US embassy cable - 05HARARE113

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TSVANGIRAI TRIP, ELECTIONS 
 
REF: (A) PRETORIA 223 (B) HARARE 83 (C) HARARE 2090 
     AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on January 
18, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube reported that MDC 
President Morgan Tsvangirai planned to lead an opposition 
delegation to Washington February 6-9.  Ncube noted that 
ZANU-PF's internal turmoil was opening space for opposition 
election preparations and could provoke a backlash among 
resentful ruling party figures "bent on revenge."  He 
asserted that the opposition's electoral success would depend 
on many factors over which it had little control, but as 
things stood now he expected the party to win 45-55 seats. 
He reported that a SADC delegation expected to visit Zimbabwe 
soon would include only lawyers evaluating the legal 
framework of elections, not more important election 
environment issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Tsvangirai Visit 
 
SIPDIS 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) According to Ncube, Tsvangirai, Shadow Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Priscilla Misihairabwa-Mushonga and he 
planned to arrive in Washington on Sunday, February 6.  They 
would seek meetings there with representatives from the 
Administration, civil society, and the Congress February 7-9, 
after which they would leave for meetings in Canada enroute 
to Zimbabwe.  Tsvangirai also hoped to meet with UN SYG Annan 
in New York on his way to or from Washington.  Ncube 
requested the Embassy's assistance in arranging meetings for 
the delegation with Administration officials.  The MDC has 
sought assistance from NDI and IRI in making appointments 
with Congress. 
 
Ruling Party Turmoil 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Ncube said the opposition was enjoying the spectacle 
of the intra-ZANU PF fight.  More practically, the MDC was 
talking quietly to ruling party figures purged in the recent 
Tsholotsho debacle and primaries process (refs B and C).  He 
 
SIPDIS 
believed these individual would have no real interest in 
joining forces with the MDC but out of vengeance might be 
induced to influence their supporters to stay away from the 
polls in order to demonstrate to ZANU-PF just how valuable 
they were to the party's fortunes.  He noted that victims of 
recent developments included not just hard-liners and 
moderates seen to be deviating from the party line, but even 
some of the most loyal followers (e.g. NGO Bill architect and 
Minister of Social Welfare Paul Mangwana) who lost out in 
primary contests. 
 
4.  (C) Ncube said he was continuing his informal dialogue 
with Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 
Patrick Chinamasa on election and constitutional issues (they 
were to meet later that day on an unspecified agenda). 
However, Chinamasa had told him that he was resigned to 
playing very little role in the next Government.  Chinimasa 
thought he might lose his ministry in a cabinet reshuffle 
before the elections and, if not, would certainly lose it 
after the elections.  (Note: Chinamasa has retained his seat 
in the Central Committee but lost his slot in the Politburo 
and is not running for a parliamentary seat.  End note.) 
Ncube said that if Chinamasa departed, Security Minister 
Nicholas Goche, who already had been involved in the 
confidential unofficial dialogue, would likely become his 
 
SIPDIS 
principal ZANU-PF interlocutor.   Ncube added that he had 
heard current Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa might take 
Chinamasa's place in the cabinet. 
 
Opposition Election Preparations 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about 
Zimbabwe's election environment, Ncube said he was pleased 
that "a lot of space" had opened up for the opposition while 
the ruling party was absorbed with its internecine combat. 
The tone and substance of official media reporting had 
improved, and Ncube joked that even he was reading the 
government-controlled Herald these days.  Nonetheless, many 
of the usual constraints continued: authorities kept finding 
excuses not to approve meetings requested by the opposition 
in Chinhoyi, for example, and one MDC MP was threatened with 
arrest for letting a member of his audience speak without 
authorization at an otherwise authorized meeting.  Moreover, 
the MDC fully expected conditions to worsen quickly when the 
dust settled in ZANU-PF and it turned its attention to the 
opposition again. 
 
6.  (C) Ncube reported that the opposition did not have the 
funds with which to conduct national primaries but that its 
candidate selection process was nearly complete.  The party's 
organization down to the grassroots continued to improve, 
although a few local structures that had seen  disagreement 
over selecting a candidate remained dysfunctional.  Ncube 
made no prediction about when the party might lift its 
"conditional suspension of participation" in the 
parliamentary elections, but reported that the party's 
campaign was in an advanced stage of planning.  The party was 
finalizing its communications strategy, which nonetheless 
would likely evolve to meet changing circumstances during the 
campaign. 
 
7.  (C) Ncube asserted that how the MDC fared in elections 
would depend on several factors beyond its control, e.g., 
access to the media, freedom of assembly, and police action 
against perpetrators of violence.  The party's ability to 
overcome voter apathy and voter fears on voting day would be 
keys to maintaining seats in traditional MDC strongholds.  To 
do so, it was organizing "voting clubs" to project safety in 
numbers, and would coordinate with authorities and observer 
groups to try to address circumstances at the local level. 
Ncube said estimates within the party for seats it will win 
if it participates range from 10 to 65 -- each extreme being 
unrealistic in his estimation.  Reiterating the uncertainty 
of key variables, he said that he nonetheless expected the 
party to win 45-55 seats.  (Note: The parliament has 150 
seats, 120 of which will be contested and 30 of which are 
selected by the President.  The MDC won 57 seats in 2000. 
ZANU-PF will need to win 70 seats to gain a two-thirds 
majority in parliament and amend the constitution at will. 
End note.) 
 
South Africa/SADC Issues 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Regarding the ruling party/government espionage 
scandal, Ncube said the opposition had seen court documents 
that indicated the involvement of not only the South African 
agent in GOZ custody, but the director-general and assistant 
director-general of the South African National Security 
Service.  Asked by the Ambassador about the ANC's recent 
public statement taking the GOZ to task on election 
conditions, its strongest to date (ref A), Ncube suggested 
that it indicated that the spy affair had not given the GOZ 
decisive leverage over the SAG. 
 
9.  (C) Ncube reported that the next SADC group to visit 
Zimbabwe on elections was not likely to be at a high-level. 
He said a group of SADC lawyers was scheduled to visit 
Zimbabwe this week to review the country's election-related 
legal infrastructure, but had been advised that the GOZ would 
only be prepared to receive them at an unspecified date next 
week.  The group was not prepared to address the most 
important election environment issues, including media 
access, freedom of assembly, and political 
violence/intimidation. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
10.  (C) We urge that serious consideration be given to 
affording Mr. Tsvangirai access to the highest levels during 
his visit, including a possible meeting with the President. 
There are pros and cons for affording Tsvangirai such 
exposure.  First, this is an opportunity for the 
Administration to underscore its commitment in Zimbabwe at 
the outset of President Bush's second term and soon after Dr. 
Rice's confirmation hearings in which she stressed our view 
of Zimbabwe as an "an outpost of tyranny."  From his 
perspective, Tsvangirai has concluded that such meetings 
would do him more good than harm politically and we see no 
reason to second guess the conclusion of the man closest to 
the politics.  The MDC President has been meeting African 
heads of state -- a rare honor for an opposition leader by 
culture and tradition on the continent.  He also was received 
at the highest levels in Europe in December, including a 
meeting with Prime Minister Blair.  Such a gesture in 
Washington will bolster Tsvangirai's stature with domestic 
and regional audiences. 
 
11. (C) However, there are also potential downsides to such a 
high visibility visit.  It could provoke a backlash within a 
ruling party that has been markedly moderating its posture 
toward the U.S. and the opposition.  It might also play into 
the hands of GOZ propagandists in portraying the MDC as 
Western lackeys.  From our perspective, the risks can be 
mitigated by public and private reiterations to the GOZ of 
our priority on the election process and the prospects for 
improved relations should the GOZ embark decisively on a path 
to advancing rule of law, human rights, and democracy.  While 
there are good arguments to be made for and against an Oval 
Office meeting and a meeting with the Secretary, on balance 
we believe they would be constructive and recommend that the 
requests be given favorable consideration. 
 
 
DELL