US embassy cable - 05ROME178

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, AF, IT, AFGHANISTAN 
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ITALY ON PRT/FSB RECCE TRIP - 
DEPLOYMENT PLANS 
 
REF: A) STATE 2743 B) '04 ROME 3849 C) '04 ROME 2913 
     D) '04 ROME 2122 
 
Classified By: CHARGES D'AFFAIREtions Chief Col. 
Castellano, along with the MFA Coordinator for Afghanistan, 
Anna della Croce, and the NATO Office Director Giovanni 
Brauzzi, on Italian PRT/FSB plans for Herat. The Joint 
Operation Headquarters representatives provided a classified 
power-point presentation (faxed to the Italy Desk) of their 
December reconnaissance (recce) mission to Afghanistan, in 
which della Croce also participated. 
 
3. (C) For initial logistics the Italians want to bring 
material to Herat via the Mashhad airfield in Iran, a 
one-time event that would save them considerable amounts of 
money and time, since Mashhad is only 250 km from Herat. 
They said they had discussed the proposal recently at SHAPE 
(General Jones reportedly said he saw no problem from a 
military point of view) and with Amb. Burns and are waiting 
for a "political" green light to go forward.  (Note:  they 
cautioned that if they cannot use Mashhad they may be forced 
to seek US help with C-17 lift). 
 
4. (C) The presentation also noted poor infrastructure for 
the FSB, including a control tower with limited capabilities, 
scarce water and power supply, an acceptable runway with many 
repairs required at the strip's edge, pads, and taxiways, 
radio assistance and fire fighting service, scarce streets, 
sewerage, etc., and the presence of UXOs (landmines) within 
the airfield area.  They foresee a transitional phase from 
now until Stage 2 starts with Italy folding its PRT 
contributions and first FSB contributions under RC 
West/CFC-A/CENTCOM but transitioning once Stage 2 comes under 
COM ISAF/JFC-B/SACEUR control. 
 
Don't Hold us Hostage to Other Events 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Italians were concerned about possible delays to 
their deployment due to USG insistence that Stage 2 could not 
begin before all requirements are met.  They were also 
unclear on whether SACEUR would declare Stage 2 when there 
was initial operating capability or when all the requirements 
were in place and expressed a strong preference for the 
former.  They emphasized that Italy is an actor in the NATO 
(ISAF) show in Afghanistan and that their timetables were not 
an Italian national goal, but were based on NATO's request 
for movement on Stage 2 PRT and FSB prior to the upcoming 
parliamentary elections (which could be held between April 
and June).  They argued that their timetable is realistic if 
commitments are made at the January 20 Force Generation 
Conference at SHAPE. 
 
6. (C) Brauzzi argued that it would be unfair to hold Italy, 
which was providing the bulk of Stage 2 offers, "hostage" to 
other allies' failure to step forward with contributions, a 
precedent that could dissuade others from taking on lead 
nation roles in Stages 3 and 4. Italy is delivering what it 
had promised, the Italians emphasized, and did not want to be 
trapped into a situation with the PRT and FSB beyond their 
control.  They argued that getting Stage 2 elements deployed 
and operational could have a snowball effect in generating 
more countries' participation. 
 
7. (C) The Italians said that in trying to stick to the 
timetable, they don't want the US to feel like they are 
trying to push us out of our PRT, or for the Afghans to feel 
like the FSB is pushing them out of the airfield in Herat. 
Citing Amb. Burns' recent letter to the Italian NATO PermRep, 
the Italians noted that they had always heard the US talk 
about PRT and FSB as two faces of the same coin, but now that 
seemed to be changing. They also worried about political 
fallout if the Italian timetable gets pushed back and Italy 
is blamed for dragging its feet.  In addition, they worried 
that delay could cause the perception of a gap between OEF 
and ISAF that would harm us all. 
 
Italians Ready to Roll 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Italy's tentative deployment schedule has a seven 
person planning team departing Italy January 19 for another 
reconnaissance mission (these personnel will not/not stay on 
as part of PRT or FSB).  For the PRT, they envision 40 people 
plus vehicles to arrive on February 3, another 23 people plus 
vehicles February 15, another 25 people on February 22, 
another 25 people plus vehicle on March 2, and a final 10 
people on March 10, with a target of having the full Italian 
PRT complement in place by March 31.  For FSB, they envision 
moving 10 people plus vehicles on April 1, 35 people plus 
vehicles on May 1, 44 people plus vehicles on May 6, 66 
people plus vehicles on May 11, 66 people plus vehicles on 
May 16, 10 people plus vehicles on May 22, with the FSB 
complement complete by May 31.  Italy plans on bringing 
120-140 people to the PRT and 190-210 to the FSB and hopes 
both will be approximately 70 percent Italian and 30 percent 
multinational. 
 
9. (C) The Italians said they had discussed deployment plans 
and logistics concepts with SHAPE/ISAF and would decide on 
communications infrastructure and its integration with ISAF 
based on the January 19 planning team findings (the team 
should leave Italy January 19 and arrive in theater January 
21).  The planning team will also assess the composition for 
each deployment and identify which forces will support FSB 
and which the PRT.  The planning team will seek to maximize 
use of local resources/contractors and will look to the US 
for suggestions in this regard. 
 
Key Enablers: Italy Will Provide Helicopters from June 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
10. (C)  The Italians will provide four to six AB212 
helicopters, including maintenance and support assets, but 
they will not be available until June - and may be delayed 
depending on time needed for upgrades.  Until these 
helicopters arrive in theater, they would need the US to 
provide helo support for medevac and Quick Reaction Forces 
(QRF).  On QRF, they said that if no one else offers, Italy 
could provide forces for QRF.  The Italians said they hope 
Spain can provide Role 2 Medical support, though they had 
heard from SHAPE the day before that the US would provide 
some medical assets (NFI). Finally, Italy plans to send a 
small civilian component to the PRT and wanted to know if 
there was/when there would be room for them. 
 
Points of Contact 
----------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The Italians gave the following POCs for CFC-A, at 
the admiral and colonel levels: Italian Joint Operations 
Command Chief of Staff Admiral Maurizio Gemignani, tel. 
39-06-4691-9080, cell 39-335-104-1950, fax 39-06-4691-9175 
and Chief of Plans COL SM Rosario Castellano, tel. 
39-06-4691-9062, fax 39-06-4691-9245.  They were eager to get 
a CFC-A POC. 
 
12. (C) Comment.  Brauzzi followed up the meeting with two 
phone calls stressing that Italy is very concerned about what 
it sees as uncertainties and ambiguities in the US position. 
The Italians have painful memories of completing detailed 
planning for two different PRTs in 2004 and in both cases 
having to stand down in response to last-minute US changes of 
directions.  Now, faced with perceived changing signals from 
the US, the Italians fear a repeat of last year's 
difficulties, just as they are getting ready to begin their 
 
 
deployments.  Brauzzi stressed that Italy hopes that, prior 
to the January 25 visit of Special Coordinator for 
Afghanistan Ambassador Maureen Quinn, the USG will provide 
Italy assurance that 1) the US intends to move forward with 
the OEF-ISAF transition; 2) we still welcome Italy's plan to 
deploy a PRT and FSB before the parliamentary elections; and 
3) the US will help provide some of the necessary resources. 
End comment. 
 
 
(U) Minimize Considered. 
 
 
SKODON 
 
 
SVC FOR PARA NUMBERING..... 
NNNN 
 
 
2005ROME00178 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL