankara was focusing on 
taking over an existing UK-lead PRT in the north to 
facilitate the British establishing another in the west or 
south.  They also briefly discussed Saudi Arabia (Gul saw 
BMENA as a potential counter to growing extremism there), 
shared concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the 
Middle East peace process (Gul was optimistic after his 
recent visit there).  End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Iraq: "Help Us Help You" 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul opened his January 11 
meeting with the visiting Commander Central Command, General 
John Abizaid, by noting that after the US, Turkey has lost 
more citizens in Iraq than any other country.  GEN Abizaid 
corrected Gul, noting that it was Iraq who had lost more 
citizens than any other country in the fight against 
insurgents as Iraqis are engaged in a struggle for a new 
beginning. 
 
3. (C) Gul noted that Turkey wanted a democratic, peaceful 
Iraq, adding that when Iraqis suffer, Turks suffer ("when 
there is a fire in the neighborhood, you feel the heat"). 
"Your success is our success," he emphasized.  Turkey saw the 
January 30 elections as important and hoped that they would 
not be postponed.  At the same time, full participation was 
also important to ensure the legitimacy of the transitional 
government.  In this regard, Turkey was reaching out to 
Sunni's to encourage their participation.  This included 
training persons from the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP) in Turkey, 
added MFA MidEast DDG Safak Gokturk.  Gul said he disagreed 
with the argument that a postponement would improve the 
security situation, and worried that changing the calendar 
"could affect other steps."  Thus, we needed elections to 
occur on schedule. 
 
4. (C) GEN Abizaid responded that the US-Turkey relationship 
was important for our successes in the region, including in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  We needed to have open communications. 
 Although we disagreed over some things, the two countries 
had no differences over the objective -- a united Iraq with a 
government that represented all Iraqis.  He expressed 
condolences for the Turkish policemen who were ambushed in 
Mosul last month.  He agreed with Gul on the need for 
elections to occur on schedule, projecting that there would 
be a big turnout in the north and south, and probably smaller 
turnout in the four Sunni Arab provinces due to the difficult 
security environment there.  Nonetheless, the newly elected 
leaders will find a way to ensure Sunni Arabs can still 
participate in the political process.  In fact, the US wanted 
Sunni leaders to come forward, and he urged Turkey to tell 
its Sunni Iraqi contacts that the US wants them to have a 
future in Iraq.  He asked Gul to reassure them that the US 
was their natural ally -- we will not allow Iran to dominate 
Iraq and we will take care of the extremists. 
 
5. (C) Many Sunnis tell the Turks that they understand that 
they should participate in the process but claim that they 
would lose their grass roots support if they did so, Gul 
said.  In response, Turkey was arguing that if Sunni parties 
feel they cannot participate, they should at least put 
forward some individuals.  Unfortunately, they fear being 
branded as a US puppet if they participate in the electoral 
process.  Gokturk added that the real key to Sunni outreach 
was the Arab world, but they have an "allergy" to universal 
suffrage.  He warned that what they say to the US is 
different from what they say in regional gatherings. 
 
6. (C) Besides elections, building up Iraq's security forces 
is important to Iraqis to move from an occupation mentality 
to one of partnership, GEN Abizaid continued.  He expected 
that the new government would be looking to Turkey to help 
with this.  He noted that the police in particular were in 
need of help.  Gul said that Turkey wanted to help with the 
training of police and was prepared to do so over the 
long-term in Turkey. In addition, the GOT supported the NATO 
training mission, although Ankara would like to see "better 
coordination" within the Alliance. 
 
7. (C) Recalling his opening remarks, GEN Abizaid reiterated 
his belief that Turkey's cooperation was important to success 
in Iraq.  He appreciated the GOT's permitting materiel to 
flow across the border, but noted that additional logistics 
support through Incirlik Air Base (IAB) could reduce crowding 
at the border and ease the demand for convoys.  Gul repeated, 
"your success is our success" in Iraq.  "We know we have to 
help you."  "We will let you know soon," he added, referring 
to our proposal to establish a logistics hub at IAB.  "We 
also need your help," he added.  (Comment: While Gul did not 
elaborate, we interpret this last comment to refer to the 
Turkish public's strong opposition to our actions in Iraq. 
"Help" may mean progress on stabilizing Iraq and some visible 
steps on the PKK.  Nonetheless, both civilian and military 
officials have suggested to us that progress on the logistics 
hub may be in the offing.  End comment.) 
 
-------------------- 
Iraq: PKK/Kongra Gel 
-------------------- 
 
8. (C) GEN Abizaid acknowledged that terrorism in Iraq was an 
important issue for both Turkey and the US.  Regarding 
PKK/Kongra Gel, our intention to rid Iraq of these terrorists 
was clear, but timing was an issue.  The current priority was 
securing the four predominantly Sunni Arab provinces and 
defeating AIF, Zarqawi, etc.  Nonetheless, CENTCOM was 
mindful of the PKK threat and would develop planning together 
with Turkey and Iraq.  Gul thanked the general for raising 
this issue.  He said he had not intended to raise it, as the 
trilateral meeting on the PKK/Kongra Gel that morning 
(septel) produced a good understanding among the parties.  He 
understood that the time was not "convenient" for military 
action, although "other things" could be done. 
 
---------------------- 
Iraq: Kurds and Kirkuk 
---------------------- 
 
9. (C) GEN Abizaid recalled his conversations with Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani and Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani.  They are 
realistic and have respect for both Turkey's interests and 
the process underway in Iraq.  Gul asserted that "Kurds are 
our relatives; we want them to be happy."  The GOT had hosted 
both Barzani and Talabani (separately) in Ankara and had 
"open and sincere" talks. 
 
10. (C) In that regard, Gul expressed concern about the 
potential for ethnic conflict in Kirkuk.  The Kurdish attempt 
to postpone elections there was worrisome.  He asked that the 
US be careful and not concede to this demand.  He understood 
that both the US and the UN shared Turkey's concern about the 
past IDP returns to Kirkuk.  This could have a big impact on 
stability, he asserted.  The Kurds were entitled to the full 
rights of citizenship, yet they are talking about a 
referendum on independence that could be a "huge problem." 
They should not be provocative, he concluded. 
 
------------------- 
Iraq:  Words Matter 
------------------- 
 
11. (C) Ambassador Edelman raised the inflammatory rhetoric 
that many Turks used during the operation in Fallujah.  Gen 
Abizaid described what the situation had been in the city 
before the operation, explained how 90 percent of the 
population had left before the operation began, and how the 
people returning to the city now are expressing gratitude to 
the coalition for ridding their community of terrorists.  Gul 
allowed that some of the statements circulating at the time 
were just silly, such as the accusation that the US was using 
"atomic bombs" in Fallujah.  Others were the result of 
extreme sensitivities giving rise to misstatements.  "We told 
them they were wrong," Gul stated. 
 
------------------------- 
Iraq: Concern about Mosul 
------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Gul asked about the situation in Mosul.  General 
Abizaid explained how the recently increased numbers of 
troops in the city has helped calm the situation.  Gul warned 
that if more troops are needed, better they be American than 
Peshmerga.  The US needs as many friends as it can find in 
Mosul, and an influx of Peshmerga might "cause other problems 
for you." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Afghanistan: Renewed Interest in PRT in North 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Gul noted that Turkey would deploy over 1,000 
additional troops to Afghanistan as it assumes command of 
ISAF in February.  He announced that Turkey had "changed its 
mind" on leading a PRT ("in the north," Deputy Undersecretary 
Uzumcu quickly added), and the Health and Education 
Ministries were working on ways to "more meaningfully" assist 
Afghanistan.  GEN Abizaid said that he looked forward to 
Turkey's leadership in ISAF and as NATO expands that mission 
westward.  He admitted to some disappointment that NATO had 
not worked faster, and hoped the number of PRTs would expand. 
 (Note: The DCM followed up with Uzumcu the following day. 
Uzumcu understood that the UK was looking to turn its two 
existing PRTs over to some other country so it could lead 
others in the ISAF phase II region.  He indicated that Ankara 
would be working with London to permit Turkey to take over 
one of the existing PRTs.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Other Issues: Saudi Arabia/BMENA, Iran, Central Asia 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
14. (C) Other issues discussed included: 
 
-- Saudi Arabia/BMENA:  GEN Abizaid expressed increasing 
concern for the stability of Saudi Arabia given al Qaida's 
ideological gains within Saudi society and targeting of the 
royal family; he encouraged Turkey to join the US in helping 
the Saudis.  Gul agreed with the general's analysis, adding 
that a closed political process produces the psychological 
environment conducive to terrorism.  Turkey saw the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI) and its 
encouragement of indigenous reform as an effective 
countermeasure to the pent-up frustrations that lead people 
to terrorism.  Cultivating young, moderate leaders was more 
important than police or military action.  Gokturk noted a 
relationship between Saudi stability and developments in 
Iraq:  Wahabis are contemplating what new balances might 
emerge if Iraq falls apart.  GEN Abizaid said he well 
understood the linkages, noting that most foreign fighters in 
Iraq are from Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
 
-- Central Asia:  Gul thought Central Asia's problems could 
similarly be traced to a democracy deficit.  He agreed with 
General Abizaid that Turkey served as a good example for both 
the Middle East and Central Asia. 
 
-- Iran: GEN Abizaid hoped Tehran could be convinced to give 
up its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.  Gul agreed, 
adding that Turkey has been conveying that message for years. 
 
-- MEPP:  Gul recalled his discussions the previous week with 
Israelis and Palestinians.  The Palestinian leaders 
understood that terrorism weakens their community and they 
pledged to do everything they could to control it.  The 
Israelis appear committed to the peace process, leaving Gul 
optimistic for the future. 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
15. (SBU) In addition to Uzumcu and Gokturk, Gul was joined 
by Iraq Coordinator Osman Koruturk, DDG for the Americas Suna 
Ilicak, MFA Spokesman Namik Tan.  US Participants include GEN 
Abizaid, the Ambassador, CENTCOM POLAD Amb. John Holzman, the 
DCM, EUCOM/J5 MajGen Scott Gration, ODC Turkey Chief MajGen 
Peter Sutton, PolMilCouns, DATT COL Roman Hrycaj, and CENTCOM 
Executive Officer COL Joseph Reynes. 
 
16. (U) Minimize considered. 
EDELMAN 

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