US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS235

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, AND NEA-FO A/S BURNS AND DAS L. DIBBLE 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2010 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, IS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: READOUT OF EU HIGHREP SOLANA'S TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST 
FOR PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
 1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  EU Middle East Envoy Marc Otte told USEU 
that, as a result of his January 9-13 trip to the region, EU 
High Rep Solana sees possibilities and opportunities for 
positive changes in the election of Mahmoud Abbas as the new 
leader of the Palestinian Authority.  In particular, Solana 
would like to take advantage of a window of opportunity 
before Palestinian legislative elections in July. Solana 
believes the U.S. has a critical role to play.  On a positive 
note, Solana had a good meeting with Israeli PM Sharon, his 
first in a long time.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  On January 18, EU Special Envoy Marc Otte briefed 
USEU in detail on EU Highrep Solana's January 9-13 trip to 
Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the West Bank/Gaza to observe 
Palestinian presidential elections and consult on Gaza 
disengagement and next steps to reinvigorate the peace 
process.  The briefing was held at Otte's initiative, who 
said he had spoken to NEA A/S Burns on January 17, but wanted 
to provide further details and keep the U.S. informed of 
Solana's meetings and conclusions drawn from the trip. 
 
Solana's meetings 
------------- 
3.  (C)  On January 9, Solana met in Jordan with the King, 
FM, and Security Services Chief.  He then went to Ramallah 
during the Palestinian presidential vote, and met with the 
Central Elections Committee chief and had dinner with EU 
election observer chief MEP Michel Rocard.  On the 10th he 
met with PA officials Mahmoud Abbas (after the results were 
announced), PM Abu Allah, and Dahlan, Rajoub, Fayyed and 
Erekat.  Hanan Ashrawi set up a civil society roundtable, and 
Solana had lunch with Palestinian businessmen (and did the 
same in Gaza).  In Gaza, Solana discussed Gaza disengagement 
and the refugee issue, and UNRWA's role, and took a field 
trip to two UNRWA camps.  Otte said Solana was impresed with 
the "devestation" of Gaza, due to hostilities and the 
long-term impact of the refugee camps.  Solana continued to 
Egypt, meeting with President Mubarak and Omar Suleiman.  In 
Israel, Solana met with PM Sharon, FM Shalom, Dov Weisglass, 
and Mossad officials. 
 
Key Conclusions:  Elections show "political maturity" 
--------------- 
3.  (C)  Otte said Solana drew three main conclusions from 
the successful PA presidential elections.  First, the 
Palestinians took seriously the responsibility to hold 
credible, democratic elections.  The PA's Central Election 
Commission (CEC) was "very professional," and operated as an 
independent entity with integrity.  There were few incidents 
and no casualties.  The Palestinian people took great pride 
in voting, and the 70% turnout was "higher than in many 
western countries."  Otte said Palestinian voters were proud 
of the ability to hold democratic elections and, comparing 
themselves to other Arab countries, commented, "Where else in 
the Arab world do you see this?"  Otte termed the elections a 
"remarkable example of political maturity."  Furthermore, 
during the campaign PA President Abbas made key statements 
supporting a political settlement and opposing armed 
struggle.  Hamas' call for a boycott went largely unheeded: 
it was clear that many Hamas sympathizers not only voted, 
they voted for Abbas.  The elections, Otte said, were "a big 
lesson for the Arab World" in democracy. 
 
Elections are beginning of a democratic process 
----------------- 
4.  (C)  The second conclusion Solana had drawn, Otte said, 
was that the elections marked the beginning of a democratic 
process that must be supported and continued.  With 
legislative elections in July, Fatah elections in August, and 
continuing municipal elections all scheduled for 2005, the 
process that began with the January 9 vote will be ongoing. 
The shortcomings identified in the January 9 vote will need 
to be corrected but, Otte cited EU election observer (and 
former French PM) Michel Rocard, these shortcomings did not 
effect the election outcome.  Hamas is likely to want to 
field candidates in the legislative elections, and how the 
West responds will be a challenge.  Otte said he expects 
Abbas to form a new PA government within two weeks.  Abu 
Allah will likely stay on as Prime Minister -- and with the 
full powers Abbas never enjoyed under Arafat. 
 
Abbas' challenges, and opportunity for US-EU cooperation 
--------------- 
5.  (C) Solana's third conclusion, Otte said, concerned the 
challenges Abbas faces.  First, he must translate the 
legitimacy of the vote to legitimacy on the street.  To do 
this, Otte said, requires visible improvement in the lives of 
Palestinians between now and the July legislative elections. 
Israel holds the key, he said, and must be encouraged to lift 
the closures, allow freedom of movement and address the 
issues identified by the World Bank.  Abbas, for his part, 
must establish law and order in the PA areas.  If both parts 
of this equation can be met, Otte said, it would allow Abbas 
to relaunch the economy.  This would be the best way to 
undermine support for terrorism. 
6.  (C)  One example illustrates the challenge, Otte said. 
In the roundtable with Palestinian businessmen (some of whom 
had U.S. passports), Solana was told that it takes longer and 
costs more to ship a container from the West Bank to Gaza 
than it does to ship the same container from Berlin to Gaza. 
Otte said that Israeli officials whom Solana subsequently met 
also acknowledged the need to address the issue of movement 
and trade. 
 
7.  (C)  The second challenge for Abbas is to establish a 
more efficient PA government.  The EU has proposed that Abbas 
establish permanent offices for himself as President and for 
the Prime Minister and other key cabinet officers in order to 
organize follow-up and implementation of policy.  Otte 
suggested the U.S. and EU could work together to support this 
requirement. 
 
Solana's message on Terrorism 
------------------- 
8.  (C)  Otte said that Solana, in his meetings with Abbas 
and other PA officials, spoke out strongly on security.  He 
insisted that the PA take action to curb terrorist violence. 
He told Abbas that he could not build a state on a culture of 
violence.  Palestinians face a choice between a civil or 
military path.  Suicide bombings are a mistake, and have not 
been condemned strongly enough.  Otte said Solana also 
reiterated a theme he had previously presented to Arafat: 
that Palestinians must understand the meaning of 9/11 for the 
U.S. and of 3/11 for Europe.  These attacks had fundamentally 
changed Western views on terrorism, and there was zero 
tolerance for terrorist attacks on civilians.  Otte said many 
of Solana's Palestinian interlocutors commented that this 
issue was now on the minds of many in Hamas, and was creating 
tension between those who continued to support suicide 
bombings and those who opposed it on grounds that it undercut 
international support for the Palestinian cause. 
 
Israel: Sharon determined, relaxed 
---- 
9.  According to Otte, Solana thanked Sharon for facilitating 
the January 9 vote.  Sharon was "determined and relaxed" Otte 
said, and told the EU envoy there was "no doubt" that he 
would go ahead with Gaza disengagement, despite the 
difficulties of Supreme Court challenges, cabinet approvals, 
budget deadlines, potential settler violence, and discipline 
problems in the army, many of whose soldiers come from 
settler families.  Otte said Sharon made a strong case for 
why the PA must halt terrorism:  Sharon cannot uproot 
settlers while under terrorist attack.  If, however, the PA 
took action on security (the meeting took place prior to the 
Karni attack), Sharon said he was prepared to coordinate the 
disengagement with the PA, meet with Abbas, resume security 
cooperation, and resume the process leading to Israeli 
withdrawal from PA areas.  Sharon said he looked to the 
international community (read the EU) to take responsibility 
for improving economic conditions in the territories, and 
noted in particular the need for foreign direct investment. 
 
Sharon:  Hizballah, Iran are key concerns 
----------------- 
10.  Otte said Sharon cited Hizballah and Iran as key 
security concerns for Israel.  He was not, Otte said, 
critical of the EU-3 approach to Iran, but asked rhetorically 
"where does engagement get you?"  Otte said Solana responded 
that there were three options:  military action, do nothing, 
or engage.  The EU ruled out the first two, leaving diplomacy 
as the only option.  The EU has no illusions that engagement 
will succeed, Solana reportedly told Sharon, but while 
negotiations continue Iran will have to take steps to prove 
its goodwill.  This will allow enhanced and more intrusive 
inspections.  The alternative would shut out inspections 
completely.  Otte claimed that Solana's Mossad interlocutors 
acknowledged that the EU assessment was "probably right," and 
they expressed interest in a continued exchange with the EU 
on Iran. 
 
EU-Israel: Dialogue Improving 
------------------ 
11.  (C)  Otte said all of Solana's Israeli interlocutors 
stressed the importance they attached to the recently-agreed 
EU-Israel Action Plan under the EU's new European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Initiative (ENPI).  Israeli 
Trade Minister Olmert will travel to Brussels in early 
February to follow up on the Action Plan and to launch a 
strategic dialogue on regional issues. 
 
Egypt:  Enhanced border presence, working on ceasefire 
---------- 
12.  (C)  Otte said Solana sensed renewed Egyptian energy to 
faciliate Gaza disengagement in his meetings with President 
Mubarak and Security advisor Suleiman.  Egypt is waiting for 
the Israelis to come to Cairo to finalize an agreement on 
redeployment of a more robust Egyptian border force.  Egypt 
is casting the effort as a response to a global need to 
improve border control post 9/11, and is also concerned about 
smuggling in the Sinai, not just in Gaza.  Egypt wants to 
combine its enhanced border presence with training of PA 
police in Egypt and a physical Egyptian training presence 
inside Gaza.  Mubarak hinted to Solana that Egypt already has 
a low-key "civilian" security presence in Gaza.  Suleiman 
said he was working on coordinating a ceasefire and hoped to 
have all the pieces come together in March.  Mubarak said 
Sharon must give Abbas "room for maneuver,"  and added that 
he planned to send his FM to Israel soon. 
 
Jordan 
------ 
13.  (C)  Otte said they heard a similar message in Jordan, 
although Abdullah was more preoccupied with events in Iraq 
and was taking a lower profile on Palestinian issues. 
Nevertheless, the King told Solana he was ready to send back 
to the West Bank the "Badr Brigade" that had trained in 
Jordan.  Abdullah also expressed interest in having more 
interaction and dialogue with the Quartet, and said he is 
exploring with other Arab leaders how to appeal directly to 
Israeli public opinion to build support for a negotiated 
settlement. 
 
Arabs: Distracted by Iraq and other issues? 
------------ 
14.  (C) Solana also met with Arab League representatives, 
and Otte said it was striking the extent to which all of 
Solana's Arab interlocutors were distracted by other regional 
issues.  Although Arab League FM's are discussing how to 
re-energize the Saudi's "Beirut Plan" to promote an 
Israeli-Palestinian settlement, Iraq is increasingly 
eclipsing Palestine as the number one Arab issue.  Egypt is 
pushing Sunni parties to participate in the Iraq elections, 
or at least in the subsequent constitution-drafting process. 
The Arab fear, Otte said, is a Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq 
fostered by Iran, and Mubarak spoke of the need "for Iraq to 
remain, at least, a confederation."  Mubarak was concerned 
that assertive Kurdish and Shia populations would leave Iraq 
less of an "Arab country."  Mubarak lamented that the U.S. 
had not listened to him when he warned against disbanding the 
Iraqi military and Ba'ath party structure so quickly. 
 
15.  (C)  The trend, Otte said, is that Arab unity on the big 
issues is breaking up.  In addition to growing concern over 
Iraq, the Arab world is increasingly looking in diverse 
directions, all of which point away from Palestine.  The Gulf 
countries are worried about the challenge and threat posed by 
Iran; the North African countries are increasingly focused on 
improving ties to the EU under the latter's new Neighborhood 
initiative, and; Egypt is looking south toward Africa, with 
one eye on a possible permanent seat on the UNSC.  Middle 
East Peace is becoming "less of a common cause," Otte said, 
noting that this will make it harder to mobilize Arab 
assistance for Palestinian reform and Gaza reconstruction. 
 
Purpose of March London Conference? 
--------------- 
16.  (C)  Otte said the Arabs Solana met were uncertain of 
the purpose of the UK's March 2 London Conference, and were 
concerned it would be used to beat up on the PA for not doing 
enough on security "once again."  Otte, who said he was also 
unclear about the purpose of the London conference, said he 
had discussed this with NEA A/S Burns, who had received some 
clarifications from the UK, and had encouraged the UK to 
contact Arab countries directly to set the record straight. 
 
Otte trip to U.S. early February 
-------------------- 
17.  (SBU)  Otte said he has been invited by Martin Indyk at 
Brookings to participate in a conference in Washington early 
February.  He would be free for meetings with U.S. officials 
all day March 1, and on the margins of the conference March 
2-3.  He said his assistant would pass to USEU further 
details, and he would appreciate help in scheduling meetings 
at State, the NSC (Elliot Abrams), and the Hill (Lieberman, 
Wexler, and Biden).  (USEU has emailed EUR/ERA and NEA/IPA 
with details on the visit.) 
 
Otte Looks Ahead 
------- 
18.  (C)  Solana completed his trip just before the Karni 
terrorist attack, so Otte's readout  reflects only the 
situation prior to that incident.  Otte said Sharon refused 
to be drawn out about his post-Gaza disengagement strategy, 
and kept discussion focused on immediate next steps.  Otte 
opined that Sharon intends to carry out Gaza disengagement 
and then hold elections.  In response to our questions, Otte 
said he was pleased with the level and frequency of U.S.-EU 
communication, and valued greatly his contacts with NEA A/S 
Burns, Amb. Kurtzer and CG Pearce and others involved in the 
peace process.  Looking ahead, he saw potential challenges 
for the U.S. and EU over continued settlement growth and 
expansion in the West Bank.  "It's not just the number of 
apartments in any one settlement; it's the increased network 
of roads and infrastructure that criss-cross the West Bank, 
making creation of an integral Palestinian state almost 
impossible," he said.  The barrier also posed a long-term 
problem, he added, with those settlements located between the 
barrier and the green line continuing to "fill in the gaps" 
and create a de facto new border that will remain even should 
the barrier be removed. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.