US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE106

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, KSTC, PARM, PREL, PINR, PK, EZ 
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE 
OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN 
 
REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1870 
 
     B. 04 SECSTATE 212634 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government 
for the U.S. government's opinion on the potential sale of a 
passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of 
Pakistan.  This cable offers additional technical and 
background information on the system.  Note:  ref A 
mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt 
of USG views on possible VERA sales.  In fact, our commitment 
to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide 
our views within 30 days.  MFA officials are asking about 
when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004). 
We have explained that the holiday period could delay our 
reply.  However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request 
to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing 
interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech 
request. 
 
2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met 
January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech 
company that produces the passive surveillance system, 
VERA-E.  The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav 
Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two 
marketing managers for ERA's military products.   The company 
gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the 
firm's short history, its civil and military products, and 
its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in 
Asia.  The company then openly answered all questions for 
more than 2 hours. 
 
3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late 
90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO 
countries and discovered that there was no interest in its 
military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries 
already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and 
will never buy VERA.   Once ERA realized this, it switched 
its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a 
number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China 
and with Vietnam.  The firm then discovered that Czech 
authorities would not approve the applications for export 
licenses.  Altering its strategy, the company decided to do 
what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version 
for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies. 
 This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01.   Reftel mistakenly 
identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E. 
In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured.  The 
ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the 
VERA that the company hopes  it will be allowed to sell to 
non-NATO states.  The company explained that it tried to 
reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to 
non-NATO states would be politically acceptable,  but not so 
far that the system would no longer be attractive to 
potential customers 
 
4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection 
Display. The model, which again only exists in theory,  would 
use the same principle as the VERA,  time difference of 
arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the 
same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E,  but 
lacks the VERA's identification, or fingerprinting, 
capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive 
radar systems.  Era provided the following explanation of the 
differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper: 
 
ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures.  It is 
based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal 
location and tracking. 
 
The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as 
follows: 
 
- The VERA-E,  which in general has been designed for NATO 
partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced 
level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal 
emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is 
sometimes called finger printing.  This identification has to 
be based on algorithms and hardware technologies,  which make 
possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis. 
This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the 
level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific 
aircraft. 
 
- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter. 
 This kind of identification is based on applied software and 
hardware equipment.  The ASDD's identification process relies 
in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM 
pulse signal.  Based on this,  it is possible to define 
general types of radar,  which might be used on many types of 
aircraft. 
 
Based on the above principles of emitter identification,  it 
should be clear that the applied system databases are very 
different.  The difference is in the radar parameters, which 
go into the database, as well the emitter identification 
based on the system's database.  In general,  there is a much 
simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in 
the VERA-E. 
 
5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or 
unauthorized copying of its products, company officials 
explained that 90% of the system's capacity is in the 
software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the 
customer. 
 
6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing 
presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the 
shortcomings and limitations of its product.  The firm 
pointed out that they still use previous generation analog 
receivers.  They called attention to the fact that VERA-E 
requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to 
deploy or move.  They noted that VERA-E can only pick up 
radar emissions, not communications or other electronic 
signals.  In answer to the question, "what do you see if the 
plane turns off its radar emitter?" they said, "nothing." 
ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased 
and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a "realistic" 
evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity 
of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general.  The 
firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on "a Czech 
budget"  and that it did not have the R&D resources that 
competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the 
French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main 
attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US 
dollars. 
 
7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn't even certain 
that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is 
granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to 
build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing.  If 
Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test, 
production on its order would begin.  In 2003 Pakistan 
expressed interest in buying six radar sets.  It is unlikely 
that the radar sets would be ready before 2006.  ERA 
officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth 
roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne 
surveilance system ERIEYE.  According to ERA officials,  the 
Swedish system incorporates both active and passive 
technology.  ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to 
buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an 
integrated air defense system. 
 
8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length. 
 The company shared information on prices and acknowledged 
that although it has had recent success in selling civil 
radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where 
margins are much higher.  It was up front about its marketing 
strategies.  ERA also offered to provide more information in 
the future, should we have additional questions. 
 
9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye's capabilities 
are correct, and taking into consideration ERA's willingness 
to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should 
consider a positive response on the question of the Czech 
export of the ASDD to Pakistan.  Otherwise, the willingness 
of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis 
could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future 
cases where we have a strong and direct interest in 
preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as 
was the case recently with China. END COMMENT 
 
10. (U)  Post looks forward to receiving Washington's 
advisory opinion. 
HILLAS