US embassy cable - 05ROME211

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
BERLIN: PLEASE PASS TO AMB. MAUREEN QUINN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, AF, IT, AFGHANISTAN 
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: PRT/FSB --  ITALY URGENTLY SEEKING 
ANSWERS 
 
REF: A) ROME 178 B) STATE 2743 C) 04 ROME 3849 D) 04 
     ROME 2913 E) 04 ROME 2122 
 
Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.4(b & d) 
 
 1. (U) This is an action cable. See Paragraphs 2 and 5. 
 
2. (C) Summary. Italy is firm in its commitment and poised to 
deploy a PRT and FSB to Herat before Afghan parliamentary 
elections (Reftel A). However, after receiving recent U.S. 
demarches on Stage II requirements, the Italians are having 
doubts about whether the U.S. will support their deployment 
plan.  During Ambassador Quinn's January 25 visit to Rome, 
the Italians will press for specific answers to three 
questions on which -- in spite of explanations given by the 
Embassy and US NATO -- Italian and U.S.views seem to differ. 
We need either to reassure the Italians that we support their 
plan or else immediately begin working with them to modify 
their plan so that we can support it.  ACTION REQUEST: Post 
requests guidance to answer questions posed in Paragraph 5 no 
later than Amb. Quinn's January 25 meetings in Rome.  End 
Summary. 
 
3. (C)  Over the past two weeks, the uncertainty expressed by 
Italian military and MFA officials has grown.  On January 19, 
Italian CHOD Adm. Giampaolo di Paola telephoned CJCS to seek 
clarification on U.S. positions regarding readiness for the 
Italian deployment, transfer of the Herat PRT to ISAF, and 
support for the Italian FSB.  On January 20, working-level 
officers from the Italian Defense General Staff (IDGS) 
stressed to Polmil Counselor and DATT that Italy's prestige 
and credibility will be damaged if the U.S. delays transfer 
of the Herat PRT to Italian command beyond June 2005 (or 
before Afghan parliamentary elections).  According to the 
officers, it is vital that Italy visibly take on the 
responsibilities to which it has committed itself.  In 
responding to U.S. requests to take on a PRT, Italy has 
assumed that, once it showed up in sufficient force, it would 
take command.  The Italians feel that the key condition for 
transferring command should be Italian readiness and not the 
readiness of others in other provinces. 
 
4.  (C)  Italy is looking forward to the January 25 visit of 
Coordinator for Afghanistan Maureen Quinn as an opportunity 
to reconfirm bilateral understanding about the terms and 
schedule of Italy's deployment.  Amb. Quinn can expect 
pointed questions on the three areas of particular concern 
mentioned in Reftel A, Paragraph 12, and further defined in 
the following paragraph. 
 
5.  (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that the Department 
provide the Embassy and Amb. Quinn with answers to the 
following questions prior to Amb. Quinn's January 25 visit to 
Rome. 
 
Deployment Schedule 
------------------- 
Italy has made its plans on the assumption that Italy should 
deploy its PRT/FSB personnel prior to Afghan parliamentary 
elections (now expected in early or mid-summer) and that ISAF 
would consequently expand to at least Herat due to the 
Italian ISAF presence.  To meet this requirement, the 
deployment schedule outlined in Reftel A is now practically 
underway. QUESTIONS: Does the U.S. still support the Italian 
deployment schedule?  If the U.S. has problems with it, we 
need to tell Italy exactly how many personnel the U.S. can 
accommodate in Herat and on what timeline for the PRT and, if 
possible, for the FSB. 
 
Transfer of Herat PRT to Italian Command under ISAF 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
We have repeatedly told the Italians that conditions on the 
ground, not a pre-set timetable, will determine the transfer 
of Herat PRT to Italian command. We have also told them 
repeatedly that, if Stage II requirements are not filled, the 
U.S. may withdraw its offer to transfer the Herat and Farah 
PRTs to ISAF command (Reftels A and B).  But the Italians 
have reacted unhappily to these points, and have cited recent 
reports from SACEUR (NFI) indicating that conditions at Herat 
are fair and improving.  Italy continues to underline its 
strong preference that the PRT should transition from OEF to 
 
 
Italian command under ISAF once the Italian troops have 
arrived (and prior to parliamentary elections).  Italy does 
not understand what additional changes on the ground need to 
occur before its military can take command.  QUESTION: The 
Italians will seek U.S. confirmation that the Herat PRT's 
transfer to Italian command under ISAF will occur by June 
2005.  Is transfer to Italian command indeed conditional on 
other factors, as suggested in Reftel B?  If so, Ambassador 
Quinn should be prepared to define such factors clearly, in 
order to give the Italians a chance to evaluate whether a 
summer transfer of command is achievable. 
 
Helicopters for Italian FSB 
--------------------------- 
Italy has agreed to provide helicopteections. 
However, U.S. Joint Staff has made it clear that Phase II FSB 
resources must be generated through SHAPE.  QUESTIONS: Is 
there a realistic prospect that SHAPE can get the helicopters 
needed to support the Italian FSB from April through June? 
If SHAPE cannot, what should Italy do before its helicopters 
are available?  Can OEF helicopters be available if needed 
for these months for the 100-plus Italians in the FSB?  If 
not, should Italy postpone the FSB deployment due to start in 
April until its helicopters arrive in theater? 
 
6. (C) Comment.  Differences between the Italian and U.S. 
positions on these questions have caused the Italians to 
doubt whether their deployment plan will work.  If we want 
Italy to modify its deployment schedule, Italy must know this 
quickly.  We should bear in mind that,  in 2004, switches in 
U.S. signals caused Italy to cancel plans for PRT deployments 
(first to Ghazni and later to Herat).  If Italy is forced to 
re-write well-advanced plans drawn up at NATO request, it may 
weaken the strong Italian commitment to the success of OEF 
and ISAF.  End Comment. 
 
 
SKODON 
 
 
NNNN 
 
 
2005ROME00211 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL