US embassy cable - 05ANKARA352

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2030 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: MFA RAISES TURKEY-US RELATIONS AND KIRKUK 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  MFA Undersecretary Tuygan told the 
Ambassador January 18 that the only significant problem in 
Turkey-US relations was Iraq.  He identified three specific 
issues regarding Iraq -- a feeling that Turkey's 
contributions (especially in encouraging election 
participation) are not appreciated; the lack of any measures 
against the PKK/Kongra Gel in Iraq; and, a perception that 
the US is ignoring Turkish warnings about developments in 
Kirkuk.  The Ambassador agreed that the USG and GOT had some 
tactical differences in Iraq despite agreement on overall 
objectives.  He refuted Tuygan's assertions that Turkey was 
ignored (on Kirkuk) or unappreciated (for its contribution). 
He also explained how even non-military action against the 
PKK/Kongra Gel would necessitate some security force 
participation and that was not possible for the time being. 
He assured Tuygan that the recent high-level engagement we 
have had with Turkey on Iraq and other issues would continue, 
pointing to the expected visit of USDP Feith at the end of 
the month.  The two agreed that better public diplomacy by 
both sides was important to expanding cooperation.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Iraq's Weight on US-Turkey Relations 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) MFA Undersecretary Ali Tuygan invited the Ambassador 
to his office January 18.  Tuygan was joined by Iraq 
Coordinator Ambassador Osman Koruturk and Iraq Department 
Head Avni Botsali.  Although the meeting was billed as to 
discuss Iraq, Tuygan explained that its origin had been an 
internal MFA meeting the previous week to explore ways to 
improve Turkey-US relations.  Quickly, he said, the 
conversation turned to Iraq.  Tuygan worried that frequent 
statements that the US and Turkey share the same objectives 
in Iraq were simply papering over a bigger problem.  We have 
no significant problems elsewhere; all our problems lie to 
the south.  The Ambassador responded that he believed Turkey 
and the US really did have the same goal of a united, 
democratic Iraq that was not a haven for terrorists of any 
kind.  While there were non-official voices in the US calling 
for a different outcome, the USG's goals were clear.  That 
said, there were tactical differences between Ankara and 
Washington over how to reach the objective.  There was also a 
widespread understanding within the USG that negative public 
opinion in Turkey about our operations in Iraq weighed on the 
relationship.  This made dialogue important, even if we did 
not agree on everything.  The flow of high-level visitors to 
Ankara was not going to end soon, he added, pointing to USDP 
Doug Feith's expected visit here Jan. 31 to Feb. 1. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Turkey's Contribution Not Appreciated 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Tuygan identified three particular problems regarding 
Iraq.  First, there was a sense in Ankara that Turkey's 
contribution to the political process was not appreciated. 
Turkey had been cooperating in substantial ways and intends 
to continue to do so.  When new issues arose, the GOT tried 
to look at them in a positive light.  He pointed to a 
"transformation of our (Turkey's) policy and attitude" over 
the past few months.  Other neighbors (read: Iran) were "in 
the field" and trying to influence events, but Turkey felt 
"isolated," trying to contribute to the political process 
rather than thwart it.  For example, the GOT was publicly 
encouraging all groups to participate in elections, and had 
been focusing privately on Sunnis. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador responded that the USG does appreciate 
Turkey's contributions to success in Iraq, as both Deputy 
Secretary Armitage and CENTCOM Commander GEN Abizaid made 
 
SIPDIS 
clear in their recent visits.  He allowed that the lack of a 
military contribution to the coalition might impact on 
Turkey's visibility on developments on the ground.  To help, 
the Ambassador said, he understood that Task Force Olympia 
(TFO) Commander BG Ham had offered to allow the Turks to 
increase the number of liaison officers it has with his 
command in Mosul and subordinate commands elsewhere in TFO's 
AOR.  On Turkey's efforts to widen participation in the Iraqi 
election, he expressed appreciation and encouraged them to 
continue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
No Non-Military Action Against PKK/Kongra Gel 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Another issue on the bilateral agenda was the 
PKK/Kongra Gel presence in Iraq, Tuygan continued.  The 
trilateral talks Jan. 11 had not produced much.  At the same 
time, GEN Abizaid called for increased use of Incirlik, 
putting Foreign Minister Gul "in a difficult spot."  While 
Turkey understood the US's "lack of desire or ability" to 
take military action against these terrorists, there was no 
indication that non-military measures would be taken either. 
In a meeting he had with Iraqi MFA Undersecretary Bayati, 
Tuygan had raised the issue of PKK/Kongra Gel front parties 
registering for the Iraqi elections.  Bayati offered to take 
this issue up after the elections if Turkey presented 
evidence that the parties were fronts.  Tuygan found his 
response hard to understand, exclaiming, "We are not talking 
about a political process like Sweden's." 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador reminded Tuygan that we have no 
significant forces north of the green line and, given the 
security situation elsewhere, none to spare to deploy there. 
Moreover, even many of the "non-military" actions, such as 
closing front offices, require some commitment of security 
forces to ensure compliance.  There are no spare forces to do 
this at the moment.  The fact is, many in Turkey (especially 
the media) over-estimate US capabilities.  Regarding the 
front parties participating in the elections, the Ambassador 
continued, we, like Turkey, had raised the issue with the 
Iraq election commission (IECI), but they are supposed to be 
an independent body.  If we were to impose our will, it could 
undermine everything we are trying to do to build an 
independent Iraq. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Turkey's Biggest Concern:  Kirkuk 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) A third issue, but the one with the greatest potential 
to blow up, Tuygan said, was Kirkuk.  According to the former 
election commissioner in Kirkuk, the Kurds secured an 
extension of registration in exchange for agreeing to 
participate in elections there.  The GOT would like to issue 
a positive statement on January 31 about the elections, but 
with Arabs and Turkmen talking of boycotts, Tuygan wasn't 
sure whether this would be possible.  If the trends continue, 
the Kurds will produce a "distorted outcome."  FM Gul shares 
this concern and had asked Tuygan to convey it to the 
Ambassador, he said. 
 
8. (C) Turning to local elections, Tuygan recalled 
negotiations in Kirkuk to distribute the seats on the city 
council equally among the Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, with a 
lesser number reserved for Christians.  The original proposal 
of 13/13/13/2 respectively was later modified to 12/12/12/5. 
All parties agreed except Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP).  Because of the extended 
registration, Barzani believed Kurds could win up to half of 
the council seats, so the KDP reportedly backed out of the 
deal.  The GOT, however, believed the 13/13/13/2 idea had 
merit: it would demonstrate the multiethnic nature of the 
city and would bode well as the constitution drafters 
considered Kirkuk's special status.  It also would help 
prevent sparking ethnic strife in the city.  Koruturk added 
that the Arabs in Kirkuk shared this concern as well. 
 
9. (C) The Ambassador said that he was not aware of the state 
of play on negotiation of electoral alliances or lists for 
the Kirkuk city council.  But on the larger issue, Turkish 
sensitivities about Kirkuk were well understood within the 
USG.  Moreover, we shared many of the same concerns about the 
potential for ethnic conflict.  Kirkuk was subject to complex 
social engineering by Saddam's regime, and the victims of 
this -- all of them, including the Arabs resettled from the 
south and the Turkmen forced out like the Kurds -- needed to 
be treated fairly in a legal and transparent manner. 
Regarding the extended registration in Kirkuk, it should be 
seen in the context of other extraordinary measures the IECI 
was taking to ensure the widest possible participation in 
Iraq's election throughout the country; this was not 
something unique to Kirkuk. 
 
----------------------------- 
Doing Better Public Diplomacy 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Returning to his opening theme, Tuygan said that 
despite the US and Turkey sharing objectives in Iraq, 
developments on the ground were "a problem."  Kirkuk would be 
a "test case" for Turkey and the region, he asserted.  Given 
the problem with public opinion in Turkey on Iraq, finding 
ways to expand Turkey's cooperation will be difficult if the 
situation in Iraq is viewed as "going nowhere."  While the US 
may not have as much control over events in Iraq as people in 
Turkey believed, the situation should not get out of control, 
he concluded.  The Ambassador agreed that negative public 
opinion made cooperation more difficult and that the US 
needed to do a better job at public diplomacy.   "So do we," 
Tuygan quickly added.  The Ambassador undertook to continue 
passing releasable information to MFA and TGS so officials 
could make well informed statements on developments. 
 
11. (C) Tuygan concluded by saying that he would tell the MFA 
spokesman to portray this meeting as a review of relations 
after the new year. 
 
12. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN